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Until a few years ago, talking about information security was a sure way to dis-tinguish between Information and Communication Technology (ICT) andbusiness people. ICT people started to ask questions about bits and bytes, key
lengths and signature updates. Business people left the room. Since then the situation
has changed dramatically: new regulations and significant security and privacy inci-
dents have pushed the security topic into the board room.
From a business perspective, security is all about managing risk. An ICT system pro-
vides the right level of security if it keeps the risk for the business at an acceptable
level. What counts for this risk are potential losses due to malicious acts by disgrun-
tled employees, criminal hackers or terrorists. Whether a risk is acceptable or not is a
business decision. How to describe this level and how to demonstrate that an ICT sys-
tem meets that level is one of the fundamental challenges in Computer Science.
While security is getting board room attention, actually securing ICT systems is be-
coming more difficult than ever: The dependencies between enterprises are rapidly
growing: Thanks to the increasing specialization in industry, more and more enter-
prises need to cooperate to provide a specific service. Moreover, these dependencies
are becoming much more dynamic in time. Today most business relations are still
based on paper contracts, but the trend clearly goes towards dynamically negotiated
and electronically confirmed contracts. As a result, the security boundaries between enterprises are
quickly becoming less and less strict. Back-end servers that were formerly carefully protected
through multiple protection layers are now directly exposed to the outside, as they offer their ser-
vices to many enterprises. Applications that used to run on dedicated servers now run on a virtual,
shared infrastructure, using physical resources that might be spread all over the world.
But the cause for this amplification of security problems – the trend towards On Demand business –
also creates new opportunities to solve these security problems:
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is the concept that supports the dynamic integration of enterprises
into larger, virtual enterprises, based on standardized Web services. This well-defined construction
principle allows embedding security and privacy in the fabric of the new infrastructure. Security and
privacy play a prime role in forming virtual enterprises – an enterprise can manage its risk only if it
knows what risk it takes by interacting with another enterprise, what trust it has to invest in its partners,
and how that trust is established and justified. Therefore these risk and trust requirements and guaran-
tees must be negotiated as part of the service-level agreements and the partners must provide service-
oriented assurances to one another on which they can base their own risk management.
Virtualization and trusted platforms: Providing services in a cost-efficient and manageable way re-
quires the sharing of technical resources whenever possible. This observation resulted in an aston-
ishing renaissance of virtualization technology. Logical partitions and strong isolation are well-
known mainframe security concepts – now they are becoming available on essentially all platforms.
Similarly, rooting the security of a platform in a piece of trusted and secure hardware is becoming
main stream, thanks to the effort of the Trusted Computing Group. Together these concepts offer the
chance to build up distributed computing platforms in a secure way from scratch. In theory this is
nothing spectacular, considering that most concepts have been known for decades, but practically
this is the first time that there is broad agreement in industry to make this happen.
Business-oriented compliance and risk management: The last part is linking ICT and business. In
the same way ICT people are used to express their security requirements in a security policy, busi-
ness people need to express what they require from their systems in a formalized compliance policy
and in the same way business people are used to being informed about their stock price falling or
climbing they need to be informed as to whether their security risk level is falling or climbing. Many
aspects of this linking are still a matter of research.
'On Demand' amplifies many of today's security and privacy problems, but it also offers the unique
chance to build in security and privacy from the beginning, and to make security and privacy first
class citizens of the new ICT infrastructure.
Michael Waidner
Michael Waidner, 
Head of the IBM
Privacy Research
Institute, IBM
Research Division,
Zurich Research Lab
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STM 2005 — First ERCIM
Workshop on Security 
and Trust Management 
by Sjouke Mauw
The ERCIM Working Group ‘Security and Trust Management’
(STM) organized a successful workshop in Milan, Italy on 15
September 2005. The initiative for this workshop was taken
at the founding meeting of the STM Working Group in
January 2005 in order to fulfil some of the group’s goals; in
particular to bring researchers together and stimulate
scientific discussion.
Changes in Irish ERCIM
Membership
The Irish Universities Association (IUA) signed the scientific
agreement with ERCIM becoming the official Irish ERCIM
member.
The 55th meeting of the ERCIM Executive Committee took
place at Dublin City University (DCU) on 23 September 2005.
In conjunction with the meeting, a signing ceremony was
necessary as the official Irish ERCIM membership was moved
from Trinity College Dublin to IUA and Dublin City
University took over the administrative and financial affairs for
IUA. Prof. Ferdinand von Prondzynski, president of Dublin
City University (for Irish Universities Association) and Eckart
Bierdümpel, Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (for ERCIM) completed
the signing process.
The Irish Universities Association represents the seven Irish
universities in ERCIM: 
• Dublin City University
• Univeristy College Dublin
• Trinity College Dublin
• University of Limerick
• National University of Ireland Cork
• National University of Ireland Galway
• National University of Ireland Maynooth.
Link: 
http://ercim.computing.dcu.ie/
Please contact: 
Mark Roantree, Dublin City University, Ireland
E-mail: Mark.Roantree@computing.dcu.ie
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Left to right: Eugene Kennedy (vice president for research at
DCU), Heather Ruskin (DCU and ERCIM board of Directors),
Eckart Bierduempel (ERCIM Executive Committee Chair), Mark
Roantree (DCU and ERCIM Executive Committee vice-chair), and
Ferdinand von Prondzynski (DCU President and IUA President).
The organization of the workshop, co-located with ES-
ORICS’05, was in the hands of Fabio Martinelli, Pierangela
Samarati (general co-chairs), Valerie Issarny, Sjouke Mauw
(Programme Committee co-chairs) and Cas Cremers (vice-
chair). Due to the high number of submissions (36) the pro-
gramme committee selected nine papers of high quality, which
were presented at the workshop and will appear in a special
issue of ENTCS.
The workshop had a broad scope, ranging from cryptography
and formal methods to physical security. The link between the
major topics, security and trust, was made by keynote speaker
Prof. Dieter Gollmann, who challenged the audience with his
presentation entitled ‘Why Trust is Bad for Security’. He argued
that the notion of trust has many different (often conflicting) in-
terpretations, and there is a need for clarity and precision.
The first session of the workshop covered smart-dust security, a
formal approach to multiparty contract signing and the devel-
opment of security models for mobile agent security. In the sec-
ond session, the notions of credit and responsibility were for-
malized, a new scheme for trapdoor hash functions was pre-
sented, and access-control mechanisms based on trust were
studied. The third and final session was completely dedicated
to trust management. It covered the extension of role-based
trust management languages with non-monotonicity, assigning
trust values to metadata, and a new authorization strategy for
distributed environments.
Given the success of this first STM workshop and the interest it
generated, we believe that this will be the first of a series of suc-
cessful workshops.
Links: 
http://www-rocq.inria.fr/arles/events/STM2005/
http://www.iit.cnr.it/STM-WG/
Please contact: 
Sjouke Mauw, Eindhoven University of Technology and Centre for
Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
E-mail: sjouke@win.tue.nl
Fabio Martinelli, IIT-CNR, Italy
E-mail: Fabio.Martinelli@iit.cnr.it
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JOINT ERCIM ACTIONS
ERCIM-Sponsored Events
ERCIM sponsors up to ten conferences, workshops and summer schools per year. The funding for all types of events
is in the order of 2000 Euro.
Conferences
ERCIM invites sponsorship proposals from established conferences
with an international reputation, where substantive overlap can be
shown between the conference topic and ERCIM areas of activity.
Typical cases would include annual conferences in computer
science with international programme committees, substantial
international participation, and proceedings published with an
established international science publisher.
Workshops and Summer Schools
ERCIM sponsors workshops or summer schools (co-) organised by
an ERCIM institute. The additional funding provided by ERCIM
should be used to enhance the workshop by, for example,
increasing the number of external speakers supported.
Next Deadlines for Applications: 
• Conferences: 15 January 2006 for conferences later than 15
September 2006 
• Workshops and summer schools: 15 January 2006 for workshops
and schools later than 15 April 2005
Events sponsored by ERCIM in 2005:
• IEEE Virtual Reality 2005, 
Bonn, Germany, 12-16 March 2005
• CASSIS’05 - Construction and Analysis of Safe, Secure and
Interoperable Smart devices, Sophia-Antipolis, France, 7-11
March 2005
• ECIR-05 - 27th BCS European Annual Conference on
Information Retrieval, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, March 21-
23, 2005
• IEEE 6th International Workshop on Policies for Distributed
Systems and Networks, 
Stockholm, 6-8 June 2005
• CAiSE 2005 — 17th Conference on Advanced Information
Systems Engineering, Porto, Portugal, 15-17 June 2005
• IJCAI-05 - 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, Edinburgh, Scotland, 30 July - 5 August 2005
• INTERACT 2005, Rome, 12-16 September 2005
• ECDL 2005 - 9th European Conference on Research and
Advanced Technology for Digital Libraries
Vienna, Austria, 18-23 September 2005
For detailed information, see: 
http://www.ercim.org/activity/sponsored.html
Milan Vojnović, originally from Croatia
completed his PhD at Ecole Polytech-
nique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) in
Switzerland and has subsequently
worked as an Associate Researcher in
the Systems and Networking Group at
Microsoft Research in Cambridge.
Milan’s work in the area of network
modelling impressed the judges with
contributions to several topics including
congestion control, mobility modelling,
queuing performance and filecasting.
For a young researcher to work on sev-
eral topics, come up with novel ideas in
each of them, some of which are seen to
be valuable contributions convinced the
judges of his merit for the award. The
work is a clear example of what ERCIM
strives to advance in that it is both theo-
retical in itself, but motivated by practi-
cal problems whose solution will have a
significant impact. For example, his
work on mobility modelling and simula-
tion uses stochastic modelling based on
fundamental probability theory, yet has
shown that many
simulations com-
monly used in
industry are
flawed, with
potentially seri-
ous implications
for the results
built on them. He
has proposed
alternative models
that can be simulated justifiably, and
released code that can be used by practi-
tioners.
The Cor Baayen award is not the first
that Milan has received, since he has
previously been given an award during
his undergraduate studies at the Uni-
versity of Split, a best fellowship
award during his graduate studies at
EPFL, the ITC-17 best student paper
award in 2001, and most recently, the
IEEE INFOCOM 2005 best paper
award and the ACM SIGMETRICS
2005 best paper award.
2005 Cor Baayen Award Winner
Milan Vojnović from Cambridge, UK has been awarded the 2005 Cor Baayen Award
for the most promising young researcher in computer science and applied
mathematics by ERCIM.
About the Cor Baayen Award
The Cor Baayen Award, awarded to a
most promising young researcher in com-
puter science and applied mathematics,
was created in 1995 to honour the first
ERCIM President, and is open to any
young researcher having completed their
PhD thesis in one of the ‘ERCIM coun-
tries’: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
The award consists of a cheque for 5000
Euro together with an award certificate. 
Submitting a Nomination
Nominations should be made by a staff
member of the university or research insti-
tute where the nominee is undertaking
research. Self nominations are not
accepted. Nominations must be submitted
with an online form, which will be made
available when the next Call is launched.
Alternatively contact the ERCIM
Executive Committee member (the
national contact point) for the country in
which the nominee is undertaking
research. 
Further information can be obtained from
the national contact or from the Cor Baayen
Award coordinator Laszlo Monostori,
SZTAKI, (laszlo.monostori@ercim.org).
http://www.ercim.org/activity/cor-baayen.html
Upgrades of W3C Quality Tools 
W3C Markup Validator
Also known as the ‘HTML validator’, the newest version of
the W3C markup validation service includes usability en-
hancements, improved feedback, support for installation on
Windows, and better support for both W3C and non-W3C
document types. This popular free service can dramatically
help improving and ensuring the quality of Web sites, there-
fore saving time and money. The Markup validator is an open
source/free software, available for download and installation
on a variety of systems and platforms.
CSS Validator
The CSS Validation Service has also been updated. Changes
include a stable SOAP access and output to the CSS validator,
the addition of a profile for the CSS 2.1 specification, and a
large number of bug fixes. 
Log Validator
A new upgrade of the log validator was released earlier this
month. The Log Validator makes it easy to manage the quality
of even large Web Sites, step by step, by finding the most popu-
lar documents failing Markup or CSS validation, or with bro-
ken links. 
Links: 
W3C Markup Validator: http://validator.w3.org
W3C CSS Validator: http://jigsaw.w3.org/css-validator/
W3C Log Validator: http://www.w3.org/QA/Tools/LogValidator/ 
News from W3C
Office in India
The Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-
DAC), is organizing an international conference/workshop on
10-11 November 2005 in New Delhi, coinciding with the
launch of the W3C Office in India. Topics such as
Internationalization, Mobile Web, Semantic Web, SVG, Voice
XML and Multimodal Interaction will be presented by both
W3C experts and Indian researchers and industrials. 
The objective of the event is to create awareness about the fu-
ture developments in Web technologies amongst the Indian IT
developer’s community, researchers and institutions to
leapfrog to software products and services based on interna-
tional standards. The W3C Office in India is the fifteenth W3C
Office in the world, and its launch follows the recent introduc-
tion of W3C’s new fee structure for organizations in develop-
ing countries.
Links:
W3C India Office: http://www.w3cindia.in/ 
Launch event: http://www.w3cindia.in/programme.htm 
W3C Offices: http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Offices/ 
‘Web Foundations 2005’
Highlights Web Design for All
International experts on accessibility, usability and Web
Standards will meet in Spain for the first time at the Web
Foundations 2005 Conference, to be held 22-24 November in
Gijón, Oviedo, Spain. This conference is the first major event
supported by the regional government’s ‘e-Asturias 2007
Plan’, as a strategy for the Information Society development.
Organized by the Fundación CTIC and the W3C Spanish
Office, this event, open to the public, focuses on conditions to
ensure universal access to information regardless of hardware,
software, network infrastructure, language, culture, and user
capabilities. 
The speakers — Shawn Henry (W3C), Jakob Nielsen
(NNGroup), Steven Pemberton (W3C), Inmaculada Placencia
(European Commission), John Slatin (University of Texas),
and Jeffrey Zeldman (Happy Cog) — will discuss ‘Design for
All’ as an essential requirement for equitable Internet access.
Steven Pemberton also gives an XForms and XHTML tutorial
on 24 November in Oviedo.
Link:
Web Foundations 2005: http://www.fundamentosweb.org/
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W3C Workshop 
on Internationalizing the Speech
Synthesis Markup Language 
W3C is organizing a workshop on internationalizing the speech
synthesis markup language (SSML) 2-3 November 2005 in
Beijing, China. The main objective of this workshop is to iden-
tify and prioritize extensions and additions to SSML that will
improve its use for rendering non-English languages. 
Widely used, SSML is designed to provide a rich, XML-based
markup language for assisting the generation of synthetic
speech in Web and other applications. The essential role of the
markup language is to provide authors of synthesizable content
with a standard way to control aspects of speech such as pro-
nunciation, volume, pitch, or rate across different synthesis-ca-
pable platforms.
To make SSML more useful in current and emerging markets,
W3C’s Voice Browser Working Group is considering enhance-
ments for non-English languages. Suggestions relevant for
multiple languages are most welcome, as the scope of the
workshop is not limited to Asian languages.
Link: 
Workshop agenda: 
http://www.w3.org/2005/08/SSML/ssml-workshop-agenda 
Latest W3C Recommendations
• xml:id Version 1.0
9 September 2005, Jonathan Marsh, Daniel Veillard,
Norman Walsh 
• QA Framework: Specification Guidelines 
17 August 2005, Karl Dubost, Lynne Rosenthal, Dominique
Hazaël-Massieux, Lofton Henderson
A complete list of all W3C Technical Reports: 
http://www.w3.org/TR/
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The Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) Education and
Outreach Working Group (EOWG) has published ‘Developing
a Web Accessibility Business Case for Your Organization.’
This document is designed to help organizations develop their
own customized business case for Web accessibility. It pro-
vides text that can be used as is, as well as guidance on identify-
ing the most relevant factors for a specific organization. The 5-
page resource suite describes social, technical, financial, legal
and policy aspects of Web accessibility: 
• Social Factors addresses the role of Web accessibility in
equal opportunity for people with disabilities; the overlap
with digital divide issues; and benefits to people without dis-
abilities, including older people, people with low literacy and
people not fluent in the language, people with low bandwidth
connections to the Internet and older technologies, and new
and infrequent Web users.
• Technical Factors addresses interoperability, quality, reduc-
ing site development and maintenance time, reducing server
load, enabling content on different configurations, and being
prepared for advanced Web technologies.
• Financial Factors addresses financial benefits from increased
Web site use and direct cost savings.
• Legal and Policy Factors addresses requirements for Web ac-
cessibility from governments and other organizations.
Business cases are sometimes accompanied by an implementa-
tion plan describing the steps involved in making an organiza-
tion’s Web site accessible. A separate WAI resource suite,
Implementation Plan for Web Accessibility, provides informa-
tion on initial assessment, developing organizational policies,
training, selecting authoring tools, and conformance evaluation.
It is essential that the Web be accessible in order to provide
equal access and equal opportunity to people with disabilities.
An accessible Web also benefits others, including older people
with changing abilities due to aging.
Links: 
Web Accessibility Business Case Documents: 
http://www.w3.org/WAI/bcase/
Implementation Plan for Web Accessibility: 
http://www.w3.org/WAI/impl/
W3C’s Specification Guidelines
to Create Better Specifications
The W3C’s Quality Assurance (QA) Working Group con-
cluded its work in August 2005 with the completion of the
Specification Guidelines W3C Recommendation, a document
which provides clear instruction to writers and editors on creat-
ing implementable technical specifications. By identifying both
requirements and ‘good practices,’ the Specification
Guidelines help both W3C and other specification authors cre-
ate and describe technologies in ways that make it easier for de-
velopers to implement them as intended.
W3C launched the Quality Assurance (QA) Activity in 2001
with the goal of improving W3C specifications by offering
guidelines to W3C groups. Since that time, the QA Working
Group produced six useful documents such as the QA
Framework Primer, the QA Test FAQ, the Variability in
Specifications Working Draft, and the QA Handbook. One of the
group’s more famous and useful documents is the W3C Quality
Assurance Matrix, a list of over 100 W3C specifications, with
links to conformance clauses, test suites and validators.
Links: 
Quality Assurance at W3C: http://www.w3.org/QA/
Matrix of W3C specifications: http://www.w3.org/QA/TheMatrix
Quality Assurance at W3C: http://www.w3.org/QA/
QA Framework: http://www.w3.org/TR/qaframe-spec/
QA Primer: http://www.w3.org/QA/WG/qaframe-primer
Matrix of W3C specifications: http://www.w3.org/QA/TheMatrix
Mobile Industry
Promotes W3C’s
Mobile Web Initiative
W3C will hold a Mobile Web Initiative (MWI) event at the
British Academy of Film and Television Arts in London, UK
on 15 November 2005. Mobile access to the Web has been a
second class experience for far too long. MWI sponsors aim at
promoting  Web access from a mobile device to become as sim-
ple, easy, and convenient as Web access from a desktop device.
The MWI sponsors are key players in the mobile production
chain, including authoring tool vendors, content providers, hand-
set manufacturers, browser vendors and mobile operators:
Afilias, Argogroup, Bango.net, Drutt Corporation, Ericsson,
France Telecom, HP, Jataayu Software, mTLD Top Level
Domain Limited, MobileAware, Nokia, NTT DoCoMo, Opera
Software, TIM Italia, RuleSpace, Segala M Test, Sevenval,
Vodafone, Volantis.
Link: 
W3C’s Mobile Web Initiative: http://www.w3.org/Mobile
Web Accessibility Business Case
Documents Published 
by Fabio Martinelli 
and Jean-Jacques Quisquater
Modern society is increasingly reliant on
the storage, processing and transmission
of information. Ensuring the integrity,
security and privacy of information is
thus paramount, regardless of whether
the information is at the level of the citi-
zen or at a national or international level.
Moreover, future trends (as outlined in
the ISTAG report, for example) in the
so-called Ambient Intelligent Space
(AmI) will only increase the role of in-
formation and our reliance on it. This
brings with it great opportunities to en-
hance our quality of life, but at the same
time, presents major challenges in terms
of the privacy and integrity of personal
information.
There is a common understanding that
achieving greater security in information
and communications technology (ICT)
would increase its development and dif-
fusion, with concomitant benefits in
many fields. While this technology is al-
ready spreading rapidly, it will only be
possible to translate our physical interac-
tions into electronic interactions if suffi-
cient trust and confidence exist in the
systems that process our in-
formation.
The integrity,
security and privacy of
information and communication are
thus paramount, in everything from per-
sonal information transfer to government
and critical infrastructures.  It is now
widely agreed that lack of trust in sys-
tems will prevent their widespread adop-
tion. As a consequence, the development
and deployment of systems with strong
effective security is vital. 
In addition, modern ICT systems may
consist of several (even thousands or
more) computation and communication
resources whose number dynamically
changes and thus are getting closer to so-
called virtual communities. In this new
framework, the capability to represent,
create, negotiate, monitor and evolve
trust relationships in a secure way be-
comes mandatory.
ERCIM has recently established a WG
on security and trust management to fos-
ter the research on these issues.  
This special issue contains 29 articles on
a variety of research topics within the
area of security and trust management,
authored by ERCIM members and other
European research groups. Jacques Bus,
head of the ‘ICT for Trust and Security’
unit within the Directorate-General of
Information Society and Media, kindly
agreed to provide a contri-
bution on the
strategic
challenge that
trust and security in the in-
formation society represents to European
research. We also invited two contribu-
tions from well-known experts in the
USA and Australia, to provide us with a
rundown of the research being per-
formed in these countries.
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Containment Infrastructure 
by Kostas G. Anagnostakis and Evangelos
Markatos, ICS-FORTH, Greece
17 iWATCH: Intelligent Watch 
Based on Networked Smart Sensors
and Autonomous Mobile Vehicles 
by Haris Baltzakis, Angelos Bilas and
Panos Trahanias , ICS-FORTH, Greece
18 Securing JAFAR – An Architectural
Framework for E-Commerce
Applications 
by Nicolas Guelfi, Cédric Pruski, Jan
Reimen and Paul Sterges, University of
Luxembourg
19 Distributed Reputation Systems for
Internet-based Peer-to-Peer Systems
and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
by Jochen Mundinger, University of
Cambridge, UK, Sonja Buchegger, UC
Berkeley, USA, and Jean-Yves Le
Boudec, EPFL, Switzerland
21 Secure Wireless Ad-Hoc Networking 
by Ioannis G. Askoxylakis, Diomedes D.
Kastanis and Apostolos P. Traganitis, ICS-
FORTH, Greece
22 Decentralized Identity 
for the Digital Business Ecosystem 
by Jean-Marc Seigneur, 
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
23 Towards Privacy-Aware Identity
Management 
by Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani
di Vimercati and Pierangela Samarati,
Universita’ degli Studi di Milano, Italy
24 CareGrid: Autonomous Trust Domains
for Healthcare Applications 
by Naranker Dulay, Emil Lupu, Morris
Sloman, Jean Bacon, David Ingram and
Ken Moody, Imperial College London, UK
25 Secure UPnP and Networked Health
Care 
by Kari Keinänen and Mika Pennanen,
VTT Information Technology 
27 An Akogrimo Approach to Securing
Virtual Organizations within Mobile
GRID Computing Environments 
by Thomas Kirkham, Julian Gallop,
Damian Mac Randal, Brian Ritchie,
CCLRC, UK, Pierluigi Ritrovato, and
Giuseppe Cirillo, CRMPA, Università degli
Studi di Salerno, Italy
28 MOBIUS – Securing the Next
Generation of Java-Based Global
Computers 
by Gilles Barthe, INRIA
29 Trust in Virtual Communities 
by Marcin Czenko, Jeroen Doumen and
Sandro Etalle, University of Twente, The
Netherlands
31 Secure and Trusted Virtual
Organization Management 
by Adomas Svirskas, Alvaro Arenas,
Michael Wilson and Brian Matthews,
CCLRC, UK
32 Trusted Network on Wheels  
by Matthias Gerlach, Institute for Open
Communication Systems - FOKUS,
Fraunhofer ICT Group, Germany 
33 A Graphical Delegation Solution for
X.509 Attribute Certificates 
by Isaac Agudo, Javier Lopez, Jose A.
Montenegro, University of Malaga, Spain
35 Security and Trust Management
Extensions to the PERMIS X.509 
Privilege Management Infrastructure 
by David Chadwick, University of Kent, UK 
36 Interactive Access Control and Trust
Negotiation for Autonomic
Communication 
by Hristo Koshutanski and Fabio
Massacci, University of Trento, Italy 
38 Access-Control Policy Administration
in XACML 
by Erik Rissanen and Babak Sadighi
Firozabadi, SICS, Sweden
38 Contributions of Team Automata in
Security 
by Maurice ter Beek, Gabriele Lenzini, and
Marinella Petrocchi, CNR, Italy 
40 Using Probabilistic I/O Automata to
Improve the Analysis of Cryptographic
Protocols 
by Ran Canetti, IBM T.J. Watson
Research Center; USA, Ling Cheung,
University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands;
Dilsun Kaynar, Nancy Lynch, MIT, USA;
Moses Liskov, College of William and
Mary, USA; Olivier Pereira, Université
catholique de Louvain (FNRS) Belgium;
and Roberto Segala, Università di Verona,
Italy 
41 Cryptographic Security by Swamping
Adversaries with Quantum Information 
by Ronald Cramer and Serge Fehr, CWI,
The Netherlands 
43 Building a Stochastic Model for
Security and Trust Assessment
Evaluation  
by Karin Sallhammar, Svein Johan
Knapskog and Bjarne Emil Helvik, NTNU,
Norway
44 Flexible, TCP/IP-Based and Platform-
Independent Management of Biometric
Data for Access Control Systems 
by Burkhard Stiller,University of Zurich,
Switzerland
45 BT’s Security Research 
by Theo Dimitrakos, BT, UK 
46 Bringing the Common Critera 
to Business Enterprise 
by Christophe Ponsard, Philippe Massonet
and Jean-François Molderez, CETIC,
Belgium
The articles describe research projects
and results in the following areas:
• wireless network security in ubiqui-
tous systems
• trust and reputation management in
virtual coalitions/organizations 
• identity management problems and
privacy issues in virtual coalitions; an
example of the integration of security
technologies with biometric systems is
also described
• the area of document security, and the
problem of security mechanisms for
documents that are platform- and
server-independent 
• the security of distributed applications,
from mobile e-commerce to e-healthcare 
• the use of rigorous techniques such as
formal languages and automata theory
to specify, verify and analyse complex
systems
• access-control models, policies and
mechanisms for exploiting well-estab-
lished technology such as X.509 certifi-
cates, and new XML-based languages
for describing policies and credentials
• research and development activities in
cyber-crime protection
and detection.
Overall, these ar-
ticles illustrate current
trends not only in ERCIM institutes,
but in the whole European research com-
munity.
Link:
http://www.iit.cnr.it/STM-WG/
Please contact: 
Fabio Martinelli, IIT-CNR, Italy
E-mail: Fabio.Martinelli@iit.cnr.it
Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Université 
catholique de Louvain, Belgium
E-mail: jjq@dice.ucl.ac.be
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Trust and security are key enablers of the
Information Society. For citizens to use
and feel comfortable with eGovernment
services they must have confidence that
their online services are trustworthy and
secure. Similarly, for consumers and
SMEs to use e-commerce and e-business
they need confidence in the security of
online transactions. As access to the
Internet diversifies, from PCs to digital
TVs, mobile phones and wireless de-
vices, people feel increasingly con-
cerned about the protection of their as-
sets and privacy in this networked world.
These aspects will become more and
more important as we move towards the
smart digital environments based on
many interacting objects, devices and
systems. 
In the future, personal area networks and
embedded computer chips will be every-
where – in our cars, our homes and even
in our clothes. Security in such mas-
sively inter-connected environments will
require solutions very different to those
of today, and its social acceptance will
require totally novel approaches to iden-
tity and privacy management through
user-friendly and trustworthy interfaces,
taking into account the privacy needs
and data protection regulations in place.
Underlying the service and user interface
level we must give attention to the infor-
mation and network security infra-
structure. Modern service organisations,
such as banking and finance, healthcare,
energy, transport and others, rely on ICT
for data exchange and control, creating
strong mutual dependencies. These criti-
cal information infrastructures must be
dependable and resilient, protecting
against malicious attacks, ensuring toler-
ance towards and recovery from attacks,
and adaptable to the changing security
requirements. 
The Present:  Trust and Security
in the 6th Framework Programme 
The above describes the focus of the re-
search in ICT for Trust and Security of
the Information Society Technologies
Priority in the 6th Framework
Programme for Community Research
(FP6). In this domain we also give par-
ticular attention to the promotion of inte-
gration of European research and its rela-
tion to global activities, given the nature
of the challenge which becomes more
and more global. In the first part of FP6,
we have launched 17 projects (six
Integrated Projects, three Networks of
Excellence, six Targeted Research
Projects and two Coordination Actions)
with a total Community funding of about
75 million Euro. These activities cover
Building Trust and Security in Information Society:
A Strategic Challenge for European R&D
by Jacques Bus
Security, dependability and trust plays a key role in building the Information
Society. With the move towards the 7th Framework Programme, the European
Union will make research more effective and better tailored to the evolving needs
and opportunities with which Europe is confronted.
Trust and Security in ICT in the the 7th Framework Programme.
Assured Service and Information
in Information Society
Towards a dependable ICT
for Information Society
NETWORK
LEVEL
SERVICE
LEVEL
Software and Services
****************
Dependable Software
GRID
****************
Security mechanisms
Future Prospects: Trust and Security in FP7
ICT for Trust & Confidence
ICT meeting societal
challenges
ICT for content,
creativity and
personal development
ICT supporting
business & industry
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advanced and sophisticated research.
There are strong interconnections with
policy developments in trust and secu-
rity, ie in multimodal and secure biomet-
rics; identity and privacy management;
electronic authentication; secure digital
assets management; virtualisation of se-
curity resources for advanced and seam-
less security. It gives also strong atten-
tion to the support of standardisation and
interoperability. More recently, as a re-
sult of the IST Call 4, we have retained
and started negotiation of 19 new pro-
jects for an expected funding of  about 70
million Euro. This set of new projects
would strongly extend the technical cov-
erage in this domain. It includes activi-
ties on the development of knowledge
and technologies to manage and control
complex and interdependent networks
and systems, so as to enhance security
and resilience in the information society
infrastructure; provision of interoperable
and open trusted computing platforms;
advanced mechanisms and models for
security, privacy and trust in mobile en-
vironments; and sophisticated technolo-
gies to fight malware on Internet.
The Future: Security and
Dependability - Trust and
Confidence the 6th Framework
Programme
Whereas the key role of security, de-
pendability and trust in building the
Information Society is unquestioned, the
move towards FP7 imposes the need to
rethink how to make the EU intervention
on and funding to research more effec-
tive and better tailored to the evolving
needs and opportunities with which
Europe is confronted. This need, which
takes into account also the technological
and market trends, brought the European
Commission services to identify for FP7,
which is planned to start in 2007, new
avenues and synergies to renew and
strengthen research impetus and momen-
tum in this area. The nature of security
and trust relates the subject to many IST
domains, infrastructural, as well as appli-
cation oriented. In order to be effective,
dependability and security must be part
of the system design, starting at the low-
est level. But it should also ensure trust
in the applications for the end-user, for
example in e-Government, e-Health and
consumer services. This rationale is the
basis for the proposed structure for re-
search on security, dependability and
trust in the FP7 Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT)
Theme. 
The overall structure and research priori-
ties of FP7 were proposed in the
Communication  of April 2005 ‘concern-
ing the seventh framework programme
of the European Community for re-
search, technological development and
demonstration activities’. One of the
‘Technology Pillars’ (TP) proposed
under the ICT theme of the Specific
Programme ‘Collaboration’ covers the
research activities on ‘Software, Grids,
Security and Dependability: dynamic,
adaptive, dependable and trusted soft-
ware and services, and new processing
architectures, including their provision
as a utility’. In addition, one of the do-
mains of ‘Applications Research’ (AR)
is defined to be ‘ICT for trust and confi-
dence: identity management; authentica-
tion and authorization; privacy enhanc-
ing technologies; rights and asset man-
agement; protection against cyber
threats’. Although TPs and AR are both
part of the Specific Programme
‘Collaboration’ in the theme ICT, they
represent different approaches to the re-
search in Trust and Security in ICT. 
The TP on ‘Software, Grids, Security
and Dependability’ deals with the key
technological challenges and compo-
nents that underpin the provision of both
‘assured service and information han-
dling’ and ‘dependable ICT systems’. It
addresses the constitutive fabric of
Information Society systems and ser-
vices. The TP supports and enables ap-
plications research (eg e-government, e-
business, e-health) where the application
drive is the engine for future technologi-
cal progress. The requirements on trust
and confidence in these application areas
are however often of a generic nature,
exploiting ‘security and privacy’ tech-
nologies all across the different applica-
tion domains. For this reason the choice
has been made to include AR on ‘ICT for
Trust and Confidence’, which would
build upon the TP described above, but
work in close cooperation with the other
AR areas to ensure optimal synergy.
Figure 1 shows how ‘Trust and Security’
is covered in the ICT Theme of FP7.
It depicts the two important technology
levels: network and services, as well as
the crucial role of security and trust in
the development of software and ser-
vices and its infrastructures (ie, GRIDs).
This technology development forms the
fundament for the application in various
domains through the domain ‘ICT for
Trust and Confidence’. Of course, such
visualisation is limited. It may however
help us in stimulating and managing the
discussion with the European stakehold-
ers such as researchers, industries, users,
etc. in order to develop a strategic
agenda for security and trust in FP7.
Conclusion
We intend to organise in the next few
months specific consultation events that
would be instrumental, together with the
other institutional consultation pro-
cesses, in the further development of the
FP7 workprogramme. We trust that the
above proposal can form a sound basis
for a fruitful discussion with European
researchers, leading to an IST workpro-
gramme that will effectively cover the
urgent research to be done for building a
secure, dependable and trusted
Information Society. 
The content of this paper is the sole re-
sponsibility of the author and in no way
represents the view of the European
Commission or its services.
Links: 
Specific information about events will be 
made available at the unit D4 web site: 
http://www.cordis.lu/ist/trust-security/index.html
‘ICT for Trust and Security’ web site: 
http://www.cordis.lu/ist/trust-security/index.html
The list of on-going projects: 
http://www.cordis.lu/ist/trust-security/projects.htm
Please contact: 
Jacques BUS, Head of Unit, European 
Commission, DG Information Society and 
Media “ICT for Trust and Security”
E-mail: jacques.bus@cec.eu.int
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Weak authentication, and inadequately
protected identity data in on-line services
are resulting in increasing instances of
fraud. Organizations suffer reputational
and financial losses and consumers loose
confidence in on-line services.
Organized criminal activity has just
about started to move on-line, but is
growing very fast. New attack vectors
such as phishing have rapidly gained
prominence in a matter of a few months.
It is impossible to predict the nature of
attack activity in 2006, let alone in 2007,
2008 … Enterprises are faced with un-
certainty about the nature of real cyberat-
tacks, yet must make funding decisions
today on how to improve their existing
authentication infrastructure. Therefore
solutions that allow adjustment of cre-
dential strength as neededis are gaining
prominence. 
The TriCipher Armored Credential
System (TACS) provides a single plat-
form that can issue and support a flexible
range of credentials from a single infra-
structure. The only system of its kind,
the TACS Vault can be used to issue au-
thentication credentials of many differ-
ent types and can also serve as a vault for
identity data (or encryption keys), pro-
viding a comprehensive solution to the
problems of weak authentication and in-
adequately encrypted identity data.
The authentication ladder (see Figure 1)
shows TACS issued credentials in in-
creasing order of strength as we go up
the ladder. This flexibility is achieved
due to the use of 3-key RSA as the un-
derlying cryptographic engine for all
forms of authentication. In 3-key RSA
there are 2 private keys for each user,
one which only the user knows and the
other securely stored on the TACS
Vault. (In contrast conventional 2-key
RSA uses a single private key known
only to the user.) Both private keys are
used to generate partial signatures which
are then combined to authenticate the
user. Flexible multi-factor authentication
is achieved by generating the user’s per-
sonal private key from a variety of fac-
tors depending upon the credential
strength.
In the simplest credential called
Armored Passwords, the user’s personal
private key part is derived from a pass-
word. This eliminates the need to store
encrypted passwords on the server and
thereby eliminates password cracking by
theft of these encrypted passwords. In
Browser 2 Factor credentials the 2nd fac-
tor is stored in an encrypted cookie
which comes to the server. Based on in-
formation in the cookie, an appropriate
personalized “welcome message” is dis-
played to the user before they enter their
password. The password and the cookie
are then combined for two factor authen-
tication. In Device 2 Factor credentials
the user’s PC (more than one can be reg-
istered) is used as a low cost and effec-
tive 2nd factor. The PC stores a non-ex-
portable 2-key RSA private key which is
cryptographically combined with the
user’s password to generate the user’s
personal private key. In Portable 2
Factor any removable device, ranging
from USB memory sticks to iPods can be
used as a convenient second factor. The
approach is similar Device 2 Factor in
that it combines a 2-key RSA private
cryptographically with the user’s pass-
word to generate the user’s personal pri-
vate key. The information on the
portable device is protected both by the
fact that the attacker does not have ac-
cess to the key on the TACS Vault, as
well as a special ‘rolling key’ which
cryptographically encrypts the second
factor. Armored Tokens add one-time
passwords to the credential. The dy-
namic password travels from the client to
the TACS Vault, which performs the
verification. The protected channel from
the client to the TACS Vault eliminates
the man-in-the-middle attack to which
one-time passwords are extremely vul-
nerable. For Smartcard-based credentials
the private key stored in the smartcard
Flexible Multi-Factor Authentication 
in an Uncertain World
by Ravi Sandhu
Most organizations require high-grade multi-factor authentication for their high-
end users, yet few can justify the high cost for all their users.  Flexible multi-factor
authentication enables organizations to issue the appropriate grade of credential
for each user class from a single reusable infrastructure, and make adjustments
as needed.
Figure 1: 
The authentication
ladder.
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(which is a conventional 2-key RSA pri-
vate key) is used as the second factor,
similar to the Device 2 Factor and
Portable 2 Factor cases. This key never
leaves the smartcard providing hardware
protection for it. Most of the above 2
Factor solutions can be easily combined
to form a 3 Factor credential. For in-
stance Password + PC + USB Disk or
Password + PC + Smartcard.
The TACS Vault itself is specially de-
signed to afford a very high degree of as-
surance. It is protected using three layers
of defenses: (i) it has a locked down,
dedicated hardened OS, (ii) all system
and user administration is strictly com-
partmentalized on least privilege, need to
know, basis, and (iii) it uses FIPS 140-1
Level 2 rated cryptography. It is also
highly scalable and fault tolerant, run-
ning as a set of 2 or 3 load-balanced and
failover appliances. Finally it is a high
assurance platform which can act as a se-
cure storage facility to protect identity
data such as credit card numbers.
Enterprises can choose to either store
identity data directly on the TACS Vault,
or else can choose to encrypt data in
place, and use the TACS Vault as a key
management facility. The data is only
available to authorized users after suc-
cessful strong authentication. 
Link: 
http://www.tricipher.com
Please contact: 
Ravi Sandhu, TriCipher, USA
Tel: +1 703 283 3484
E-mail: sandhu@tricipher.com 
Figure 2: Flexible multi-factor authentication.
The RNSA will facilitate a knowledge-
sharing network for research organisa-
tions, government and the private sector
to develop research tools and methods to
mitigate emerging safety and security is-
sues relating to critical infrastructure.
The network will integrate complemen-
tary, yet diverse research areas including
physical and information infrastructure
security, and surveillance and intelligent
systems. The RNSA has identified the
majority of Australia’s leading re-
searchers, Commonwealth and state offi-
cers and industry leaders involved in
critical infrastructure protection. This in-
cludes more than 300 researchers and
professionals from 25 Australian re-
search organisations, 15 government or-
ganisations, and an industry consortium
comprising over 50 companies. The net-
work has also identified a number of rel-
evant international collaborators.
Objectives 
The network will identify and facilitate
the integration of research programs and
collaboration in the areas of critical
infrastructure protection (CIP). The
RNSA will encourage and support:
• Open exchange of information and
sharing of resources across disci-
plinary, organisational, institutional
and geographical boundaries by or-
ganising workshops, focus groups and
an annual conference.
• Development and implementation of
cohesive and integrated research plans
among researchers by bringing them
together and encouraging communica-
tion opportunities for cross-disci-
plinary research collaboration.
• Nurturing the careers of young investi-
gators and research students through
incentives, such as attending an annual
summer retreat, as well as opportuni-
ties to participate in international and
inter-institutional exchange programs.
• Links with actual and potential end-
users, and the broader community
through an advisory board composed
of recognised key stakeholders in
Australian CIP.
Priority Research Area
Recommendations
The RNSA’s research strengths are indi-
cated by the status of its world leading
Australian Research Network in Security
by Ed Dawson 
The Research Network for a Secure Australia (RNSA) is a multi-disciplinary
collaboration, funded by the Australian Research Council for a period of five
years, established to strengthen Australia’s research capacity to enhance the
protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure from natural, human-caused, or
accidental disasters, and terrorist acts. 
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The objective of this research project is
to develop practical and comprehensive
technical measures for document secu-
rity. It commenced in September 2003,
and is being conducted by the Zurich
Information Security Center (ZISC) – in
particular its members Prof. Dr. David
Basin (Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich), Dr. Günter Karjoth
(IBM Zurich Research Laboratory), Beat
Perjés (Credit Suisse), Dr. Gritta Wolf
(Credit Suisse) and Paul E. Sevinç
(Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Zurich).
Document Security is motivated by the
fact that enterprises must secure many of
the documents they process for reasons
that include protecting a customer’s pri-
vacy in accordance with the law, and
gaining an advantage over competitors
by not sharing trade secrets. Currently,
these enterprises must resort to organiza-
tional measures, since technical ones are
impractical, insufficiently comprehen-
sive, or completely lacking.
The (long-term) vision of Document
Security is to ensure that information in
documents can be protected by mecha-
nisms that enforce a security and privacy
policy, and that the mechanisms are not
limited to a particular platform or even
Document Security
by Paul E. Sevinç
For over five years, researchers from around the world have worked on controlling
access to XML documents. Typically, the focus has been on server-side
mechanisms for record-like documents and the system architecture has assumed
a centralized policy administration point. In contrast, we study client-side
mechanisms for narrative-like documents with sticky policies.
researchers who have extensive national
and international linkages in relevant sci-
ence, engineering and technology re-
search. These researchers have been suc-
cessful in attracting research funding and
have access to research students and
young investigator training programs.
The RNSA incorporates a wide research
base concentrating complementary re-
search expertise that can address CIP
challenges. Expertise pooled by the
RNSA is broadly grouped into three re-
search areas, composed of various pro-
grams as currently identified by the net-
work participants. The research areas
and corresponding research programs
(see Figure) all contribute to the com-
mon research opportunities.
National Benefit
The RNSA is a knowledge-sharing net-
work for government, universities and
the private sector producing innovative
solutions to secure Australia’s critical in-
frastructure from threats that have the
potential to cause national security, eco-
nomic, and/ or social impacts.
Facilitating a coordinated approach to
CIP will align the efforts of researchers
and key stakeholders (ie government or-
ganisations and the private sector) in the
broad areas of science, engineering and
technology. The RNSA has established
notable contacts and collaboration with
equivalent or similar activities overseas,
eg in Europe, Asia, USA, Canada, and
NZ. The RNSA activities program and
its outreach plan will foster the develop-
ment of local expertise through the en-
hancement of postgraduate education
and the encouragement of CIP re-
searchers, having particular emphasis on
cross-disciplinary approaches. This will
ensure that overall security advice in re-
lation to CIP will not need to completely
depend on imported or overseas skills.
The network serves as a vehicle for the
dissemination of best research practices
in CIP, as well as a repository of exper-
tise to advise government and industry
on CIP matters. 
Link: 
RNSA web site: 
http://www.secureaustralia.org
Please contact: 
Ed Dawson, Queensland University 
of Technology, Australia
Tel: +61 7 3864 9551 
E-mail: e.dawson@qut.edu.au
Research areas and corresponding research programs. 
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document processor. The threat model is
that a company’s stakeholders (employ-
ees, consultants, shareholders etc.) who
access sensitive documents are not
trusted, because:
• they may be careless in their use and
distribution of data
• their software might be untrustworthy
(eg compromised by a Trojan horse)
even when the users are trustworthy or
• some may actually be dishonest.
This lack of trust means strong client-
side control is required, which propels
Document Security into the realm of
rights management and trusted comput-
ing.
From the vision and the threat model, we
derived the project scope of Document
Security: the primary goals are content
confidentiality (eg to protect trade se-
crets) and policy integrity (in order to
keep attackers from simply assigning
themselves arbitrary permissions).
Microsoft coined the term ‘enterprise
rights management’, since the first goal
differs from the goal of digital rights
management (DRM), which typically in-
volves payment for access to non-confi-
dential data (eg a movie). Privacy is out-
side the scope of our project.
It is worth mentioning that we derived
our requirements not from what we as
computer scientists consider challenging
or interesting, but from actual business
use cases of a major Swiss bank. For in-
stance, users must be able to define dif-
ferent rules (policy) for different parts
(content) within one and the same docu-
ment so that they do not have to create
several differently censored versions of a
document. Another example is that it
must be possible to specify that certain
users have the permission to delegate
permissions to other users so that they
can also delegate certain document-pro-
cessing tasks.
The documents we consider are a super-
set of XML documents. We have devel-
oped a formal (ie mathematically pre-
cise) model of this superset. Finally, we
have formally defined the semantics of a
policy language that implies the sticky-
policy paradigm. That is, the policy
sticks with the information and remains
enforced when the information is trans-
ferred between documents (eg via cut
and paste). The subjects are basically
sets of properties (ie name-value pairs)
that could be used for modelling roles for
(hierarchical) role-based access control.
The granularity of the objects is that of
single attributes and nodes. The set of ac-
tions not only includes actions on the
content (in particular ‘read’), but also on
the policy (‘add rule’, ‘delegate permis-
sions’). Furthermore, and in addition to
conditions, we also support provisions
and thus allow for access decisions to be
made dependent on them (eg signing a
non-disclosure agreement [NDA] or log-
ging access).
Our next step will be to consider contain-
ers other than documents (eg a database).
When the information originates from
another type of container, the document
will take the other container’s policy into
account, in accordance with the policy-
combination or policy-mapping seman-
tics (eg intersection of restrictions).
As for a prototype, we have designed a
client system (perceived by the user, for
instance, as a word processor) that will
be implemented by students under our
supervision. Content and policy are the
components of a document tuple (see
Figure). As the user (red) is not part of
the trusted base (green), the integrity of
the client system – particularly the confi-
dentiality of secret keys – must be en-
sured by either operating-system mecha-
nisms (if the computer is administrated
by trusted employees of the enterprise)
or by hardware-based mechanisms.
While the Provisions Service (blue) is
part of the trusted base, too, it is merely a
local stub. Otherwise, dishonest users
could simply trash their computer to de-
stroy access logs or NDAs.
Document Security has resulted in a few
spin-off projects such as a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) emulator for
Linux and an evaluation of XML-diff al-
gorithms. It also raises interesting ques-
tions in the domain of usability and secu-
rity.
Link:
http://www.zisc.ethz.ch/research/docsec
Please contact:
Paul E. Sevinç, Information Security 
GroupD-INFK and ZISC, Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland
Tel: +41 44 632 7250
E-mail: paul.sevinc@inf.ethz.ch
Document Security system architecture.
SPECIAL THEME: Security and Trust Management
16
Over the last few years, we have wit-
nessed increasing levels of innovation
among cyber-attackers, which, com-
bined with the increasing penetration of
broadband Internet service and the per-
sistent vulnerabilities of host software
systems, has led to new classes of rapid
and scalable mechanized attacks on in-
formation infrastructure. Levelling the
playing field requires scalable, auto-
mated responses to malicious code that
can react as quickly as modern network
worms propagate. Traditional ap-
proaches have relied on signatures, man-
ual containment and quarantine.
However, while tools are improving,
progress in the development and deploy-
ment of the necessary technology is
widely regarded as too slow for a threat
that is so clear and imminent. 
To address this problem, the Distributed
Computing Systems Laboratory at
FORTH-ICS has initiated and is cur-
rently coordinating two IST-funded pro-
jects, LOBSTER and NoaH, whose goal
is to roll out the necessary infrastructure
to support research, development and ex-
perimental deployment of advanced
cyber-defence mechanisms. 
LOBSTER aims at providing a pilot
infrastructure for passive Internet traffic
monitoring that will improve current un-
derstanding of the Internet, and will con-
tribute towards solving difficult perfor-
mance and security problems. Based on
appropriate abstractions and cooperation
among several points of presence, LOB-
STER will help to monitor the underly-
ing network, providing early warning of
security incidents, as well as accurate
and meaningful measurements of perfor-
mance. The main goal of LOBSTER is
to deploy an advanced pilot European
Internet Traffic Monitoring
Infrastracture, based on passive monitor-
ing sensors at speeds starting from
2.5Gbps and ranging possibly up to
10Gbps. The architecture of the system
is heavily influenced by and will make
use of the knowledge, software and hard-
ware artefacts obtained by a core group
of project partners in SCAMPI, a re-
cently completed IST research project. 
NoAH is a three-year project developing
infrastructure for security monitoring
based on honeypot technology.
Honeypots are computer systems that do
not provide production services, but are
instead intentionally made vulnerable
and closely monitored to analyse attacks
directed at them. NoAH will use geo-
graphically dispersed honeypots as an
early-warning system, and will correlate
the data received from them to generate
automated warnings and possibly trigger
appropriate containment measures.
The two projects use complementary ap-
proaches towards the same goal, namely,
to help ISPs and National Research
Networks limit the damage to their net-
works, allow information security orga-
nizations to better assess threats, and
provide researchers with a wealth of at-
tack-related data to improve detection
techniques. The participants will be able
to gather and analyse information about
the nature of Internet cyber-attacks by
developing an infrastructure to detect
and provide early warning of such at-
tacks, so that appropriate countermea-
sures may be taken to combat them. Both
efforts are exploring opportunities for
supporting other related initiatives, in-
cluding Geant and the global Honeynet
project. 
Links:
http://dcs.ics.forth.gr/
http://www.ist-lobster.org/
http://www.fp6-noah.org/
Please contact:
Evangelos Markatos, ICS-FORTH, Greece
E-mail: markatos@ics.forth.gr
Towards a European Malware Containment
Infrastructure
by Kostas G. Anagnostakis and Evangelos Markatos 
‘LOBSTER’ and ‘NoaH’ are two projects designing the necessary infrastructure
to support research, development, and experimental deployment of advanced
cyber-defence mechanisms.
Modern worms have demonstrated that they can infect tens of thousands of computers worldwide in a few hours. Source:
http://www.caida.org/ analysis/security/code-red/
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Recent events and changes in society
have created an increased demand for se-
curity, which in turn has forced govern-
ments and organizations to make per-
sonal and asset security a priority. For
example, London, the most populated
city in Europe, has recently instituted
some huge security programs, largely
based on CCTV surveillance systems.
Because of these programs, thousands of
CCTV cameras have been installed for
surveillance in various areas of interest
(eg more than ten thousand cameras in
the London metro and Heathrow airport
alone). However, cameras are of little
use without some means of analysing the
data they record. A review in 2002 by the
Home Office, the British government de-
partment responsible for internal affairs,
found that the cameras had a ‘small ef-
fect’ on crime and did not address terror-
ism at all; other studies have also been
inconclusive. London’s police admitted
that regarding the utility of sensor data,
manpower is a major limitation: for the
cameras to be useful for spotting terror-
ists, an army of police would have to be
on hand to scrutinize the images. 
In addition, the current security boom is
to a great extent an export of the United
States. The 2004 Athens Olympics was
the first summer Olympic Games since
the September 11th terror attacks, and
the most heavily guarded event in his-
tory. The security budget for this single
event exceeded one billion euros – more
than three times the amount spent on
protecting the previous Olympic Games
(Sydney 2000). Most security systems
for the Athens Olympics were provided
by US companies and more specifically
by a group of companies under the US-
based SAIC (Science Applications
International Corporation). 
Most existing systems rely on stationary
sensors such as cameras and motion de-
tectors for surveillance and tracking.
Easy deployment, scalability and cus-
tomizability are also very important is-
sues for security systems. For this rea-
son, the current trend of taking over the
processing, communication and sensing
capabilities from workstations and grad-
ually embedding them in the sensors
themselves is expected to pick up in the
years to come. In the long run, the ‘dis-
appearing computer’ will hand over its
competences to smaller devices embed-
ded virtually everywhere in the environ-
ment. Usually such sensors do not pos-
sess any processing power and no com-
munication takes place between them.
Besides sensors, small passive informa-
tion tags are commonly used for identifi-
cation of products and persons as well as
for anti-theft control.
iWATCH is an interdisciplinary activity
at FORTH-ICS. It aims to use existing
state-of-the-art technology and expertise
in this important application domain, and
conversely, to use the specific applica-
tion domain to drive further work on the
underlying technology. The focus of
iWATCH is to investigate how situation
awareness and security in large-scale
premises and assets of global interest can
be improved by integrating various de-
vices under a common framework that
involves:
• Low-cost intelligent sensors with RF
communication, memory and process-
ing capabilities can by deployed in
large numbers to (a) facilitate easy cre-
ation of high-density sensor networks
for monitoring large areas, (b) act as
tagging devices for physical assets or
commodities of interest, and (c) iden-
tify authorized personnel.
• Autonomous robotic vehicles can pro-
vide an automatic mechanism for tag
locating and continuous tag mapping,
as well as surveillance and specialized
sensing capabilities during site pa-
trolling or in case of an emergency.
Besides offering specialized surveil-
lance functionality, mobile robotic
platforms can at any time poll infor-
mation about intelligent sensors and
update the database with sensor data
history. They can also improve esti-
iWATCH: Intelligent Watch 
Based on Networked Smart Sensors 
and Autonomous Mobile Vehicles
by Haris Baltzakis, Angelos Bilas and Panos Trahanias
The iWATCH activity aims at developing an embedded network of intelligent
sensors and autonomous mobile platforms that will enable localization,
identification and tracking of mobile assets, goods and people within the context
of a real-life monitoring application. 
iWATCH scope and
system components.
SPECIAL THEME: Security and Trust Management
18 ERCIM News No. 63, October 2005
mates of sensor location, thus over-
coming fundamental limitations in
sensor-sensor communication and
placement. 
• The envisioned functionalities will be
conveyed under a joint operational en-
vironment, offering complete, cen-
tralised situation awareness, supported
by satellite communication technol-
ogy. The iWATCH project addresses
the deployment of existing hardware
components with appropriate middle-
ware, as well as the development of
sensor-based security applications
based on the resulting embedded net-
work system and the capabilities of-
fered therein. Finally, iWATCH will
offer higher level integration at a cen-
tralized location, aiming at complete
situation awareness among geographi-
cally distributed sites. The ‘tactical
surveillance and control picture’ gen-
erated by each application site can be
transmitted by reliable location-inde-
pendent means such as space relays
(satellites), and combined at a central
station of choice (headquarters or con-
trol room) to form a unified operations
environment. This environment, pre-
sented as an ‘information wall’, is the
fundamental instrument for achieving
situation awareness.
Finally, iWATCH brings together re-
searchers from autonomous vehicles, in-
telligent sensors, networking, and signal
processing and capitalizes on existing,
cutting-edge expertise and technology in
order to provide automated tracking,
identification, mapping and inventory
control for assets and persons as well as
patrolling by autonomous mobile vehi-
cles in large-scale premises.
Link:
http://www.ics.forth.gr/~trahania/ 
Please contact: 
Panos Trahanias, ICS-FORTH, Greece
Tel: +30 2810 391 715
E-mail: trahania@ics.forth.gr
Since the early nineties and the advent of
distributed e-commerce, computer sci-
ence has been confronted with problems
related to security, in both the exchange
and server-side handling of data. The
key to success for e-commerce applica-
tions resides in gaining the trust of po-
tential users. Applications must therefore
be developed in order to offer adequate
levels of security. The ADS
(Architecture Engineering for
Dependable Distributed Systems) team
of the SE2C is interested in three major
problems relating to security and trust
management in the development and use
of distributed e-commerce applications.
First, in the eyes of users, data confiden-
tiality during an exchange between the
client application and the server consti-
tutes the most critical point of security.
This phenomenon, which remains purely
a network problem, increased in impor-
tance with the arrival of third-generation
telecommunications networks and the
appearance of the mobile commerce (m-
commerce) paradigm. The use of an ar-
chitectural framework such as JAFAR
allows the developers of distributed ap-
plications to take into account and to
more easily solve, at the software level,
this problem of data exchange. This is
managed in particular through the use of
security solutions already implemented
in the heart of the framework (eg com-
munication interfaces supporting the
TLS protocol, the use of certificates to
encrypt the data etc). In addition, where
the level of confidentiality demands it,
the framework is enriched by the devel-
opment of other components that inte-
grate more powerful means of encryp-
tion. Security certificates also are impor-
tant to authenticate the e-commerce site
to the users. We are currently studying
the various security solutions that can be
used in the context of e-commerce and
integrated in JAFAR, in particular solu-
tions over UMTS networks.
Second, both the persistence and the
availability of data are significant points
in the success of e-commerce applica-
tions. Indeed, considering the company
Amazon, an outage of its Web interface
would have a very significant effect on
its sales turnover. Thus, the applications
must be designed in order to prevent re-
mote attacks such as denial of service at-
tacks, which target the availability of re-
sources. During the development of
JAFAR, we have studied the various
possibilities for detecting this type of at-
tack, as well as the measures to be taken
when a major resource is no longer avail-
able. In particular, we are working on the
decentralized aspect of the resources in
order to reduce as far as possible the
length of time for which they are un-
available. However, we also envisage in-
tegrating the adaptation and resilience
aspects of the system in the near future,
by means of other projects such as COR-
RECT, privileging the fault-tolerance as-
Securing JAFAR – An Architectural Framework
for E-Commerce Applications
by Nicolas Guelfi, Cédric Pruski, Jan Reimen and Paul Sterges
Security is the key to the success of e-commerce applications. In the context of
the ‘FIDJI’ project, the Software Engineering Competence Center (SE2C) at the
University of Luxembourg has developed JAFAR, a J2EE (Java 2 Platform,
Enterprise Edition) architectural framework for the development of secure e-
commerce applications. Research is now focusing on the various security
problems that are directly linked to the use and development of such applications. 
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pect, or new projects awaiting validation
from the European commission.
Lastly, since storage security is relative
to the business application and its sup-
porting storage infrastructure, a risk mit-
igation methodology is a sound way to
strengthen storage availability, reliabil-
ity and privacy. This is why storage of
and access to stored data are the final two
significant points that influence the de-
sign of e-commerce applications. The
layer architecture of JAFAR is con-
ceived in a rigorous way and determines
the permissions granted to users after
their identification. In addition, JAFAR
was developed in order to offer a maxi-
mum of services to users while reducing
the number of interfaces that make it
possible to seize information or intro-
duce erroneous data. The latter particu-
larly includes code that is interpretable
by the system, such as SQL or HTML,
which can have disastrous effects on
stored data. We are studying ways to de-
fine security rules which will be checked
at run-time and which can be changed on
a production system to react to observed
patterns of abuse. Moreover, JAFAR in-
tegrates a module making it possible to
rigorously control the data to be stored
by detecting possible pieces of malicious
code. 
Links: 
SE2C homepage: http://se2c.uni.lu
FIDJI Project: http://se2c.uni.lu/projects/fidji
CORRECT Project: 
http://se2c.uni.lu/projects/correct
Please contact:
Nicolas Guelfi, University of Luxembourg
Tel: +352 420 101 251
E-mail: Nicolas.Guelfi@uni.lu
Architecture 
of JAFAR. 
Reputation and recommender systems
are widely used to provide a basis for the
choice of transaction items and partners
in online scenarios. They have proven
useful in online auctioning systems such
as eBay or online book stores such as
Amazon, and can be viewed as a substi-
tute for the word-of-mouth mechanisms
observed in offline personal encounters.
As a result, it has recently been proposed
that reputation systems be extended to
decentralized and self-organized systems
such as Internet-based peer-to-peer sys-
tems and mobile ad-hoc networks. The
need here is predominantly to provide in-
centives for cooperation and to protect
the network from node misbehaviour.
However, reputation systems need to be
distributed in decentralized scenarios
and their potentially complex behaviour
is not yet fully understood. This under-
standing is necessary to investigate
whether distributed reputation systems
might prove as useful as their counter-
parts for centralized systems. In a collab-
orative effort started in 2004 between
EPFL, SIMS and the Statslab, we are
therefore analysing the behavior of dis-
tributed reputation systems and evaluat-
ing whether and how they can best be
used.
We have developed a reputation system to
detect, discourage and stop node misbe-
haviour in Internet-based peer-to-peer sys-
Distributed Reputation Systems 
for Internet-based Peer-to-Peer Systems 
and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
by Jochen Mundinger, Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec
Reputation systems are widely and successfully used in centralized scenarios.
Will they work equally well, however, in decentralized scenarios such as Internet-
based peer-to-peer systems and mobile ad hoc networks?
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tems and mobile ad hoc networks. We
proposed a protocol called CONFIDANT
(Cooperation Of Nodes — Fairness In
Dynamic Ad hoc NeTworks) to cope with
misbehaviour. Detection is based both on
first-hand observation and on second-hand
information provided by other nodes. 
To be useful, reputation systems need to
be reliable and robust against liars. They
can, however, be tricked by the spread of
false reputation ratings. On the other
hand, simple solutions such as exclu-
sively relying on one’s own direct obser-
vations do not make use of all the infor-
mation available. 
Our fully distributed reputation system is
based on a modified Bayesian estimation
procedure and can cope with false infor-
mation so as to effectively use second-
hand information. Each node maintains a
reputation rating and a trust rating for all
other nodes it cares about. Reputation
ratings capture the quality of the be-
haviour of a node as an actor in the net-
work performing routing and forwarding
tasks. From time to time reputation in-
formation is exchanged with others.
However, second-hand information is
only accepted if it is compatible with the
current reputation rating or comes from a
trusted node. To decide whether it is
compatible, we introduce a simple mech-
anism called the deviation test. If the re-
ceived estimation of misbehaviour devi-
ates more than a threshold value from the
current one, it is rejected, otherwise it is
accepted. The trust rating is updated
each time a deviation test has been per-
formed, meaning compatible nodes are
thus more trusted.
We use simulation to evaluate and
demonstrate the performance. We found
that CONFIDANT can keep the network
performance high even when up to half
of the network population misbehaves.
We showed that our approach of using
second-hand information significantly
speeds up the detection of misbehaving
nodes while keeping the number of false
positives and negatives negligibly low. 
Simulation results also suggest that the de-
viation test performs nearly as well on its
own without the trust component. We
have therefore analysed it in more detail
and in a more general context. We intro-
duced a mathematical model for a dis-
tributed reputation system based on the
deviation test. We show that it exhibits a
phase transition behaviour, ie critical para-
meter values exist, below which liars have
no impact and above which liars do have a
certain impact and corrupt the reputation
system. The critical values are obtained
via a mean-field approach and are con-
firmed by direct computation as well as
simulation. We thus give guidelines for a
good choice of parameters. We also pro-
vide insight into a fundamental design
question of such systems, namely whether
or not direct observations only should be
passed on as second-hand information.
Our current focus is on combining our
simulation-based approach with the ana-
lytical approach. In particular, we are ap-
plying the insights gained by the analysis
to find and zoom in on relevant parts of
the experiment space. We are interested
in seeing whether and how the phase
transition effects observed in the analyti-
cal work carry through to our simulations
of a more complex system, such as a mo-
bile ad hoc network implemented in
GloMoSim. Based on our analytical re-
sults, we now know what sort of be-
haviour we need to look for in the simula-
tions. This will then enable us to see how
the guidelines for a good choice of pa-
rameters from the analytical approach
translate into a good choice of parameters
for the more realistic system. We thereby
optimize the performance of the dis-
tributed reputation system.
In conclusion, we provide a methodology
to identify potential sweet spots and irregu-
lar behaviour of complex distributed repu-
tation systems in decentralized self-orga-
nized systems. We expect to complete the
combination of the two approaches by the
end of the year.
Links:
http://lcawww.epfl.ch/salem/IP4Web/
ImmuneNetworking.htm
http://winet-coop.epfl.ch/
http://icapeople.epfl.ch/leboudec
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~sonja
http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~jm288
Please contact:
Sonja Buchegger, SIMS, UC Berkeley, USA
Tel: +1 510 643 2251
E-mail: sonja@sims.berkeley.edu
Jochen Mundinger, Statistical Laboratory, 
University of Cambridge, UK
Tel: +44 1223 337952
E-mail: J.Mundinger@statslab.cam.ac.uk
Jean-Yves Le Boudec, 
EPFL-IC-LCA, Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 69 36631
E-mail: jean-yves.leboudec@epfl.ch
Distributed Reputation System in a Mobile Ad-hoc Network.
Nodes publish first-hand informationB misbehaves
A rates C’s reputation A isolates C
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Consider a disaster situation, a terrorist
attack for example, in which a wireless
network needs to be formed on an ad hoc
basis, without the support of any fixed
infrastructure, in order to interconnect all
relevant computing and communication
devices. The objective is to share infor-
mation with the highest security possi-
ble, since no-one can guarantee that
‘high-tech’ terrorists/attackers won’t try
to disrupt or intercept the rescue efforts.
However since neither a certification au-
thority nor a secure communication
channel exists, attackers have the ability
to eavesdrop and tamper with messages
transmitted over the air. Additionally,
since no Identification Authority is pre-
sent, group members may easily be im-
personated. 
In the above scenario, the main problem
involves group members establishing a
secure wireless network and at the same
time eliminating outside threats.
Moreover, in the case where a new node
arrives and wishes to become a member
of an existing group, how can this partic-
ular node participate in the group session
without distracting the initial group?
Having entered the group session, how
can this node then gain the same privi-
leges as other group members? And of
course, in a more general case where a
whole group is formed from scratch,
how can the network be extended to in-
corporate it?  
In order to answer the above questions,
the Telecommunications and Networks
Laboratory (TNL) of FORTH-ICS has
introduced a new family of security pro-
tocols for wireless ad hoc networks. The
security problems addressed by our sys-
tem are:
• Contributory key establishment. An ad
hoc network is set when a session key
is agreed to by all network entities.
This session key is generated through
a process where all participating enti-
ties contribute equivalently.
• Secure authentication. Strong authen-
tication must be derived from a small
password.
• Resilience against attacks during the
key formation:
- Forward authentication. If a mali-
cious party manages to compromise a
Secure Wireless Ad-Hoc Networking
by Ioannis G. Askoxylakis, Diomedes D. Kastanis 
and Apostolos P. Traganitis
The lack of a fixed infrastructure in ad hoc networks forces ad hoc hosts to rely
on each other in order to maintain network stability and functionality. It also
introduces several problems relating to security. This project focuses on the
security issues of ad hoc networks employed to meet specific emergency-
preparedness requirements. Examples of such emergency networks include those
deployed for disaster relief efforts following natural disasters or terrorist attacks,
or for military operations.
Figure 1: The node algorithm
for finding a partner and
performing a DH two-party
key exchange.
proc do_rnd_subrnd(rnd_nbr,subrnd_nbr)
mask:=00..01 //initialization.
mask:= mask << rnd_number-1 // left shift.
partnet := my_address XOR mask.
new_mask :=  mask >> 1 //right shift mask.
TPDH(partner, new_mask) // two party D-H.
if(result=fail)
/* In case of a failed D-H, the node
is seeking for a new partner,
within the same round
but within a different subround.
The new partner is the next partner
of the faulty node of this round.*/
mask:=mask << sround_number
new_partner:= my_address XOR mask
new_mask := mask >> 1
TPDH(partner,new_mask)
endif
Figure 2: 
The 2-d case of the
general d-cube
protocol.
2-d case
1st round
2nd round
Figure 3: 
The 3-d case of the
general d-cube
protocol.
3-d cube rounds 1 and 2.
3-d cube round 3
ERCIM News No. 63, October 2005
SPECIAL THEME: Security and Trust Management
22 ERCIM News No. 63, October 2005
network node, he will be unable to par-
ticipate in the network
- Tolerance against passive attacks.
Even if an attacker inserts, deletes, or
modifies the key-formation messages
exchanged among legitimate entities,
the security of the network will not be
compromised.
Within this project, we have modified
protocols for password authenticated
multi-party Diffie-Helman (DH) key ex-
change, to make them more resistant
against dictionary attacks. Figure 1 pre-
sents the node algorithm for finding a
partner and performing a DH two-party
key exchange, Figure 2 depicts the 2-d
case, which will be described below, and
Figure 3 depicts the 3-d case of the gen-
eral d-cube protocol. 
In the 2-d case it is considered that node
A is a faulty partner. Therefore, in round
1, node B will fail to complete the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange with A. However
(see Figure 1), instead of remaining idle
during this round, node B will perform a
new DH key exchange with node C. This
exchange will be successfully completed
resulting in a new key  and at the same
time informing  that  is faulty.
Meanwhile, node C has already per-
formed a successful key exchange with
node D creating key . Round 1 will be
concluded with the creation of the keys
and . On the second round, node B will
perform a DH key exchange with node D
and the key  will be created. This key will
be the common session key for the enti-
ties . Node C can calculate the common
session key for itself, since it has all
necessary information needed from the
previous round. The main point in this
scenario is that during the second round
node  won’t have to perform any DH key
exchange with the faulty node A. is being
isolated because its neighbors in earlier
rounds, than those foreseen by the d-cube
algorithm, have performed extra DH key
exchanges due to its behavior.
Additionally, we have also introduced
new key establishment methods based on
elliptic curve cryptography due to its
lighter computational requirements, which
is important for ad-hoc networks consist-
ing mostly of thin clients. Finally we have
proposed new faster protocols for the dy-
namic case, where the composition of the
ad-hoc network changes in time with the
arrivals and departures of nodes. 
The current project was developed by
TNL under the Information Security
Program of FORTH-ICS. 
Please contact:
Ioannis G. Askoxylakis, ICS-FORTH
Tel: +30 2810 391723
E-mail: asko@ics.forth.gr
The Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE)
funding consists of a €14 million three-
year research project supported by the
European Commission’s 6th Framework
Programme IST Thematic Priority. The
project started in November 2003 and is
planned to end in October 2006. Twenty
partners from ten EU Member States are
involved. Regional involvement ensures
that the end objective is to benefit SMEs.
Thanks to the technical commons pro-
vided by the DBE, even micro-compa-
nies will soon have access to advanced
information and communication tech-
nologies to grow their business. A mini-
mal set-up example may be a simple
broadband connection to the Internet
combined with a running peer-to-peer
version of the DBE SERVENT
(SERVer/clieNT) to have access to the
free common DBE services (such as
business Web presence and networking).
Thanks to the open-source DBE Studio,
more customized services or revenue-
generating owned services could just as
easily be developed and served. 
This example highlights a few visible as-
pects in favour of the sustainability of
the DBE: the use of basic means to ac-
cess the Internet; the provision of valu-
able open-source building blocks; and
the unobtrusive sharing of unused com-
puter resources of those who found value
in running the basic building blocks. The
research so far has focused on the scala-
bility, availability and reusability of the
technical commons. Advances have
been made in peer-to-peer replication;
firewall/NAT transparent transversal;
service composition; business ontology
modelling, learning and evolution; and
self-organization of service proxy and
super peers. 
The interest from driver SMEs has been
so significant that many of these driver
companies have lobbied for a faster im-
plementation of a more secure version of
the technical commons. Indeed, without
authentication of the interacting entities,
the three main security properties – con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability –
can be trivially violated. 
Unfortunately, the current state of the art
in security for identity management is
challenged by open large-scale decen-
tralized environments, such as peer-to-
peer on top of the Internet. The Identity
Gang task force has recently been set up
to discuss whether or not the new
Microsoft Identity Meta-system pro-
posal is a sound basis on which to build
decentralized identity management. This
proposal seems to scale down the scope
of Microsoft’s previous Passport effort
with regard to identity management. It
Decentralized Identity 
for the Digital Business Ecosystem 
by Jean-Marc Seigneur
Trustworthy decentralized identity mechanisms are promising to foster the Digital
Business Ecosystem (DBE), an EU-funded FP6 IST Integrated Project. While
progress has been made and driver SMEs are lobbying for more, such mechanisms
still remain on the research agenda.
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appears to indicate that federated identity
management may never be globally
adopted by SMEs due to their overheads. 
In addition, in the spirit of a self-orga-
nized DBE, identity management in
DBE should be an entity-centric identity
management solution rather than a sys-
tem-imposed identity management.
Entity-centric identity management is in-
herently decentralized because any en-
tity is free to choose how its identifiers
and credentials are managed. The current
proposal is to store IDBEs – the identi-
fiers and their associated credentials – in
CREdential Servers (CRES), similarly to
the GRID MyProxy credential reposi-
tory. In fact, the GRID initiative has sim-
ilar security requirements to those of
DBE, especially to coordinate resource
sharing in dynamic, multi-institutional
virtual organizations. The worldwide
Grid community has put a lot of effort
into security between decentralized vir-
tual organizations. It therefore makes
sense to reuse their work, which eventu-
ally consists of a comprehensive tool kit
called the Grid Security Infrastructure
(GSI). However, since securely using the
GSI involves quite a steep learning
curve, we envisage a simplified version
of the GSI, with more convenient graphi-
cal user interfaces than the basic GSI
command line tools. We are also work-
ing towards a more portable CRES than
the MyProxy credential server.
The CRES may be either local or remote
and would be used to retrieve X509
Proxy Certificates credentials when
needed. The advantage of a remote
CRES is that users can use IDBEs on dif-
ferent computers without undertaking
the risky task of moving the long-term
credentials between these computers. If
the CRES is managed by a professional
CRES DBE service provider, the long-
term credentials become better protected
thanks to the knowledgeable security
staff of the provider. The choice of the
trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs) is
left to the SERVENT owners. By de-
fault, the trusted CAs may be limited to
CAs run by known DBE regional cata-
lysts. However, our approach is open to
external providers such as the current
main Internet CAs or specific peers run-
ning a DBE CRES service. Thus, we
allow the DBE peers to use a spectrum of
technical trust in IDBEs: from self-
signed, to certified by a web of computa-
tional trust or free CAs, such as CAcert,
to current professional CAs including in-
surance and fraud protection services.
Links:
DBE website: http://www.digital-ecosystem.org 
The DBE team at Trinity College Dublin 
(thanks to DSG DBE for the general 
discussions and David O’Callaghan for his 
comments with regard to Grid security):  
http://www.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/?category_id=-55
GRID Security Infrastructure: 
http://www.globus.org/security/
Computational trust: 
http://www.trustcomp.org/
The Identity Gang: 
http://www.identitygang.org/
Example DBE driver SME lobbying for more 
security: http://yukatan.fi/display/yukatan/
2005/07/12/DBE+updates
Please contact:
Jean-Marc Seigneur, 
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Tel: +353 1 608 1761
E-mail: Jean-Marc.Seigneur@trustcomp.org
The first DBE driver companies workshop.
Nowadays, a global information infra-
structure connects remote parties world-
wide through the use of large-scale net-
works, relying on application-level pro-
tocols and services such as the World
Wide Web. Human activities are increas-
ingly based on the use of remote re-
sources and services, and on the interac-
tion between remotely located parties
that may (and sometimes should) know
little about each other. Because of the
vast amount of personal information thus
available, concerns are growing regard-
ing the privacy of users: effective infor-
mation sharing and dissemination can
take place only if users have some assur-
ance that disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion is not a risk. Digital identity man-
agement is therefore of paramount im-
portance for supporting successful inter-
action. A comprehensive identity man-
agement solution should provide com-
plete support for the definition and the
life-cycle management of digital identi-
ties and profiles, as well as infrastructure
for exchanging and validating this infor-
mation.
Emerging scenarios of user-service in-
teractions in the digital world are also
pushing toward the development of pow-
erful and flexible privacy-enhanced ac-
cess control models and languages. The
need for privacy means that access con-
trol policies and models must be
rethought, and new forms of authoriza-
tion specification and enforcement de-
veloped. In particular, two major issues
exist: i) access control needs to operate
even when interacting parties wish to re-
main anonymous or to disclose only spe-
cific attributes about themselves; ii) data
Towards Privacy-Aware Identity Management 
by Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati 
and Pierangela Samarati
The overall goal of the PRIME project (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe)
is the development of a privacy-enhanced identity management system that allows
users to control the release of their personal information. The PRIME architecture
includes an Access Control component allowing the enforcement of protection
requirements on personal identifiable information (PII). 
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collected during access control as well as
data stored by the different parties may
contain sensitive information on which
privacy policies need to be applied. 
In the context of the PRIME project, our
main task is the development of the
Access Control Decision Function
(ACDF) module, together with the defi-
nition of a privacy-aware model and lan-
guage for specifying and enforcing pro-
tection requirements on PII. 
The access control component is based
on a simple and expressive language
whose main features are summarized as
follows:
• Flexible and expressive access control
rules. Access control rules make use of
partial identities associated with users.
It is also possible to specify access
control rules relating to subjects ac-
cessing the information and to re-
sources to be accessed, in terms of rich
ontology-based metadata.
• Interactive enforcement. An access
control component may not have all
the information it needs to decide
whether or not access should be
granted. On the other side, requesters
may not know in advance which infor-
mation they need to present to get ac-
cess. As a consequence, the access
control process is a way of negotiating
with the access requester the disclo-
sure of additional personal informa-
tion to achieve a final access decision. 
• Client-side restrictions. In addition to
traditional server-side access control
rules, users should be able to place re-
strictions on the use of their personal
information once released to a third
party. For this purpose, we introduce
the notion of release policies govern-
ing the release of properties, creden-
tials and PII of the party.
• Anonymity and end-user control. The
access control system enables full end-
user control over the digital identity to
be used. In other words, access control
needs to operate even when interacting
parties wish to remain anonymous or
to disclose only specific attributes
about themselves.
• Interchangeable policy format. Parties
need to specify protection require-
ments on the data they make available
using a format that is readable by both
humans and machines, and is easy to
inspect and interchange. The language
therefore has a simple declarative
form. 
The ACDF module is under develop-
ment and will be integrated with the
PRIME architecture, which will be de-
veloped in collaboration by Compagnie
IBM France, IBM Research GmbH
(Switzerland), Unabhangiges
Landeszentrum fuer Datenschutz
(Germany), Technische University
Dresden (Germany), Deutsche
Lufthansa AG (Germany), Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven (Belgium), T-
Mobile Deutschland GmbH (Germany),
Hewlett-Packard Ltd (UK), Karlstads
Universitet (Sweden), Universita’ degli
Studi di Milano (Italy), Joint Research
Centre (Italy), Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique (France), Johann
Wolfgang Goethe Universitaet Frankfurt
(Germany), Chaum LLC (USA),
Rheinisch-Westfalische Technische
Hochschule Aachen (Germany), Institut
EURECOM (France), Erasmus
Universiteit Rotterdam (The
Netherlands), Stichting Katholieke
Universiteit Brabant (The Netherlands),
Fondazione Centro San Raffaele del
Monte Tabor (Italy), and Swisscom AG
(Switzerland).
Links:
PRIME project: http://www.prime-project.eu.org/ 
Security Group at the Dipartimento di 
Tecnologie dell’Informazione, Universita’ 
degli Studi di Milano: http://seclab.dti.unimi.it 
Please contact:
Pierangela Samarati
Universitá degli Studi di Milano, Italy 
E-mail: samarati@dti.unimi.it
Future large-scale health care will in-
volve many different organizations co-
operating in patient care, including hos-
pitals, GPs, dentists, pharmacies, drug
companies and insurance companies.
With the advent of new wireless health-
care devices, it is becoming feasible to
contemplate new applications that offer
real-time health care to patients, and in-
volve complex interactions between
many services in many organizations. 
Consider a simple scenario in which a
patient with an acute heart condition sub-
scribes to a monitoring service that pro-
vides wearable sensors and a small wire-
less controller. These devices send moni-
tored information to the service centre
and provide feedback, if necessary, to
the patient from a medic. If an emer-
gency is detected, the monitoring service
calls an ambulance. The monitoring ser-
vice needs access to patient cardiac his-
tory from the patient’s GP and from the
hospital where the patient had treatment,
and so liaises with the emergency ser-
vices and the hospital to which he/she
will be taken for emergency treatment.
Assume the monitoring service also pro-
CareGrid: Autonomous Trust Domains 
for Healthcare Applications
by Naranker Dulay, Emil Lupu, Morris Sloman, Jean Bacon, 
David Ingram and Ken Moody
The overall goal of the CareGrid project will be to develop middleware for
supporting decisions based on trust, privacy, security and context models. Health
care will be used as the application domain, but the middleware developed will
be applicable to other e-science applications.
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vides anonymous monitoring records for
medical research. Hospitals need to in-
teract with the patient’s GP and possibly
social services in order to provide care
for a patient following treatment.  In a
small hospital, there may not be suffi-
cient local expertise to evaluate patient
information such as X-rays and ECG
readings, and so these need to be sent to a
remote expert over the network. Perhaps
the patient’s usual consultant is unavail-
able and a new trusted one must be cho-
sen: this is a form of trust-based choice
of service. A consultant evaluating an X-
ray or an ECG may wish to search for
similar examples via a medical services
grid but then the question of trust in the
source of the examples arises. Issues of
trust, privacy, security and context per-
vade this simple scenario.
CareGrid aims to provide middleware
for organizing and coordinating trust,
privacy and security decisions across
collaborating entities using autonomous
trust domains and context. Trust do-
mains can be federated and/or grouped in
hierarchical or P2P fashion. This re-
quires protocols for group-membership
and trust negotiation, as well as an over-
arching architecture that is self-manag-
ing. Examples include a body-area net-
work monitoring the health of a patient, a
team of care workers responsible for a
patient, and a hospital or regional health
authority. In addition to trust domains,
specific components of the CareGrid ar-
chitecture include the following:
• A trusted communication layer some-
what akin to SSL/TSL that supports
trust negotiation, privacy control and
evidence collection. Requests for
trusted interactions are forwarded to the
local trust domain, which is responsible
for determining whether the interaction
should succeed or fail. This can involve
negotiation with the trust domain of the
requester as well as other trust domains.
The trust domain is also capable of pro-
viding a signed statement of the reasons
for success or failure. If a request suc-
ceeds, the system will typically estab-
lish a new secure channel and trigger
any necessary security adaptations, eg
in the communications or access con-
trol systems.
• A language framework for specifying
trust, privacy, security and manage-
ment policies.
• A federated access control model suit-
able for expressing authorization policy
for dynamic trust-domains and dynami-
cally created security associations, in
particular to dynamically change autho-
rizations, or mandate changes to the se-
curity policy in response to changes in
trust and context. 
• An evidence service that collects, fil-
ters, synthesizes and anonymizes ex-
perience, risk, recommendation and
reputation data that can be used as evi-
dence for trust evaluation. Note that
evidence may have to be archived for
audit and statistical evaluations. The
evidence service will include
anonymization mechanisms to main-
tain the usefulness of evidence data to
the greatest possible extent, while still
honouring privacy requirements. 
• A context management service that al-
lows trust, privacy and security to be
related to context, and for triggering
trust-privacy-security adaptations
when context changes. Examples of
context include the location of a per-
son or device, the time of day, environ-
mental readings, physiological state
(eg heart rate), patterns of past be-
haviour, user preferences and current
roles. The context management ser-
vice will support context schemas,
context sensing and flexible context
querying. Initial work will be per-
formed at Imperial College on incor-
porating uncertainty into context val-
ues and defining functions over uncer-
tain contexts. 
• Mechanisms for protection against at-
tacks on the trust-privacy-security-
context infrastructure.
The CareGrid project is a collaborative
project between groups at Imperial
College London and the University of
Cambridge. The two groups have com-
mon and complementary expertise in dis-
tributed and ubiquitous systems, includ-
ing security and trust management. The
project is funded by the UK’s EPSRC and
is due to start in October 2005.
Please contact:
Naranker Dulay, Imperial College London, UK
Tel: +44 20 7594 8288
E-mail: nd@doc.ic.ac.uk
Resource discovery and communication
are fundamental problems in the net-
working of devices and services.
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) is a
widely accepted solution for discover-
ing, controlling and monitoring net-
worked appliances. Network installa-
tion becomes simple; furthermore, net-
works can be built in which one termi-
nal controls all appliances and each ap-
pliance can be controlled by many dif-
ferent control points. However, UPnP
does not specify sufficient security
mechanisms. Secure UPnP was there-
fore developed to ensure that only au-
thorised nodes can control and monitor
devices.
Secure UPnP and Networked Health Care
by Kari Keinänen and Mika Pennanen
For today’s rapidly growing mobile environments, VTT Information Technology’s
research is providing middleware for the development of networked health-care
systems, and other applications for various end-user devices (PDAs, mobile
phones etc) and wireless networks (WLAN, Bluetooth etc). The key point is the
addition of network facilities to existing applications, rather than the development
of new applications.
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Security Solution 
Our Secure UPnP provides authentica-
tion of hosts, data confidentiality and in-
tegrity, as well as key management. We
employ well-known and proven security
components, in particular Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) and X.509 certifi-
cates. 
SSL is widely used, for example, to se-
cure bank account access over the public
Internet. We use SSL to secure all TCP
traffic, which carries most of UPnP mes-
sages. To establish an SSL session, each
node must have a X.509 certificate for
authentication. Certificates are granted
by a local Certificate Authority (CA) but
only if the Administrator has accepted
the new node. UPnP discovery phase
uses UDP where it is not possible to use
SSL, but we encrypt UDP data. The
UDP encryption key is shared by the
whole network and distributed using
SSL. 
Application Areas
Secure UPnP makes it possible to build se-
cure networks that are easy to install and
have multiple control terminals. A variety
of physical networks can be used and
shared with other applications.
Application areas include health care in
homes, hospitals, gyms and outdoor
sports, home networks, building networks,
industrial automation, sensor networks,
and transport telematic networks.
The Networked Health Care system
VTT pioneered the concept of ‘overall
personal health-care information sys-
tem’. Networked Health Care can be
used with several health care instru-
ments, eg scales, exercise cycles or fit-
ness steppers to improve people’s health.
We work with several personal scenarios
that aim to effectively control a person’s
weight and improve his/her overall fit-
ness. We focus on the middleware layer
and communication solutions. Users re-
ceive advice and information and the op-
tion of exercise training lessons with
their own personal instructor, eg motiva-
tional virtual cycling environments with
adjustable resistance. Providing detailed
exercise feedback is a good way of en-
couraging people to manage their own
personal health care.
The Networked Health Care system can
be integrated with a number of appli-
ances: for instance, an exercise cycle
which lets you choose the speed of resis-
tance, with the motivating virtual cycling
environment working as a remote con-
trol. Personal health information such as
heart rates, speed and calorie consump-
tion/supply are collected directly from
the Networked Health Care instruments
(eg scales, exercise cycle) or from the
user’s profile (eg eating habits). Such in-
formation helps to monitor and control
weight and fitness progression, to en-
courage physical exercise and to im-
prove the user’s health. 
The system provides secure communica-
tion between instruments (see devices
below) and only authenticated devices
can join the Secure UPnP network. The
network is a self-organizing system,
which allows ‘on-the-fly’ associations be-
tween application entities and network re-
sources without complex configuration.
Future work will concentrate on adding
new appliances to the system. We also
intend to provide remote controlling sup-
port between private networks.
Please contact:
Kari Keinänen, VTT, Finland 
Tel: +358 9 456 5673
E-mail: kari.keinanen@vtt.fi
Mika Pennanen, VTT, Finland
Tel: +358 9 456 5623
E-mail: mika.pennanen@vtt.fi 
Figure 2: Networked Health
Care system.
Figure 1: 
Secure UPnP architecture.
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Mobile Dynamic Virtual
Organizations (MDVO)
Services shared by groups or individuals
within distributed computing environ-
ments can be seen as virtual organisa-
tions (VOs). Within a traditional Grid
these organizations can be seen as gener-
ally static and non-mobile. These tradi-
tional non-mobile VOs benefit from
being able to register and link to services
in permanent ways. Since service ad-
dresses and location details very rarely
change, they can be made subject to
common security measures associated
with static networked topologies.  
In Akogrimo, mobility is clearly
a key concern. Since the VOs
are both mobile and dynamic,
several security issues are raised
ranging from connection insecu-
rity (wireless or otherwise) to
Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) chal-
lenges. These security problems
are present in particular during
service discovery and re-discov-
ery, since mobile services are
prone to loss of connection,
changes in bandwidth and so on. 
Operative Virtual
Organisations (OpVO)
Within Akogrimo this problem
is approached by using a sepa-
rate VO for the processing of
services. This separate VO is re-
ferred to as an Operative Virtual
Organization and is in existence
for the lifetime of the particular work-
flow. In this model, user and service
agents wrap a security layer around Grid
users and services. The OpVO is linked
to a Base VO via secure messaging and
shared components, but it is essentially a
temporary environment for the execution
of services as opposed to the more per-
manent traditional view of the VO. A
simple illustration of the basic security
steps in the execution of a mobile Grid
service can be seen in the figure.
The figure shows a service able to oper-
ate within VHE2, a Virtual Hosting
Environment, wrapped by a service
agent (SA), and able to be invoked by a
workflow in the OpVO.  Security is han-
dled in the VHE where the service re-
sides and also in the Base VO where the
service is registered. The Base VO is
central to the model and has the power to
create and destroy an OpVO. This allows
the existence of a hierarchy, the apex of
which is a central point of security and
policy enforcement for the workflow.
Direct communication should not be
possible between entities (eg users, ser-
vices, resources etc) that belong to dif-
ferent administration domains, without
going through the Base VO’s
security services. The execution
of services within the OpVO
and VHE reduces the workload
on the Base VO, and it can be
argued that this reduces the po-
tential of a security breach oc-
curring within the main Base
VO, which could be running
multiple OpVOs.
During workflow execution the
Base VO in the model is largely
used as a repository of VHE ser-
vice details and security policy.
The Workflow Manager links
the VHEs to the Base VO for the
purpose of discovery and autho-
rization during the creation of
an OpVO. This link calls ser-
vices located in the VHEs by
looking into the Base VO’s ser-
vice registry. As services are
discovered and brought into the
An Akogrimo Approach to Securing Virtual
Organizations within Mobile GRID Computing
Environments
by Thomas Kirkham, Giuseppe Cirillo, Julian Gallop, Damian Mac
Randal, Brian Ritchie and Pierluigi Ritrovato
The Akogrimo Project (EU FP6-IST, 2004 to 2007) was introduced in a previous
article, ‘The Grid Goes Mobile’ in ERCIM News (Issue 59). Akogrimo is aiming to
radically advance the pervasiveness of Grid computing across Europe. To achieve
this goal, and in addition to embracing layers and technologies which are intended
to make up the so-called next-generation Grids (eg knowledge-related and
semantics-driven Web services), Akogrimo aims to design and prototype a
blueprint of a next-generation Grid that exploits and closely cooperates with
evolving mobile Internet infrastructures based on IPv6. In this article, initial higher-
level work on the security of virtual organizations and future plans for work in
the security area are discussed.
The Operative VO architecture and key security points.
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OpVO they are authenticated and
granted access via the secure exchange
of tokens issued by the Base VO. If a ser-
vice drops out or loses its connection
after discovery, the workflow manager
has the ability to send a request from the
OpVO for a new service to be used; in
this case the discovery and authentica-
tion process from the Base VO will be
repeated. This re-authentication will help
prevent security breaches such as ‘man
in the middle’ attacks, which are popular
on wireless connections. In addition, all
traffic from the OpVO to the Base VO
will be via an encrypted Web Service
Secure Conversation link.
Conclusion and Future Work
In finding a solution to the problem of
mobile Grid-based security, it can be ar-
gued that the use of Operative Virtual
Organisations is the tip of the iceberg.
The model is presented here in simplistic
terms: plenty of scope exists for future
investigation. The areas in which we are
currently looking to improve security in-
clude greater monitoring, integration
with security capabilities and constraints
provided at the Network (mobile) layer
(eg OASIS SAML standard for identity
management and single sign-on), speci-
fications for common security wrappers
for integrating resources of administra-
tion domains having their own security
policies and mechanisms, further details
on the secure exchange of messaging
using Web Service Secure Conversation
and encryption, and the defining of pol-
icy in a more detailed fashion at all levels
of the project.
Links:
CCLRC www.cclrc.ac.uk/
CRMPA: http://www.crmpa.it/
Akogrimo: http://www.mobileGrids.org/
Please contact:
Julian Gallop, CCLRC, UK
E-mail: j.r.gallop@rl.ac.uk 
Global computers aim at providing a
global and uniform access to services
through distributed computational in-
frastructures consisting of very large
numbers of interacting devices.
Prominent examples include the
Internet, banking and telephone net-
works, digital video infrastructures,
peer-to-peer and ad hoc networks.
While global computers may profoundly
affect our quality of life, they will only
become pervasive if novel security archi-
tectures are developed for bringing to
users the level of reliability and security
they expect for sensitive services. To re-
alise this aim, the project will develop
and combine type systems and program
logics that can be used to ensure func-
tionality and security policies for Java-
enabled global computers.
Next Generation Global Computers
The next generation of global computers
will emphasize the emergence of infras-
tructures with increasingly autonomous
and heterogeneous devices:
• autonomy: devices will not be sub-
jected to a global and uniform control,
may belong to several global comput-
ers and may even move between dif-
ferent global computers
• heterogeneity: devices shall present
significant differerences in their com-
putational infrastructure (operating
systems, communication protocols, li-
braries) and resources (memory, power
autonomy, connectivity).
In order to accommodate these trends, the
next generation of global computers will
also require that devices are extensible
with the computational infrastructure,
platform or libraries needed to execute
services as requested. This evolution will
cause global computers to escape the
scope of computational models which
permeate mobile code, the Grid, or
agents, and which impose a sharp separa-
tion between untrusted mobile applica-
tions, and the fixed and trusted computa-
tional infrastructure upon which they ex-
ecute. At the same time, the evolution to-
wards autonomy and extensibility will
create new security threats that would not
be found in current computational mod-
els, and thus any security architecture for
global computing must comply with re-
quirements that reach far beyond the lim-
its of the current state –of –the art.
A Security Architecture 
based on Verifiable Evidence
The objective of the Mobius project is to
develop a security architecture that
meets the needs of global computers, by
providing:
• innovative trust management, dispens-
ing with centralized trust entities and
allowing individual components to
gain trust by providing verifiable evi-
dence that they do not affect the secu-
rity of the overall system
• static enforcement mechanisms, suffi-
ciently flexible to cover the wide range
of security concerns arising in global
computing, and sufficiently resource-
MOBIUS – Securing the Next Generation 
of Java-Based Global Computers
by Gilles Barthe
Global computers have the potential to realize the vision of ambient intelligence and
to offer citizens a global and uniform access to services. Yet their success is
conditioned by the development of appropriate security architectures that help
establish trust and security in a global setting. Within the Global Computing 2 initiative,
the FET Integrated Project ‘MOBIUS’ aims at providing the technology for securing
next-generation global computers, building on the Proof Carrying Code paradigm.
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aware and configurable to
be applicable to the wide
range of devices in global
computers
• support for system compo-
nent downloading, for com-
patibility with the view of a
global computer as an
evolving network of exten-
sible devices.
The security architecture
builds on ideas from Proof
Carrying Code (PCC), and re-
quires that mobile code is pro-
vided with a certificate, ie a
condensed mathematical
proof that the code is secure.
In order to be applicable to
global computers, the MO-
BIUS project will pioneer a
PCC architecture that accom-
modates the distributed nature of global
computing and allows enforcement of ad-
vanced policies, including both func-
tional properties and advanced security
properties such as non-interference or re-
source control. To ensure scalability, the
MOBIUS project will also extend and
combine two prime enabling technolo-
gies of PCC, ie type systems and program
logics, and use the strength of these two
techniques in hybrid certificates, to be
verified through combined type checking
and proof checking. Finally, the MO-
BIUS project will develop certificate
translation as a means to bring to the code
consumers the benefits of program verifi-
cation, which is almost universally per-
formed at source code level.
To maximize its impact, the MOBIUS
project is focusing on Java-enabled
global computers, and uses program log-
ics that support the Java Modelling
Language (JML). It will allow an imple-
mentation of the MOBIUS security ar-
chitecture to be built on top of existing
tools developed within the consortium.
This will be evaluated on case studies
from a range of application domains,
covered by the consortium industrial
partners, and by the End User Panel.
The project is coordinated by the French
research institute INRIA, and is part of
the pro-active initiative Global
Computing 2, launched by the Future
and Emerging Technologies unit of the
IST programme.
Link: 
Project web site: http://mobius.inria.fr 
Please contact: 
Gilles Barthe, Project coordinator:
Tel: +33 4 92 38 79 38
E-mail: Gilles.Barthe@sophia.inria.fr
Virtual Communities (VC) are a means
of linking people with common interests,
professional occupations, or resource-
sharing habits. Several virtual communi-
ties already exist – Orkut, Kazaa, or
Bittorrent to name the most prominent –
and attract millions of Internet users. As
a member of a virtual community one
can access community resources that
should be protected from outsiders. The
challenges are to identify someone as a
community member, since communities
grow and shrink dynamically, and to es-
tablish trust between users on the basis
of limited knowledge between parties.
Existing virtual communities do little to
protect their members from malicious in-
ternal and external users and as such are
not acceptable for commercial use. 
VC provide mechanisms that help to im-
plement efficient, secure access to confi-
dential data or protected resources. A
member of a VC can access community
resources that are not accessible to out-
siders. For example, Apple could build a
community of users who wish to down-
load high-quality movies from iTunes’
distributed secure servers. There should
be no centralized access point, so that the
system is more scalable and easier to
maintain. Different community members
may also have different privileges, in-
cluding those of reselling music to other
members of the iTunes community. The
actual quality and the exact limitations
Trust in Virtual Communities
by Marcin Czenko, Jeroen Doumen and Sandro Etalle
The objective of our research in the context of the BSIK Freeband project I-SHARE
is to provide a sophisticated trust management framework for virtual communities. 
Modern verification environments based
on program logics typically operate on
source programs. The Mobius project
proposes to combine these
environments with type systems, which
provide an automated means to enforce
many basic policies, and use the
resulting framework to cover a wide
range of security policies for global
computers. Evidence of programs
adherence to their policy will be
recorded by certificates: condensed,
easily checkable formal proofs. In order
to bring the benefits of source code
verification to the code consumers,
compilers will be enhanced to transform
specifications and proofs for bytecode
programs, yielding certificates that
establish the correctness of bytecode
programs and can be checked
efficiently by code consumers.
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on the amount of music that is accessible
to community members depend on how
much they wish to pay. In this scenario,
the outsiders would be all the Internet
users who do not pay for this access. As
they are not members of the iTunes com-
munity, they cannot access any files
there and cannot inject fake music into
the network. Additionally, such con-
trolled access to community re-
sources helps not only to protect
confidential information, but also
to plan the use of bandwidth or
load of service providers. 
Trust management makes secu-
rity transparent to the end users
so that they no longer require
substantial knowledge of the se-
curity mechanisms. Many exist-
ing approaches to trust manage-
ment require a centralized archi-
tecture and thus do not fit well in
the distributed nature of the
Internet. Therefore, in our re-
search, which started late 2004,
we are combining distributed trust man-
agement and VCs into one solution that
is suitable for both commercial and pri-
vate use. 
The first question we are trying to ans-
wer is how to formalize support for VCs
in a trust management system. Secondly,
because of the highly distributed nature
of the Internet, we also need to investi-
gate under which conditions the infor-
mation necessary for secure user authen-
tication is available. Finally, we aim to
construct a suitable system design that
provides security that is transparent to
the end user.
Each community member must be able to
prove membership of a community prior
to being granted specific access permis-
sion. Such proof can be thought of as a
distributed set of signed statements called
credentials. Each credential consists of at
least an issuer, a subject and a statement
representing the actual meaning of the
credential. The issuer and the subject of a
credential both represent Internet users.
A credential expresses the issuer’s trust
in the subject, giving the subject the per-
missions stated in the credential. The
number of VCs one can join is unlimited;
therefore one can be the subject of many
credentials at the same time.
As a typical scenario, imagine that Alice
would like to share the videos she took
during her last holiday (see Figure 1). She
does not want the whole world to see her
footage, but rather wishes to restrict the
potential audience to her friends. Alice
can create a virtual community – ‘friends’
– which contains Alice’s friends. To re-
alise this, Alice issues credentials, one for
each of her friends, saying that he or she is
a member of the community ‘Alice’s
friends’. In practice, Alice does not have
to contact her friends personally, but the
whole process can take place behind the
scenes, using software agents acting on
behalf of Alice and her friends. Alice’s
friends may not be even aware of the
whole process and simply view Alice’s
film as if it was their own.
When Bob wants to see Alice’s films, his
software agent contacts Alice’s software
agent to check whether the credentials
provided by Bob’s software agent are
valid. Checking validity of credentials is
not the only task a software agent must
perform. If Alice’s software agent de-
tects that the credentials received from
Bob’s software agent are not sufficient to
grant permission to see the pictures,
Bob’s software agent might be asked to
provide additional credentials. As all
credentials are stored in a distributed
fashion, the job of Bob’s agent is to track
down the necessary credentials. The dif-
ficulty is in locating all the necessary
credentials efficiently.
Imagine that some time later, Bob, en-
couraged by his good experience with
Alice, also wants to share his videos.
Bob then creates his own ‘friends’ com-
munity, and each member of the ‘Bob’s
friends’ community is allowed to see
Bob’s movies. Additionally, as Bob
trusts Alice, he decides that all members
of ‘Alice’s friends’ community can also
access his movies. In other words, Bob
says that any friend of Alice is also a
friend of his. We say that Bob delegates
authority over his ‘friends’ community
membership to Alice.
Even more sophisticated scenar-
ios might arise. Therefore, our
overall objective is to design and
implement a sophisticated trust
management framework that
simplifies the protection of confi-
dential resources in virtual com-
munities. We use a so-called role-
based trust management ap-
proach to model both trust and
virtual communities. In our ap-
proach we use logic and logic
programming to represent com-
plex trust relationships that can
appear in a real life experience.
We also propose a new role-based trust
management language with a formal
declarative meaning based on the well-
founded semantics for logic programs.
Our research is conducted as part of the
I-SHARE project, which is part of the
Freeband consortium funded by the
Dutch national BSIK program. I-Share
involves five project partners: Delft
University of Technology (TU-Delft),
Eindhoven University of Technology
(TU/e), University of Twente (UT),
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU) and
Philips Research, Eindhoven.
Links:
Freeband Communication web site: 
http://www.freeband.nl/index.cfm?language=en
I-SHARE Project web site: 
http://www.freeband.nl/project.cfm?id=520
DIES group home page: 
http://dies.cs.utwente.nl
Please contact:
Marcin Czenko, 
University of Twente, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 53 489 3709
E-mail: Marcin.Czenko@utwente.nl
Jeroen Doumen, 
University of Twente, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 53 489 2801
E-mail: Jeroen.Doumen@utwente.nl
Virtual Communities allow for controlled access to shared
resources.
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The TrustCoM framework will enable
the secure enactment of collaborative
business processes in self-managed and
dynamic value-chains of businesses and
governments. One of the central aspects
of TrustCoM research is VO (virtual or-
ganization) management, which aims to
support dynamic virtual communities
throughout their entire life cycle.
Although proprietary implementations
of VO management tools exist, secure
tools based on interoperating open stan-
dards are not yet available. The open
standards on which to build them are just
being released as reliable implementa-
tions. The TrustCoM project provides an
answer to these problems with its VO
Management framework, based on the
open Service-Oriented Architecture and
open Web Services standards.
Current Grid-based VO management
supports only the VO memberships
function – listing VO members who are
entitled to use VO resources. It does not
support the management of the risks as-
sociated with VO membership through:
• the identification of potential VO part-
ners through reputation management
• the roles defined in business process
models that VO partners perform to
limit resource access and reputation
transfer
• the contractual or SLA obligations on
the VO for security and privacy
• the enforcement of policies derived
from contracts for quality and timeli-
ness of business process enactment.
The VO management subsystem should
provide the services necessary for main-
taining the VO structures, monitoring
members’ performance, enforcing VO
policies, assigning members to play cer-
tain roles and perform tasks and so forth.
In essence, the VO management process
involves ensuring that the members of a
VO play by commonly agreed-upon
rules and that members’ behaviour is ob-
servable, thus allowing these rules to be
enforced.
The TrustCoM VO management compo-
nent will not only provide a membership
function but will also provide life-cycle
and context management functions.
These will provide a generic VO man-
agement layer that records membership
as well as addressing the management of
the risks of VO membership.
TrustCoM is following the life-cycle
model developed in the VO roadmap
project (Camarinha-Matos and
Afsarnabesh, 2003), including phases
such as identification, formation, opera-
tion/evolution and dissolution. The iden-
tification phase deals with setting up the
VO; this includes selection of potential
business partners by using search en-
gines or looking up registries. VO for-
mation involves partnership formation,
including the VO configuration by a VO
manager (who distributes information
such as policies, Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) etc), and the binding
of the selected candidate partners into
the actual VO. After the formation
phase, the VO can be considered to be
ready to enter the operation phase where
the identified and properly configured
VO members perform according to their
role. Membership and structure of VOs
may evolve over time in response to
changes of objectives or to adapt to new
opportunities in the business environ-
ment. Finally, the dissolution phase is
initiated when the objectives of the VO
have been fulfilled.
Making the creation, operation and dis-
solution processes rapidly responsive re-
quires both the appropriate legal mecha-
nisms and dynamic management of the
VO. There appears to be an obvious
match between the business-driven de-
sire to create and manage dynamic VOs,
and the technological solution available
in composable Web services. Although
proprietary IT implementations of com-
posable Web service tools exist, secure
tools for VO management (VOM) based
on interoperating open standards are not
yet available, let alone those that also ad-
dress legal issues. Consequently, IT
based dynamic VOM is confined to
closed communities that have adopted a
single proprietary solution. Although
proprietary implementations of VO man-
agement tools can operate either within
single organizations or across coopera-
tive organizations, they also pose sub-
stantial adoption costs, which in turn are
only justified by long-term relationships
within the closed community using the
proprietary approach.
In addition, the TrustCoM VO manage-
ment solution will use, where appropri-
ate, declarative specifications of VO
management processes. This approach
will allow the publishing of and access to
commonly understood and approved
protocols of VO management and VO
members’ interactions. Having these in-
teractions explicitly choreographed will
reduce the complexity of end-point soft-
ware components of VO members’ soft-
ware, thus increasing the robustness,
sustainability and efficiency of VO man-
agement procedures. TrustCoM is using
WS-CDL specification (a candidate
W3C standard) to specify choreogra-
phies and emerging open-source tools,
which allow modelling and validation of
the protocols as well as end-point gener-
ation for WSDL-based and BPEL-en-
abled services.
Tools for managing the identified risks
are being developed in the TrustCoM
framework for the trust, business process
management, contracts and policy com-
ponents respectively. Putting them to-
Secure and Trusted Virtual Organization
Management
by Adomas Svirskas, Alvaro Arenas, Michael Wilson 
and Brian Matthews
TrustCoM is a European Integrated Project that aims to develop a framework for
trust, security and contract management in dynamic Virtual Organizations.
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Within Germany’s nationally funded
Network on Wheels (NoW) project,
which started in June 2004, there is a
dedicated group of experts from various
companies and research institutes look-
ing at potential attacks on such networks
and devising methods and mechanisms
to protect them. This is the first occasion
that security considerations have been
applied from the start of network devel-
opment. This article provides some in-
sight into the current and future work on
security in the NoW project, and demon-
strates the seriousness with which secu-
rity and privacy are regarded. 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks 
of vehicular ad hoc networks, devising
both core technologies and possible ap-
plications for these networks. It is ex-
pected that in the near future, the current
specification of WAVE (Wireless
Access for Vehicular Environments), a
802.11 based technology, followed by
specifications from the Car2Car
Communication Consortium (C2CCC)
will put into place basic technologies for
applications such as advanced active
safety, faster and better driver informa-
tion systems and exciting applications
for entertainment and information based
on vehicle to vehicle (v2v) and vehicle to
infrastructure (v2i) communications. 
The challenges in this new type of net-
work are the short contact times between
different mobile nodes, a far from ideal
radio environment that includes large ve-
hicles which obstruct the radio path, and
the sheer size of the network. In addition,
management of the network can no
longer rely on ubiquitous infrastructure
access, as ad hoc networks allow for
infrastructure-independent operation.
These restrictions of the network make
the design of security mechanisms very
challenging, and the fact that the system
is under constant development does not
make the process any easier. 
Security Requirements 
Users, that is, the customers, will only
buy and use a system they trust. From the
users’ point of view, the system can be
trusted if it provides the orthogonal re-
quirements of availability, privacy and
correctness.
Trusted Network on Wheels 
by Matthias Gerlach 
Vehicular ad hoc networks may become the largest ad hoc network ever deployed,
and of fundamental importance for the safety and comfort of their users – the
drivers and passengers. Clearly, deploying a revolutionary technology on such
a large scale presents major challenges in the secure design of the system, its
protocols and applications.
gether to manage the risks of joining and
operating within a VO is the TrustCoM’s
innovation for VO management. The
TrustCoM VO management component
represents a generic VO application
layer that ties together these TrustCoM
components, and it is upon these compo-
nents that individual VOs can build and
incorporate specific applications (eg
aerospace modelling tools, remote learn-
ing tools). By defining the standard VO
management protocols based on open
standards, TrustCoM is contributing to
the establishment of VO management
patterns that may be useful beyound the
scope of the project itself.
Link: 
http://www.eu-trustcom.com/
Please contact:
Michael Wilson, CCLRC,
Tel: +44 1235 446619
E-mail: m.d.wilson@rl.ac.uk
Figure 1: Generic
system model in
support for a
heuristic security
analysis.
Figure 2: As soon as two or more vehicles
are in radio communication range, they
connect automatically and establish an ad
hoc network.
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Availability of the system implies that
the system is robust even in the presence
of malicious or faulty nodes, which due
to the network size might be the general
case. Note that this is not solely a secu-
rity requirement but a common system
requirement. Hence, security mecha-
nisms can only provide a basis to enforce
availability. 
The privacy of users is an important asset
in public networks. Basically, privacy re-
quires untraceability of actions to a user
and unlinkability of the actions of a node.
These must be provided by the applica-
tions as far as possible, and be inherent to
the internal functionalities of the commu-
nication system. The communication sys-
tem should give away as little informa-
tion as possible that could be used to vio-
late the privacy of the users. 
Finally, correctness in the security do-
main relates to secure communication.
This boils down to the well-known secu-
rity objectives of authenticity, freshness
(which is, in fact authenticity in the time
domain), integrity and non-repudiation. 
Another important aspect within such a
system will be authorization in the differ-
ent levels of the system, starting from the
authorization to send messages on the
radio interface to the use of certain appli-
cation layer services provided by the net-
work. 
Approach in NoW
Specifying the security requirements is
not enough, however. As the envisioned
system is a complex one, we would like
to identify potential attacks on the sys-
tem in advance, in particular as we al-
ready know some of the base technolo-
gies. The generic system model depicted
in the figure helps to specify the different
subsystems’ vulnerabilities and security
requirements. Current work consists of
detecting attacks on the different parts of
the system and estimating both their im-
pact and probability. 
Starting from general attacks such as the
insertion of false messages, system de-
nial of service and privacy violations, at-
tacks can be refined using attack trees.
Attack trees represent a hierarchical or-
ganization of an attacker’s goals in AND
and OR conjunctions, which become
more detailed the deeper down the tree
you go. Attack trees can also be used to
assess the impact of a system’s vulnera-
bilities, so as to decide where the priority
of the work must be. Within the Security
Working Group of NoW, we are cur-
rently constructing attack trees for a vari-
ety of applications using different ser-
vices of the communication subsystem.
Both the attack trees and mechanisms to
secure the network will be published and
discussed openly as they are finalized. In
the Security Working Group of NoW,
we believe that security mechanisms
should be publicly scrutinized before
they become part of the actual system. 
Links: 
NoW project website: 
http://www.network-on-wheels.de
C2CCC web site: http://www.car-to-car.org
Please contact: 
Matthias Gerlach, Fraunhofer FOKUS
Tel: +49 30 3463 7132
E-mail: Matthias.gerlach@fokus.fraunhofer.de
Delegation is a major goal when a real
scalable distributed authorization system
is needed. However, the uncontrolled use
of delegation statements can become an
important security threat; for instance,
any user could improperly obtain over a
resource the same privileges as the owner
of that resource. Therefore, delegation
solutions should include a mechanism to
control the delegation of privileges as
well as making use of suitable authoriza-
tion statements. 
One of the first tasks in the project PRIVI-
LEGE, developed in the Computer
Science Department at the University of
Malaga, has been to study and put into per-
spective the delegation implications of
standard schemes that have been proposed
in the literature as solutions for distributed
authorization problems. As such, we have
realized that in PolicyMaker and Keynote
schemes, the delegation statement does
not exist; that is, any authorization state-
ment can be delegated once and then again
without any control. On the other hand,
SDSI considers three different possibili-
ties for controlling delegation, although
SPKI reduced it to a Boolean condition.
Such a Boolean parameter is only a mod-
est mechanism to control the depth of del-
egation. 
There are more theoretical solutions that
use logic programming for the represen-
tation of authorization and delegation
statements. In logic programming, those
statements are represented as predicates,
and decisions are based on formulae ver-
ification. Although logic programming
offers a powerful mechanism to repre-
sent authorization and access control de-
cisions, it has important drawbacks: it is
difficult to understand and has obscure
transcription. Moreover, no logic solu-
A Graphical Delegation Solution for X.509
Attribute Certificates
by Isaac Agudo, Javier Lopez, Jose A. Montenegro
Delegation is becoming a major topic for distributed authorization. Several
approaches have been proposed in order to provide delegation in distributed
environments. However, none of these matches all the requirements of a flexible
delegation method. Based on work from the project PRIVILEGE, a flexible solution
based on the use of graph theory is proposed.
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tion has been integrated in any standard
authorization framework.
Additionally, there are graphical solu-
tions that are thought to be less powerful
but more expressive and easily under-
stood. A graphical solution may be based
on the use of directed graphs to model
authorization and delegation processes.
Basically, this maps each credential in
the system to a directed edge in a graph.
Edges go from the issuer of the autho-
rization or delegation statement to the
subject who is authorized or granted
privileges. Usually, the root of the tree is
the owner of the resource under consid-
eration. It is therefore possible to study
the relations between entities in the sys-
tem in a graphical way.
The project PRIVILEGE focuses on the
use of X.509 Attribute Certificates.
Therefore, it includes a practical imple-
mentation of a Privilege Management
Infrastructure (PMI). As part of our
work, we have developed a mechanism
to perform a controlled delegation that
uses the extension fields of the attribute
certificates. Our proposal is based on
graphical solutions, attaching extra in-
formation to every edge in the graph. In
particular, we include an index, a real
number in the interval [0,1], that mea-
sures the level of confidence of the issuer
on the issued certificate. Moreover, we
distinguish between positive and nega-
tive statements. Positive ones grant the
right encoded in the certificate and nega-
tive ones deny it. In order to encode it,
we use the variable sign (see Figure 1).
We also add another Boolean variable,
delegation, to define whether the certifi-
cate can be chained, ie delegated.
We add this information directly in the
certificate, by using the extensions field.
This field allows us to include additional
information into the attribute certificate.
Although the X.509 standard
provides several predefined ex-
tension categories, we focus on
the delegation extension cate-
gory, which defines different ex-
tension fields. Among them, the
ITU-T recommendation in-
cludes:
Authority attribute identifier: In
privilege delegation, an
Attribute Authority (AA) that
delegates privileges shall itself
have at least the same privilege
and the authority to delegate that
privilege. An AA that is delegat-
ing privilege to another AA or to
an end-entity may place this ex-
tension in the AA or end-entity
certificate that it issues. The ex-
tension is a back pointer to the
certificate in which the issuer of
the certificate containing the extension
was assigned its corresponding privi-
lege. The extension can be used by a
privilege verifier to ensure that the issu-
ing AA had sufficient privilege to be
able to delegate to the holder of the cer-
tificate containing this extension.
That extension is suitable for our pur-
poses. However, it does not define the
weight associated to the edge between
the issuer and the holder of the certificate.
Therefore, we define our own extension,
in ASN.1 (see Figure 1), based on the au-
thority attribute identifier. 
This new extension determines a se-
quence between the source of authority
(SOA) and the holder. Each sequence in-
cludes another sequence, ArcsId, in
which is included the information of the
edges in the graph, weight of the edge,
origin node, and Boolean information
about statements, delegation and sign.
The destination node must match the se-
rial number of the attribute certificate.
As the reader can infer, the design of au-
thorization and delegation statements in
a graphical mode can be converted auto-
matically into X.509 attribute certificate
chains. The example included in Figure
2 shows the graphical design of delega-
tion statements (normal line) and autho-
rization statements (dotted line) and its
equivalent representation using attribute
certificates. Every attribute certificate
stores, in the extensions field, the graphi-
cal information.
PRIVILEGE will finish at the end of
2006, and is scheduled to have a com-
plete practical implementation of the
delegation solution, further elaborating
on the complexity of management of del-
egation chains in fully distributed autho-
rization systems.
The Research Project PRIVILEGE
(TIC2003-8184-C02) has been funded
by the Spanish Ministry of Science and
Technology.
Please contact:
Javier Lopez, University of Malaga, Spain
Tel: +34-952-131327
E-mail:jlm@lcc.uma.es
Figure 1:
Attribute
certificate and
weight path
identifier
extension.
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm
Issuer
Validity period
Holder
Attributes
Iss. Unique Identifier
Extensions
AA signature
WeightPathIdentifier EXTENSION ::=
{
  SYNTAX             ArcsId
  IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce-WeightPathIdentifier }
}
WeightPathIdentifierSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ArcsId
ArcsId ::= SEQUENCE {
Origin          IssuerSerial,
Destination  HolderSerial,
Weight         REAL (0..1),
Delegable    BIT,
Sign             BIT
}
Figure 2: Design of statements and corresponding
certificate chains.
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The PERMIS Trust Model
The resource (target) owner is the autho-
rization root of trust for all resources
under his/her control. This is termed the
Source of Authority (SOA) in an X.509
Privilege Management Infrastructure
(PMI). The SOA creates his/her policy
and stores it in a digitally signed policy
attribute certificate (AC). When the
PERMIS authorization engine is initial-
ized, it receives the distinguished name
of the SOA and the location of the LDAP
directory where it will find the SOA’s
policy. PERMIS reads the policy from
the SOA’s LDAP entry and checks its
signature. PERMIS can now be assured
that it has the correct policy to trust, and
that it has not been tampered with.
The SOA’s policy, which follows the
classical Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) model, comprises two parts:
• a Role Assignment Policy (RAP)
which specifies who is trusted to as-
sign which roles (in the form of X.509
role ACs) to which groups of user 
• a Target Access Policy (TAP) specify-
ing which roles are needed to access
which target resources under which
conditions. 
The RAP enables static delegation of au-
thority because the SOA names one or
more (possibly remotely located) man-
agers who are trusted to assign roles.
Since the names of these remote man-
agers are included inside the digitally
signed policy AC, they cannot be un-
knowingly tampered with; therefore
PERMIS is able to trust these remote
managers to assign X.509 role ACs to
groups of users. Any role ACs that PER-
MIS is passed or retrieves in getcreds
that do not conform to the RAP are sim-
ply discarded. In this way the SOA can
be assured that his/her delegation policy
is being rigorously enforced by PER-
MIS.
Current Research Projects
DyVOSE, run jointly with the e-Science
centre at the University of Glasgow, is
adding dynamic delegation of authority
to PERMIS. This feature will allow the
SOA to indicate whether he/she trusts re-
mote managers to further dynamically
delegate their roles to other users in the
same domain as themselves. Dynamic
delegation of authority is supported in
the X.509 PMI model through an appro-
priate certificate extension, and the SOA
can set an integer in his/her PERMIS
policy to indicate the length of the dele-
gation chain that can be trusted. Once
this is fully implemented, the SOA will
not need to update his/her RAP policy
with the names of additional remote
managers who can be trusted, as is cur-
rently the case. Instead, as long as these
additional managers have a valid delega-
tion path to a remote manager in the
PERMIS policy, then any ACs issued by
them will be trusted.
DyCom is combing PERMIS with
GRASP to create a fine-grained access
control infrastructure for Grids, and is
also adding separation of duties to the
PERMIS trust model. Separation of du-
ties will ensure that a user with mutually
exclusive roles is not allowed to perform
conflicting tasks. This requires PERMIS
to keep a record of past and present au-
thorized actions, so that future conflict-
ing ones can be denied. In an offshoot of
this project, we have developed a secure
Security and Trust Management Extensions 
to the PERMIS X.509 
Privilege Management Infrastructure
by David Chadwick
Authorization in vitual organizations (VOs) and multi-organization federations is
difficult to set up and manage. Having a pan-VO role- or attribute-based access
control infrastructure can ease the burden, providing that trust relationships
between the various entities can be safely managed. This is the problem domain
that the PERMIS authorization system (www.openpermis.org) has been addressing
for several years. Currently, three research projects are adding significant new
capabilities to it, in the form of dynamic delegation of authority, separation of
duties, and reputation management of the participants.
PERMIS authorization system. 
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audit Web service (SAWS) as a general
purpose audit tool. 
As part of the EC TrustCoM integrated
project, we have built a reputation man-
agement system capable of recording the
reputations of users (for example, as per-
formed by eBay). The next step is to link
this to the PERMIS decision engine so
that access control decisions can be
based on the current reputation of a user
(which is related to their trustworthi-
ness). Currently users are either trusted
or not to access a target resource, based
on their X.509 ACs. Once reputations
are included in the decision-making
however, users’ permissions may be re-
moved if their reputation drops below a
certain value. In addition, the TrustCoM
project is defining standard protocols for
credential validation (ie calls to getcreds)
and the making of policy decisions (ie
calls to decision). It is likely that WS-
TRUST and XACML respectively will
be used for these. PERMIS will be en-
hanced to support these protocols once
they have been finalized by the consor-
tium.
Link:
http://www.eu-trustcom.com
Please contact: 
David W. Chadwick, University of Kent, UK
Tel: +44 1227 82 3221
E-mail: D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk 
Richard Sinnott, (for DyVOSE)
University of Kent, UK
E-mail: ros@dcs.gla.ac.uk,
Damian Mac Randal (for DyCom)
CCLRC, UK
E-mail: D.F.Mac.Randal@rl.ac.uk 
Theo Dimitrakos (for TrustCoM), BT, UK 
E-mail: theo.dimitrakos@bt.com 
Dynamic coalitions and autonomic com-
munication add new challenges: a truly
autonomic network is born when nodes
are no longer within the boundary of a
single enterprise, which could deploy its
policies on each and every node and
guarantee interoperability. An auto-
nomic network is characterized by the
self-management and self-configuration
of its constituent nodes. In an autonomic
network, nodes are partners that offer
services and lightly integrate their efforts
into one (hopefully coherent) network. 
Policy-based network access and man-
agement already requires a paradigm
shift in the access control mechanism:
from identity-based access control to
trust management and negotiation, but
even this is not enough for cross-organi-
zational autonomic communication.
In an autonomic communication sce-
nario, a client may have all the necessary
credentials to access a service but may
be unaware of this. Equally, it is unreal-
istic to assume that servers will publish
their security policies on the Web so that
clients can perform policy combinations
and evaluations themselves. Rather, it
should be possible for a server to ask a
client, on the fly, for additional creden-
tials: the client may then choose whether
or not to disclose them. The server then
re-evaluates the client’s request taking
the newly submitted credentials into
consideration, and iterates the process
until a final decision (of ‘grant’ or
‘deny’) is reached. We call this modality
interactive access control.
While some of these challenges can be
solved by using policy-based self-man-
agement of networks, this is not univer-
sally the case. Indeed, if we abstract
away the details of the policy implemen-
tation, we can observe that the only rea-
soning service that is actually used by
policy-based self-management ap-
proaches is deduction: given a policy and
a set of additional facts, find out all con-
sequences (actions or obligations) of the
policy and the facts. We simply look at
whether granting the request can be de-
duced from the policy and the current
facts.
Autonomic communication needs an-
other reasoning service: abduction.
Loosely speaking, we could say that ab-
duction is deduction in reverse: given a
policy and a request to access a service,
we want to know what credentials/events
are missing that would grant access. 
The contribution of the framework is in
the way we bootstrap from the basic rea-
soning services of deduction, abduction
and consistency checking, a comprehen-
sive interactive access-control algorithm
that computes on the fly the missing cre-
dentials needed for a client to get access.
We extended the algorithm to cope with
arbitrary access policies so that in cases
of inconsistency it performs a recovery
step and finds a set of excessing creden-
tials banning the client to get a solution
for the desired resource. Following this,
a strengthened version of the algorithm
is devised that is resistant to DoS attacks.
We have modelled a fully fledged ac-
Interactive Access Control and Trust
Negotiation for Autonomic Communication
by Hristo Koshutanski and Fabio Massacci
Recent advances in Internet technology and globalization of peer-to-peer
communications offer organizations and individuals an open environment for
rapid and dynamic resource integration. In such an environment, federations of
heterogeneous systems are formed with no central authority and no unified
security infrastructure. Considering this level of openness each server is
responsible for the management and enforcement of its own security policies
with a high degree of autonomy. 
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cess-control framework and shown its
correctness and completeness.
Based on the interactive access-control
algorithm, we introduce a trust negotia-
tion protocol that runs on both client-
and server-sides. It automatically inter-
operates and negotiates missing creden-
tials until either a final decision of
‘grant’ is taken and the negotiation is
successfully completed, or one of the
parties fails to negotiate the requirements
and the service request is denied.
Figure 2 shows a message-flow example
of the negotiation protocol. 
We have implemented the interactive
access-control modality as a Web
Service. For this purpose we used
X.509 PKI/PMI and OASIS SAML
standards as a unified way of conveying
credentials and defining authorization
statements respectively. We integrated
the two standards with the W3C SOAP
protocol so that our access control en-
gine can be used and invoked in a plat-
form-independent manner. We have
done a Java wrapper for the DLV sys-
tem that implements the interactive ac-
cess-control algorithm. The DLV sys-
tem is used as a core engine of the basic
functionalities of deduction, abduction
and consistency checking. The architec-
ture of the access control engine is
shown in Figure 1.
Future work will look at characterizing
the complexity of the framework and ex-
tending it to cope with stateful systems
and especially with the open issues of re-
vocation of credentials.
Links: 
X.509 PKI/PMI: 
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html 
OASIS SAML: 
http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security 
W3C SOAP: http://www.w3.org/TR/soap 
DLV: http://www.dlvsystem.com 
Please contact: 
Hristo Koshutanski and Fabio Massacci,
University of Trento, Italy 
E-mail: hristo@dit.unitn.it, massacci@dit.unitn.it
Figure 1: Interactive Access-
Control Engine Architecture.
Figure 2: Example of Interoperability of the Negotiation Protocol. 
PAR denotes the policy for access to resources, PAC denotes the policy for access to
credentials and PD the policy for disclosure of (foreign) credentials. Credentials used in
the policies are in the following notations: Alice’s local credentials are marked with
subscript ‘A’ and Bob’s with ‘B’, respectively. Bob’s access policy PAR says that access
to resource r1 is granted if {CA1,CA2} or, alternatively, {CA1,CA3} are presented by Alice.
Access to r2 is granted if Alice satisfies the requirements for access to r1 and presents
CA4. 
Analogously, we read Bob’s disclosure policy PD as meaning that to disclose the need
for credential CA2 there should exist already-disclosed credential CA1, which by default
is always disclosable. In contrast, the need for credential CA4 is never disclosed but is
expected by Bob’s access policy PAR when r2 is requested.
The real interactions start when Alice requests r1 from Bob. Then, suppose that the set
{CA1,CA2} is minimal with respect to the other alternative {CA1,CA3}, and say that CA2
contains a role lower in the hierarchy than the role in CA3. Then, Bob replies with two
counter requests to Alice. Alice, in her turn, runs the two requests in new threads and
replies to Bob, according to her policy for access to sensitive credentials PAC, with a
counter-request for CB1 and the disclosure of CA2.
The negotiation process continues, as shown in the figure, until Bob discloses all
credentials requested by Alice and Alice, in her turn, discloses all credentials requested
by Bob so that at the end the desired resource is granted. 
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The eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language, XACML, is a very effective
and now widely adopted standard lan-
guage for expressing access control poli-
cies. The specification of XACML in-
cludes the language, its semantics and a
framework for making access control de-
cisions based on XACML policies.
However, XACML is currently lacking an
access control model for the policy itself. 
The current XACML model of policy
administration puts the access control of
policy administration outside the policy
model. To control who may edit the pol-
icy, mechanisms such as access control
at the operating system level must be
used. In large distributed systems, such
mechanisms may prove difficult to man-
age. There may be a need to manage the
policies in parts of the system not under
the control and within the trust of a spe-
cific Policy Decision Point, for instance
from a mobile device. The rights to
change the policy may themselves be
highly dynamic. Consequently, there is a
need for the policy itself to have an ac-
cess-control policy model. Our research
has been focused on these issues. 
The Policy-Based Reasoning group at
SICS has for several years been perform-
ing research on how best to manage large
numbers of access permissions in a dy-
namic and decentralized network. The
main results of our research are a frame-
work and a calculus, called privilege cal-
culus. In the framework, we distinguish
between access permissions and admin-
istrative permissions, both referred to as
privileges. Privilege calculus allows us
to reason about privileges and their ad-
ministration. The core mechanism of
privilege calculus is constrained delega-
tion, which allows constraints to be put
on the creation of privileges, access per-
missions or administrative permissions. 
Recently, a number of XACML
Technical Committee (TC) members
have discussed the need for adding ad-
ministrative support to XACML. The
discussed ideas are very similar to the
delegation mechanism of privilege cal-
culus. We are now looking into the pos-
sibility of extending the current XACML
specification and implementing our dele-
gation model in SUN’s open-source
XACML implementation. Our work will
be part of two projects – the TrustCom
EU FP6 project and Decentralized
Authorization Management in Network-
Based Defence – in which we investigate
the use of XACML as a policy language
for distributed services in highly dy-
namic and decentralized networks.
Adding delegation to XACML involves
defining new forms of policy that can ex-
press administrative rights, and a new
processing model that can verify that
delegations have been performed in an
authorized manner. The new features of
XACML help users to implement flexi-
ble decentralized access control manage-
ment, for instance in the setting up of a
large organization or joint business ven-
ture. This will reduce the administration
costs of the organizations and make them
more flexible. Having these features
available in a standard access control
language will make their use simpler and
more widely adopted.
Please contact:
Babak Sadighi Firozabadi or Erik Rissanen,
SICS, Sweden
Tel: +46 8 633 1500
E-mail: babak@sics.se, mirty@sics.se
Access-Control Policy Administration in XACML
by Erik Rissanen and Babak Sadighi Firozabadi
In recent years, researchers at SICS have been looking at managing large numbers
of access permissions in a dynamic and decentralized network. The main results
of our work are a framework and a calculus, called privilege calculus, for access
permissions and their administration. 
The Information Security group at the
Institute for Informatics and Telematics
(IIT-CNR) has both practical and theoret-
ical experience with many aspects of se-
curity. The Formal Methods and Tools
(FM&&T) group at the Institute of
Information Science and Technologies
(ISTI-CNR) has experience in research
on formal methods for the specification,
design and verification of computer sys-
tems. Recently, researchers from these
two groups teamed up to investigate how
a formal model of team automata can con-
tribute to the specification and analysis of
security issues. This cooperation will be
continued in the context of an EU-funded
project on Software Engineering for
Service-Oriented Overlay Computers
(SENSORIA).
Team automata form a mathematical
framework introduced in 1997 by C.A.
Ellis to model components of groupware
systems and their interconnections. Their
Contributions of Team Automata in Security
by Maurice ter Beek, Gabriele Lenzini, and Marinella Petrocchi
Researchers from two CNR Institutes in Pisa are studying ways in which a formal
model of team automata can be exploited to specify and analyse security-related
issues.
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usefulness however extends to modelling
collaborations between system compo-
nents in general (for an overview, see
[TA]).
A team automaton is composed of com-
ponent automata that distinguish input,
output and internal actions. Input actions
are not under the automaton’s control,
but are triggered by the environment,
which can include other automata.
Output and internal actions are under its
control, but only the output actions are
observable by other automata. Input and
output actions together constitute the ex-
ternal actions and form the interaction in-
terface between the automaton and its en-
vironment; internal actions do not partici-
pate in any interactions.
In composing a team automaton, the crux
is to define the way in which those origi-
nally independent components interact.
Their interactions are formulated in terms
of synchronizations of shared actions, a
method for modelling collaboration
among system components that is well
known in the literature. A component au-
tomaton does not necessarily participate
in every synchronization of an action it
shares. Hence there is no such thing as
the unique team automaton over a set of
component automata. Rather, a whole
range of team automata, distinguishable
only by their transition relation, can be
constructed from a given set of compo-
nents. It is this freedom to choose a tran-
sition relation that sets the team automata
framework apart from most other au-
tomata-based models, most of which use
a single and very strict method for choos-
ing the transition relation of an automa-
ton composed over a set of automata - in
effect resulting in composite automata
that are uniquely defined by their con-
stituents.
In a series of papers (see [TA]) we have
shown how team automata can ade-
quately be used to model (and sometimes
verify) various access control policies,
multicast/broadcast communication pro-
tocols and general (cryptographic) com-
munication protocols.
To begin with, we have demonstrated the
model usage and utility for capturing in-
formation security and protection struc-
tures, as well as critical coordinations be-
tween these structures. On the basis of a
spatial access metaphor, various known
access-control strategies have been given
a rigorous formal description in terms of
synchronizations in team automata.
Moreover, we have initiated to validate
some of the resulting specifications with
the model checker Spin.
Later we have initiated the use of team
automata for the security analysis of mul-
ticast and broadcast communication. For
this purpose, we have performed a case
study in which team automata were used
to model an instance of a particular
stream signature protocol. The one-to-
many and one-to-all communications,
which are so typical of multicast and
broadcast communications, were cap-
tured by team automata in a native way as
synchronizations between the set of com-
ponent automata constituting a team au-
tomaton. We have also developed a
framework for security analysis with
team automata, which has required three
basic formal steps. 
First, we defined an insecure communi-
cation scenario based on the addition of a
so-called ‘most general intruder’ to a
team automaton model of a secure com-
munication protocol. The intruder was
modelled as an active agent able to influ-
ence communication among honest
agents. This insecure scenario can be
used to analyse some security properties
of cryptographic communication proto-
cols involving two roles – an initiator and
a responder. Rather than occurring di-
rectly, all communication is assumed to
flow through an insecure channel. This
insecure channel may release some mes-
sages to an intruder, which in its turn can
either listen to or modify (fake) the mes-
sages passing through this channel.
When verifying security properties for
cryptographic communication protocols,
it is indeed quite common to include an
additional Dolev-Yao-style intruder that
is supposed to be malicious and whose
aim is to subvert the protocol’s correct
behaviour. A protocol specification is
consequently considered secure with ref-
erence to a security property if it satisfies
this property despite the presence of the
intruder. Abstracting from the crypto-
graphic details concerning the operations
according to which messages can be en-
crypted, decrypted, etc, the insecure sce-
nario is informally described by the team
automata interactions sketched in the fig-
ure.
Second, a well-established theory for
defining and verifying a variety of secu-
rity properties was reformulated in terms
of team automata and subsequently, a
compositional analysis strategy was de-
scribed for it. Under appropriate assump-
tions, this can be used to verify some se-
curity properties in the communication
protocol modelled by the scenario. 
Third, this framework was applied to
show that integrity is guaranteed for the
particular setting of the case study. This
shows the effectiveness of our approach
for a realistic stream signature protocol,
thus facilitating an easy comparison for
those familiar with other approaches. In
fact, an approach that uses an automata-
based formalism for the specification and
verification of properties in the field of
security is not unique, but has become
very popular in recent years.
Finally, very recently, team automata
have been used to model and verify a pro-
tocol aiming at privacy in communica-
tion among mobile agents. This was the
first attempt to use team automata for the
analysis of privacy properties.
Links:
[TA]: http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/~mtbeek/TA.html
FM&&T: http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/
IIT: http://www.iit.cnr.it/
Please contact: 
Maurice H. ter Beek, ISTI-CNR, Italy 
Tel: +39 050 315 3471
E-mail: maurice.terbeek@isti.cnr.it
An insecure
communication
scenario for team
automata.
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Cryptographic modelling and analysis is
typically complex, involving many sub-
tleties and details, even when the anal-
ysed protocols are simple. Furthermore,
analysis is handwritten and often tedious
to verify. These factors make the secu-
rity analysis of cryptographic protocols
susceptible to errors and omissions. 
This project demonstrates how to cast
cryptographic security analysis of dis-
tributed protocols within the
Probabilistic I/O Automata (PIOA)
framework of Lynch, Segala and
Vaandrager. This framework provides
standard tools for arguing rigorously
about the concurrency and scheduling
aspects of protocols. It supports reason-
ing with multiple levels of abstraction
and has a well-defined notion of compo-
sition. Consequently, using the PIOA
framework can help in making crypto-
graphic analysis more precise and less
susceptible to errors. 
In the context of this project, we aim to
develop general techniques applicable to
the analysis of a wide range of security
protocols that exhibit various levels of
complexity in terms of adversarial
behavior or the use of cryptographic
primitives. As a first step, we are cur-
rently analysing a relatively simple pro-
tocol, the two-party Oblivious Transfer
(OT) protocol, in the presence of a semi-
honest adversary (essentially, an eaves-
dropper). The particular OT protocol we
are studying is the classic protocol by
Even, Goldreich and Lempel, which uses
trapdoor permutations (and hard-core
predicates for them) as the underlying
cryptographic primitive. For the under-
lying cryptographic notion of security,
we start from Canetti’s Universally
Composable Security.
In spite of the relative simplicity of the
investigated case, the exercise is non-
trivial and requires addressing a number
of fundamental issues. These include
modelling resource-bounded computa-
tions, resource-bounded adversarial be-
haviour and scheduling, combining non-
deterministic and probabilistic choices,
and modelling computational hardness
assumptions. Some of these are beyond
the reach of the existing semantic theory
of probabilistic I/O automata. This pro-
ject therefore involves using not only
probabilistic I/O automata in security
protocol analysis but also extending the
basic theory to address the requirements
of such analysis.
Approach
One common approach to simplifying
cryptographic protocol analysis and im-
proving its correctness is to model cryp-
tographic primitives as ‘symbolic opera-
tions’, or ‘ideal boxes’, which represent
the security properties of the primitives
in an idealized way that involves no error
probabilities or computational issues.
This approach is quite promising; how-
ever, it does not completely remove the
need for cryptographic analysis of proto-
cols. Rather, it only proves the security
of the overall protocol by assuming the
security of the cryptographic primitives
in use. One still has to prove
the security of these primitives
in a fully fledged crypto-
graphic model with all its sub-
tleties. Our project proposes
an alternative (in fact, comple-
mentary) approach to making
cryptographic protocol analy-
sis more systematic and rigor-
ous, and thus less susceptible
to errors. 
We benefit from the powerful
proof techniques that have tra-
ditionally been used within I/O automa-
ton frameworks. In particular, we ex-
press the system at multiple levels of ab-
straction, where the highest level in the
abstraction hierarchy represents the
specification of the protocol and the low-
est represents the real-world system run-
ning the protocol. We demonstrate simu-
lation relations between these levels that
allow us to conclude that the real-world
system implements the abstract specifi-
cation. The composition operation for
PIOAs makes it possible to separate the
specification of correctness and security
requirements of the protocol, and to ex-
press the real-world system naturally, as
a composition of logically separate units
interacting with another.
Using Probabilistic I/O Automata to Improve
the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
by Ran Canetti, Ling Cheung, Dilsun Kaynar, Moses Liskov, Nancy
Lynch, Olivier Pereira and Roberto Segala 
Modelling cryptographic protocols and analysing their security is a tricky business.
On the one hand, valid modelling and analysis must address the concurrency
aspects of asynchronous distributed systems, with potentially adversarial
scheduling of events. On the other hand, realistic analysis must accommodate
the fact that, in most interesting cases, it is impossible to completely prevent
successful attacks against the protocol. Instead, we can only bound the success
probability of attacks that use a bounded amount of computational resources,
based on underlying computational hardness assumptions. 
The environment tries to distinguish the ideal-world
system, representing the specification of the
protocol, from the real-world system running the
actual protocol.
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Future Work
We would like to assess the techniques
we have developed so far in the analysis
of more complex protocols. This com-
plexity arise through more powerful ad-
versaries, more complex interaction pat-
terns between the components of the pro-
tocol, or more subtle uses of crypto-
graphic primitives.
One limitation of our current approach is
that the existing scheduling mechanism
is oblivious to execution histories and
hence significantly limits the capabilities
of the adversarial components. We will
investigate how our assumptions about
task-PIOAs and scheduling mechanisms
can be relaxed to enable the analysis of a
larger class of protocols.
Once our modelling and proof tech-
niques become more general and estab-
lished, we can focus on mechanizing our
proofs with interactive theorem-provers,
or even automate some or all of the proof
steps. 
Link:
Technical report: 
http://www.lcs.mit.edu/specpub.php?id=1792
Please contact:
Olivier Pereira, Université catholique de 
Louvain (FNRS), Belgium
Tel: +32 10 47 91 63
E-mail: pereira@dice.ucl.ac.be 
The security of most of the crypto-
graphic schemes in use today is based on
the assumption that some computational
problem is difficult to solve. For exam-
ple, the widely used RSA encryption
scheme is based on the difficulty of fac-
toring large integers. Part of the research
done in the Cryptology and Information
Security Group at CWI is devoted to the
study of models that allow for crypto-
graphic schemes based on assumptions
of a different nature.
One approach is to use quantum-me-
chanical effects, and to try to base the se-
curity solely on the laws of quantum
physics, without restricting the adver-
sary’s power. This has proven to be fruit-
ful in the context of Secure
Communication, where two mutually
trusting communicating parties require
security against an outside adversary.
However, it falls short of providing secu-
rity for mutually distrusting communi-
cating parties against each other. This
problem is known as Secure
Cooperation. A simple but already non-
trivial Secure Cooperation is the genera-
tion of a random bit, solely by interactive
(asynchronous) communication, such
that each party is convinced that the bit is
not biased against his preference.
Another example is the so-called
Millionaires’ Problem, where two par-
ties would like to find out who is richer,
but in such a way that the wealth of each
is not revealed to the other. In general,
using Secure Cooperation techniques al-
lows mutually distrusting parties to eval-
uate any given function on their private
inputs – revealing the function value but
protecting the individual private inputs.
A fundamental form of Secure
Cooperation is Oblivious Transfer. A
sender transmits two bits to a receiver,
who may choose which one he would
like to receive. This is executed in such a
way that the sender does not learn the re-
ceiver’s choice and the receiver only
learns the chosen bit and not the other
one. Oblivious Transfer is complete for
Secure Cooperation in that, at least in
principle, it can be used as a building
block to achieve any Secure
Cooperation.
Another approach is to design schemes
in such a way that a possible adversary is
literally swamped with data. He will
have to store them all in order to break
the scheme, and to obtain classified in-
formation and/or provoke a malfunction
of the scheme. However honest users of
the scheme who are not trying to break it,
need only store a small part of the infor-
mation. Such a scheme is then secure
under the assumption that a potential ad-
versary does not have overwhelming
memory, even though he might have in-
finite computing power.
Cryptographic Security by Swamping
Adversaries with Quantum Information
by Ronald Cramer and Serge Fehr
In the ongoing quest for cyber security, quantum mechanics plays an increasingly
important role. The Cryptology and Information Security Group at CWI in
Amsterdam recently designed a new practical scheme for so-called Oblivious
Transfer. This is a cryptographic tool known to be sufficient to secure any
cooperation among mutually distrusted parties. The new scheme is based on
quantum mechanics and the technological difficulty of storing photons without
disturbing their quantum state. The basic idea behind the scheme is to swamp
an adversary with more quantum information than they can possibly store.
According to quantum information theory, the uncertainty a potential adversary
has about the total amount of information can be exploited by the honest parties
in order to secure private information. 
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A particularly interesting feature of this
so-called Bounded-Storage Model is ‘ev-
erlasting security’: if the adversary fails
to store the mountain of data during the
execution of the scheme, then his chance
of breaking it is lost forever together with
the data he failed to store. That would
never change, even if they should obtain
larger storage capacity sometime in the
future. This is in sharp contrast to con-
ventional computational cryptography, in
which schemes may be broken ‘in retro-
spect’, once an adversary has gained suf-
ficient computing power. On the other
hand, while basing cryptography on com-
putational assumptions allows for very
efficient schemes, a major disadvantage
of the Bounded-Storage Model is the im-
mense amount of data that must be com-
municated (even for the honest users) in
order to be able to swamp a potential ad-
versary’s memory.
Recently, in collaboration with re-
searchers from Aarhus University
(Denmark), CWI’s Cryptology and
Information Security Group has put for-
ward and studied a variant of the
Bounded-Storage Model which is based
on swamping the adversary’s quantum-
memory: the Bounded-Quantum-Storage
Model. Quantum mechanics provide a
good platform for such an approach: on
the one hand, according to Heisenberg’s
Uncertainty Principle, converting quan-
tum information to classical information
by measuring irreversibly destroys some
of that information, and the challenge is
to arrange it so that the adversary cannot
afford this loss while honest users can.
On the other hand, in contrast to classical
information, storing quantum informa-
tion is very difficult (at this point essen-
tially impossible), and thus it requires
very little to swamp the adversary’s
quantum memory. 
In this model the CWI researchers have
constructed a scheme for Oblivious
Transfer, and thus indirectly for any
Secure Cooperation. The scheme in-
volves the transmission of a stream of
single photons (or other atomic parti-
cles), and it is proven secure under the
sole assumptions that Heisenberg’s
Uncertainty Principle holds
and that a potential adver-
sary cannot store more than
a large fraction of the trans-
mitted photons, even though
he may have infinite com-
puting power and classical
memory.
Apart from quantum cryp-
tography, CWI’s Cryptology
and Information Security
Research Group focuses on
all mathematical aspects of
cryptology, such as algebraic
secret sharing and secure multi-party
computation, computational number the-
ory (eg the Number Field Sieve Project
for factoring RSA challenge numbers),
information-theory-based cryptography,
public-key cryptography in general (in
particular, chosen cipher-text security
for encryption schemes), cryptographic
protocols, and formal security analysis.
Link:
http://www.cwi.nl/crypto
Please contact:
Ronald Cramer, CWI, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 20 592 4166
E-mail: Ronald.Cramer@cwi.nl
Serge Fehr, CWI, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 20 592 4257
E-mail: Serge.Fehr@cwi.nl 
Using quantum communication to achieve
cryptographic security.
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The new paradigms of ubiquitous com-
puting and high capacity data transfer
have opened up the Internet as the main
area for information interchange and
electronic commerce. Attacks against the
computer networks used by modern soci-
ety and economics for communication
and finance can therefore threaten the
economical and physical well-being of
people and organizations. To allow con-
tinuous risk estimation of today´s ICT
systems, there is an urgent need for mod-
els providing probabilistic measures of
operational security. 
Stochastic Modelling
During the last decade, significant re-
search has been performed on applying
traditional dependability techniques to
quantify the security attributes of ICT
systems. In particular, stochastic mod-
elling techniques such as Markov chains
Building a Stochastic Model for Security 
and Trust Assessment Evaluation 
by Karin Sallhammar, Svein Johan Knapskog and Bjarne Emil Helvik 
The ICT systems of today are complex inventions and we rely on their existence
in almost all aspects of our everyday life. It is therefore crucial that they can
provide the services we need whenever we require them. Due to the
interconnection of networked systems, attacks are becoming increasingly
sophisticated and can be performed remotely. To what degree can we trust that
a system will perform its intended task in a secure and reliable manner? 
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or stochastic Petri nets have been identi-
fied as promising approaches. In a de-
pendability context, a system will con-
tinuously be vulnerable to failures of
software and hardware, which may
transfer the system from a good state into
a corresponding failed state. Usually,
these methods do not consider failures
due to malicious acts. However, by using
an analogy between a system failure and
a security breach, it is possible to model
an intrusion attempt as one or more state
changes that transfer the system into a
security breach state, ie a state which de-
viates from the specified security policy.
The use of a stochastic model, which
combines security-related attacks with
traditional dependability fault sources
has a wide range of application: 
• to quantify security: by using the
steady-state probabilities of the
stochastic model, one can calculate
operational measures such as the
‘mean time to security compromise’
for the system
• for trade-off analysis: for example,
one may evaluate the possible effect of
security countermeasures before im-
plementing them 
• as a method to help administrators
find optimal defence strategies and to
calculate the expected loss associated
with different strategies. 
However, attacks may not always be
well characterized by models of random
nature. Most attackers will act with in-
tent and will consider the possible conse-
quences (satisfaction, profit and status
versus the effort and risk of their actions)
before they act. One of the remaining
challenges is therefore how to incorpo-
rate intelligent attacker behaviour into
the stochastic models. 
The Game Model
At the Q2S centre at NTNU, Norway, we
are developing a stochastic model that
can be used for assessing the security
and trustworthiness of ICT systems. Our
model considers all aspects that may af-
fect the security or dependability at-
tributes of the system, including:
• normal user behaviour
• administrative activities
• random software and hardware fail-
ures 
• intentional attacks.
To incorporate intentional attacks in the
model, the attacker behaviour must be
predicted. By using a stochastic game
model, we can compute the expected at-
tacker behaviour for a number of differ-
ent attacker profiles. 
The game model in the figure is based on
a reward/cost concept. This assumes that
attackers will consider the reward of suc-
cessful actions versus the possible cost
of detection before they act, and that they
will always try to maximize the expected
outcome of the attack. The dynamics of
the states of the stochastic games form a
Markov chain, under the assumption that
attackers, users and administrators do
not change their behaviour over time.
Having solved the stochastic game, the
expected attacker behaviour can then be
reflected in the transitions between states
in the system model, by weighting the
transition rates according to a probability
distribution. In the final step, the corre-
sponding stochastic process is used to
calculate security measures of the sys-
tem, in a similar manner to the common
availability and reliability analysis of
ICT systems. 
Previous research has shown that
stochastic models can be used to model
and analyse the trustworthiness of ICT
systems in terms of both security and de-
pendability attributes. Our current re-
search indicates that game theory is a
suitable tool for incorporating the ex-
pected attacker behaviour in such mod-
els. However, verifying the method’s
ability to predict real-life attacks will re-
quire further research, including valida-
tion of the model against empirical data. 
Link:
http://www.q2s.ntnu.no 
Please contact:
Karin Sallhammar
Centre for Quantifiable Quality of Service
(Q2S), NTNU, Norway.
E-mail: karin.sallhammar@q2s.ntnu.no
The interactions between the attacker and the system
modelled as a stochastic game.
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The collaborative project ‘Biometric
Access Control’, run with the ITIS e.V.
(located at the University of Federal
Armed Forces, Munich, Germany) and
Biometronix GmbH (Munich,
Germany), has developed a new, plat-
form-independent, flexible and TCP/IP-
based Biometric Local Area Network
Control Center (BioLANCC) in support
of both access-control systems and sin-
gle sign-on solutions. 
The following example illustrates the
motivation behind the current work on
networked biometric data control cen-
tres. Consider a holding company with
its headquarters and human resources
department in Munich, and two external
research laboratories in Budapest and
Zürich. Since the main administration
server in Munich hosts all the access
rights of employees, visitors, temporary
employees and cleaning staff, Munich
has an overview of the entire company.
Access rights may be changed (em-
ployee relocation), withdrawn (em-
ployee retirement), or added (new em-
ployment). Of course, the two research
labs in Budapest and Zürich also need to
be able to change access rights according
to their local requirements. In addition,
many different types of access-control
hardware, such as fingerprint scanners,
need to be grouped according to labs, re-
search groups, or buildings. Such an or-
ganization demonstrates the administra-
tive and organizational gains to be
achieved with BioLANCC.
Thus, the development of BioLANCC
was driven by a detailed organizational
requirements analysis, key security re-
quirements, and the need for an opera-
tion on multiple hardware devices as
well as on different operating systems.
The logically centralized management
approach includes distributed access and
maintenance of single users’ access. In
particular, the fast and efficient support
of access rights for temporary employ-
ees, or students in an academic environ-
ment, is a beneficial feature not found in
any other existing system. Remote and
centralized control have been integrated
based on a networked TCP/IP solution. 
Figure 1 depicts the system’s architec-
ture. The implementation basis is deter-
mined by a two-tier, Java-programmed
application, which accesses an SQL
database. The initial use of MySQL is in
the process of being replaced by a
Postgress database. In addition, a three-
tier version is under development, in
which multiple thin management clients
will be supported. BioLANCC’s specific
features include the standardized use of
an IP network for communications be-
tween all biometric access devices and
the control centre, and full platform in-
dependency; currently supported are
Windows, Linux, Solaris, and Mac OS
X. Other features are the integration of
multiple hardware devices (based on an
open device interface and the BioAPI), a
flexible user and device-group manage-
ment, a time-zone manager for users and
Flexible, TCP/IP-Based and Platform-
Independent Management of Biometric Data
for Access Control Systems
by Burkhard Stiller
The use of biometric data for access control, eg fingerprint scans, offers a
simplification of room access control or a key-management function. A detailed
cost analysis of existing systems shows that in addition to specific security
requirements, the loss of physical keys or magnetic access cards can increase
the overall costs dramatically. A large employee turnover, a large number of
access points, such as doors and gates, and various user- as well as key-groups
compounds the situation. A biometric data management approach would solve
these problems and additionally, would ensure that keys could not be passed on
to different personnel. 
The interactions between the attacker and the system modelled as a stochastic game.
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devices, and a user-selectable, graphical
interface for all management operations
(drag and drop). Finally, a reporting
module customizable by the user allows
for the supervision and backtracking of
correct access as well as the investiga-
tion of, for example, error reports and
failed authentications. 
BioLANCC has been successfully im-
plemented at the Department of
Computer Science of the University of
Federal Armed Forces in Munich. The
system includes eighteen fingerprint
scanners and caters for several hundred
permanent and temporary employees, in-
cluding professors, research assistants
and students. At this stage, fingerprint
scanners (V20 devices) from Identix are
in use; this installation is currently the
largest biometric access control system
of its type in Europe. During the course
of the project, additional requirements
were identified and are being integrated.
This covers the BioAPI mentioned
above, as well as different types of bio-
metric hardware devices (eg iris scan-
ners). A device wizard offers the possi-
bility of integrating a new access point
easily into the system. Multilingual sup-
port is also at hand. Finally, its continued
effective operation in a harsh academic
environment demonstrates
BioLANCC’s robustness.
Links: 
http://de.biometronix.com/index.php?biolancc
http://us.biometronix.com/index.php?biolancc
Please contact: 
Burkhard Stiller, 
University of Zurich, Switzerland 
and ITIS e.V. Munich, Germany
E-mail: stiller@ifi.unizh.ch
The Research Challenge
Many emerging security challenges are
the result of disappearing boundaries:
• innovations in mobile technology and
the convergence of personal commu-
nications and computing devices mean
that the ability to access corporate data
is no longer limited to making a physi-
cal connection to the corporate net-
work
• flexible working practices and net-
worked personal electronics are blur-
ring the boundary between work and
leisure time, making work an activity
rather than a place
• converged multi-service IP networks
are removing the distinction between
voice/video and data, and computation
and communication
• service-oriented technology such as
Web services, Grid computing and
utility computing are being used to in-
terconnect computing resources and
databases, and to connect business
processes across enterprise bound-
aries, heralding the era of the virtual
organization.
Such changes and advances are not inse-
cure in themselves, but security has tra-
ditionally been about defining and de-
fending boundaries. In a world without
clear boundaries, new approaches will be
needed.
The research programme at BT is ad-
dressing these challenges by conducting
research in three broad areas:
• securing the converged network
• securing the virtual organization
• security management frameworks.
The results of this research will be criti-
cal to BT’s ability to secure its own busi-
ness against attack, and will help the
company develop its position in the mar-
ket for security and compliance services.
Securing the Converged Network 
To improve the security of BT’s net-
works, the company is researching ways
of identifying the true source of any
packet of data sent across the Internet.
Attackers often ‘spoof’ IP addresses to
obscure their identity and location, so a
reliable means of working out exactly
where messages came from, regardless
of the claimed IP address, would be a
strong deterrent. 
BT is also researching ways of structur-
ing networks that could enhance security
and performance, and improved ways of
monitoring the data generated by
Internet intrusion detection systems.
Simulations are used to help researchers
improve their understanding of the secu-
rity issues and protection needs of IP and
MPLS networks.
Research is also being conducted into
improved ways of validating the identi-
ties of employees and customers. Among
other options, BT is exploring the use of
speaker verification technologies to ‘rec-
ognize’ people based on the characteris-
tic acoustic features of their voice – that
is, recognizing not what is said but who
is saying it.
In the context of the EU-funded project
Ambient Networks (http://www.ambient-
networks.org), the team is working to-
wards creating next generation of net-
BT’s Security Research
by Theo Dimitrakos
BT’s Security Research Centre was formed in April 2004 under the BT Group
Chief Technology Office as part of the ongoing expansion of security research
within BT. The goal of the centre is to deliver world-class security research to
support BT’s growing business in mobility, broadband and ICT (Information and
Communications Technology). The new research centre, led by Bryan Littlefair,
plans to grow to 25-30 staff, many PhD-qualified. This team is in addition to the
many engineers working on development projects as part of the BT security
programme. 
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work solutions for mobile and wireless
systems beyond 3G. It will enable scal-
able and affordable wireless networking
while providing rich and easy-to-use
communication services for all. It is
geared towards increasing competition
and cooperation in an environment pop-
ulated by a multitude of user devices,
wireless technologies, network operators
and business players.
A collaboration between BT and
Imperial College London is exploring
the issue of providing overall dynamic
protection against cyber-based attacks.
Securing the Virtual Organization
Trust is essential in any form of commu-
nication and especially in securing rela-
tionships between enterprises. BT’s re-
searchers are exploring the development
of systems that can enable the appropri-
ate sharing of information assets while
protecting them from external software
attacks and physical theft. It is also ex-
ploring how new technology might make
intranets more flexible – something
closer to a secure online shared
workspace than a physically separate
network. 
The team is also working as a partner in
the EU-funded project TrustCoM
(http://www.eu-trustcom.com), which is
working to establish a way of represent-
ing trust and contractual relationships
that enables the creation of collaborative
business processes between organiza-
tions. The ideas are being tested against
the needs of collaborative engineering
projects, and those of small and medium-
sized enterprises that could work to-
gether to deliver services to clients as a
‘virtual supplier’. 
The team is also conducting research in
the context of the EU-funded project
GUIDE (http://www.guide-project.org/),
which aims at creating an architecture
for secure and interoperable e-govern-
ment electronic identity services and
transactions for Europe. The project’s
approach is multi-disciplinary and in-
cludes technology, and procedural and
policy development across Europe.
In addition, the twin topics of Web ser-
vices and Grid security are being re-
searched to develop secure ways of inte-
grating services and resources across en-
terprise and organizational boundaries.
Security Management Framework 
BT’s researchers are developing a long-
term roadmap that outlines how gover-
nance and engineering issues will need
to be addressed in the future.
Partners 
BT’s research programme includes both
projects undertaken entirely by the com-
pany’s own researchers and those under-
taken together with research partners
from leading universities and research
institutes, corporate research centres,
and end-user organizations. Some pro-
jects are sponsored by strategic EU and
UK government programmes, while
BT’s corporate research partners include
Microsoft, IBM, SAP and BAE Systems.
The company also has a growing number
of links with HP Laboratories, Bristol,
complementing the commercial alliance
between BT and HP in the ICT market-
place. Finally, BT’s Security Research
Centre has appointed Dr Theo
Dimitrakos as a representative on the in-
dustrial advisory board of the newly es-
tablished ERCIM technical working
group on Trust & Security.
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Information security has become a criti-
cal aspect in the operations of many
companies, from multinationals to
SMEs. Failing to address it adequately
can have dramatic consequences: loss of
access to data can freeze an organization,
sensitive information might be sold to
competitors, and so on. In an ever more
connected world, ever more exposed to
malicious users, many companies are ex-
posed to such a painful experience be-
fore becoming aware of the importance
of designing for security. Such design
starts by correctly specifying what is to
Bringing the Common Critera 
to Business Enterprise
by Christophe Ponsard, Philippe Massonet and Jean-François Molderez
Security is a primary concern for companies, many of which are quickly becom-
ing aware of it but are still ignorant of how to handle it correctly. The Common
Criteria (CC) provides a systematic approach with a methodology and a set of
reusable protection profiles. In practice however, they have proven difficult to
adopt and costly to use. In order to overcome these obstacles, CETIC (Centre of
Excellence in Information Technology and Communication) is promoting an
adapted usage of CC, and has developed supporting tools based on an existing
requirements-engineering toolkit.
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be protected, against what threat, and in
which environment.
Over the years, a number of standards
that were developed separately finally
converged to the ‘Common Criteria’
(CC), an internationally agreed method
for gathering, organizing and assessing
the security requirements for an IT prod-
uct. CC provides a scale of eight evalua-
tion assurance levels (EALs) in line with
the effort and techniques required to de-
velop a secure IT product. The resulting
process is similar to a typical require-
ments engineering (RE) process (see fig-
ure). It includes an analysis of the envi-
ronment, the definition of high-level ob-
jectives to address potential threats and
their refinement into concrete require-
ments. Certification requires a strong ra-
tionale to be provided for the artefacts
under evaluation. 
Besides the fact that CC is an interna-
tional standard, it is also based on sound
RE practice and includes flexible adapta-
tion mechanisms. Designers are free to
reuse and/or adapt predefined require-
ments, or to add specific and customized
requirements. They can also build re-
quirements models at various abstraction
levels, thus leaving details for later im-
plementation stages.
Connecting with Business
Enterprise
Despite the inherent qualities of CC that
makes it a good vehicle to address secu-
rity concerns, its use remains focused on
specific projects, generally addressed by
large companies and mainly for the pur-
pose of product certification. 
Based on discussions with Belgian com-
panies of various sizes, CC was per-
ceived as difficult to understand, learn
and apply in the context of a small struc-
ture, and definitely not worth using for
systems in which security is less critical.
In order to overcome those difficulties, a
number of improvements have been
identified. For example, companies often
ignore the fact that several protection
profiles are already freely available;
these can provide an exhaustive check-
list of security requirements for various
systems such as cash machine, firewalls,
e-purse systems and so on. The confor-
mance between the system and the pro-
file can also be managed at the right as-
surance level, achieving a good balance
between system criticality and available
resources. It is also possible to apply
only part of the process. This is the case
in the Electronic Money System Security
Objectives: based on a comprehensive
risk analysis for e-money systems, this
document develops a list of security ob-
jectives that should be fulfilled in order
to cover these risks/threats in a given en-
vironment.
An important part of the problem is also
that security is a ‘vertical concern’, im-
plying all system levels from hardware
to middleware to software applications.
A successful security design should
therefore rely on an interdisciplinary ap-
proach, involving people from fields
such as software quality, distributed sys-
tems and electronic systems, the three
main fields in which CETIC is active.
Finally, tool support is also crucial. So far
there exist few tools for the Common
Criteria (and more generally in the RE
field) that have a real methodological
support. The most widely used tool is a
word processor, possibly complemented
with a traceability tool. An ideal tool
should provide a rich meta-model captur-
ing relevant security concepts such as the
environment, threats, agents (user or ma-
licious), security objectives and require-
ments. It should support the CC library,
query it and provide operations (refine-
ment, iteration, selection etc) on it. Most
importantly, it should capture the ratio-
nale between all the required CC artefacts
in order to automate document genera-
tion as far as possible. 
Further work
Our current goal is to adapt an existing
goal-oriented requirements engineering
framework called Objectiver to the secu-
rity domain. This tool provides services
like diagram edition, query support and
semi-automated document generation.
Being based on meta-modelling, it can
easily be tuned to support the Common
Criteria. We also plan additional support
to navigate within the CC, manage ratio-
nales and generate protection profiles
and security target documents.
CETIC is currently working on this area
in collaboration with Belgian companies
and universities, in the context of various
European projects. Based on our exper-
tise in requirements engineering for criti-
cal systems and in tool development,
CETIC is working on the specification of
domain-specific protection profiles and
the development of an adapted tool sup-
port to ease the use of the Common
Criteria. Security in domains such as the
GRID and ambient intelligence are being
investigated, as well as the application of
CC at a high assurance level with the use
of formal methods.
Link:
Objectiver: http://www.objectiver.com
Please contact: 
Philippe Massonet,
CETIC Research Center, Belgium
Tel: +32 71 91 98 27
E-mail: phm@cetic.be
An overview
of the CC
process.
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INRIA thus had to set up a whole pro-
cess. This process begins with the con-
viction that certain research results are
very likely to spawn innovations on the
market. The right person or persons to
head up the project must then be found, a
motivated and enthusiastic team must be
built and the initial setting up and transi-
tion problems must be resolved. In addi-
tion, a business model capable of con-
vincing and bringing in investors must
be developed, along with a good under-
standing of the market.
The main reason behind the birth of
INRIA-Transfert was a realization of the
urgent need to help finance the creation
of innovative companies. We decided to
start by setting up a subsidiary with the
aim of establishing a clear boundary be-
tween the public subsidies allocated to
INRIA and the funds dedicated to creat-
ing start-ups. Hence, a concern for clar-
ity and transparency was paramount in
the creation of INRIA-Transfert. Once it
had been set up, we realized it could also
play another role: providing guidance to
project leaders to help them build their
companies better and faster.
The only dedicated structure in the
French ICST sector, INRIA-Transfert
benefits from the experience accumu-
lated by INRIA. The institute had al-
ready contributed to creation of start-ups
over the years, as and when opportuni-
ties arose. The name INRIA-Transfert
was a way to capitalize on this past expe-
rience and the institute’s renown.
Indeed, thanks to the positive image as-
sociated with INRIA’s reputation as a
centre of scientific and technological
competencies and the fact that it is well
known to financiers and investors, its
subsidiary is able to offer this function of
guidance not only to its own research
scientists but also to people associated
with other research institutes, both pub-
lic and private. This is a deliberate and
conscious choice: from our point of
view, encouraging company creation is a
concrete way of ensuring that research
carried out in public (and private) re-
search centres is brought to a successful
conclusion and transformed into prod-
ucts and services through the creation of
start-ups. 
We believe that having a network of in-
novative companies in this very impor-
tant sector is in the interests of both
France and INRIA. It is a way of trans-
ferring our approach and being attentive
to what is happening in the real world.
My enthusiasm and conviction does not
stop me from being realistic: I’d like to
stress the fact that turning an idea into a
successful new company depends 80%
on prevailing economic conditions.
However, since the creation of INRIA-
Transfert, this opportunity is clearly one
of the career paths offered to INRIA re-
searchers. We have proved our capacity
to foster the creation of start-ups, directly
or indirectly, through the funds managed
by I-Source Gestion. INRIA-Transfert is
a challenge that we are in the process of
winning.
INRIA-Transfert Assessment: 
A Sign of Recognition
After a year or more of guidance and
evaluation carried out in collaboration
with the entrepreneurs involved, the best
company creation or development pro-
jects are awarded one of two special cer-
tifications. They are a concrete represen-
tation of our evaluation as of the date on
which they are awarded, depending on
the company’s state of development.
They reflect a decision and a commit-
ment, associated with a certain accep-
tance of risk. It’s also a way of giving
these start-ups greater credibility.
Born of INRIA — 
Twenty Years Creating Spin-Off Companies
by Laurent Kott
The foundation of a company is an opportunity to make the most of the enthusiasm,
experience and dynamism of a research team. Naturally, the creation of a company
with solid growth potential requires that a complete team be assembled, highly
competent in many other areas than science and technology.
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Pertinence IT® certification confirms
the usefulness of the technology and the
economic viability of the start-up based
on a number of evaluation criteria. It is
awarded by INRIA-Transfert in consul-
tation with its team of experts and the
company’s pilot customers, and illus-
trates their opinion of the company’s
economic value and its ability to survive
in the marketplace.
Croissance IT® (Growth in English) cer-
tification is awarded to companies that
have already obtained Pertinence IT®
certification. It indicates that the start-
up’s products, team, technology and
sales strategy put it in a favourable posi-
tion in a market with high growth poten-
tial. This certification is awarded by
INRIA-Transfert, its experts, and institu-
tional investors that already hold part of
the company’s capital or are likely to in-
vest in it.
Start-Ups Bearing 
the INRIA Trademark
As of 19 April 2005, companies stem-
ming from INRIA have the right to use
the slogan ‘Born of INRIA’. Brought to-
gether under the same slogan, modelled
on the well-known ‘guaranteed vintage’
label, ‘Born of INRIA’ start-ups will be
able to capitalize on the institute’s name
and renown. It is also a way of highlight-
ing the strong relationship between each
of these companies and the institute,
either through the people responsible for
their creation or through the technology
they apply which was originally devel-
oped by INRIA.
More than ever, INRIA remains con-
vinced that company creation in the field
of ICST is one of the most efficient and
long-lasting means of technology trans-
fer. INRIA wishes to express its admira-
tion and gratitude to the research scien-
tists, the engineers and their collabora-
tors who embark on such ventures.
Success or failure partly depends on the
project proponents, and on general con-
ditions. Let us hope that confidence re-
turns to economic and financial circles,
because it has never deserted scientists
and technology experts.
Links:
http://www.inria.fr/valorisation/20ansdestartup/
index.en.html
http://www.inria-transfert.fr/english/index.html
Please contact:
Laurent Kott, INRIA-Transfert, France
E-mail: Laurent.Kott@inria.fr
AM2 Systems
Semantic-web technology
supplier
www.am2systems.com
Athys Technologies
Behaviour detection and
measurement
www.blueeyevideo.com
CAPS entreprise
Code optimisation for
embedded sytems
www.caps-entreprise.com
Cogenit
Tests and engineering in
telecommunications
www.cose.fr
Cose
Data acquisition for scientific
computing
www.cose.fr
Diatelic
Telemedicine system for
patients undergoing CAPD
www.diatelic.com
Distene
Solution for pre- and post-
processing to optimize the
simulation-based design
chain
www.distene.com
Dolphin Integration
Products and services in
microelectronics
www.dolphin.fr
eliKya
Knowledge acquisition aid
www.elikya.com
Enginest Software
Planning and scheduling
tools
www.enginest.com
Ergomatic Consultants
Computer system ergonomy
Esterel technologies
Reliable system design
software
www.esterel-
technologies.com
Finoptech
Computation intensive
solutions for financial
engineering
www.finoptech.com/
GeometryFactory
Geometric Software
Components
www.geometryfactory.com
Gene-IT
Bio-informatics and genome
www.gene-it.com
Icatis
Software for clustering and
Grid computing
www.icatis.com
ILOG
C++ and Java software
components
www.ilog.fr
Istar
Air and space image
processing
www.istar.fr
Jalios
Content Management
solution
www.jalios.com
Kelkoo
Internet buying guide
www.kelkoo.com
KEENEO
Software editor for
behaviour recognition and
intelligent video surveillance
www.keeneo.com
LTU technologies
Software solutions that
analyze and describe the
content of images
www.LTUtech.com
Lorin
Real time calculators
www.lorin.fr
Medience
A software vendor for data
integration
www.medience.fr 
N2NSoft
Simulation and optimization
of large IP networks
www.n2nsoft.com
Noesis
Computer vision and image
processing
www.noesisvision.com
PolySpace Technologies
Testing and validation tools
www.polyspace.com
Probayes
Mastering uncerntainty
www.probayes.com
QuantifiCare
Services to provide accurate
and objective measurements
of disease evolution 
http://www.quantificare.com
RaisePartner
Quantitative analysis
solutions for finance
www.raisepartner.com
Realviz
Digital special effects and
animated computer images
www.realviz.com
Robosoft
Mobile robots and
associated peripherals
www.robosoft.fr
RT Consultant
Ergonomics and applied
human factors in
aeronautics and information
technology
www.rt-consultant.com
ScalAgent
Mediation Software Systems
www.scalagent.com
TAK Imaging
Development in
microelectronics and
multimedia
www.takimaging.com
Tak’Asic
Development in
microelectronics and
multimedia
www.takasic.fr
Time-AT
Conception, integration and
forework of vision, Industrial
computing and
telecommunications
products
www.timeat.fr
Trusted Logic
Open and secure
architectures for embedded
systems
www.trusted-logic.fr
UDcast
One-way broadcast on the
Internet
www.udcast.com
VSP-Technology
Walking around a model in
real time
www.vsp-tech.com
W2G Technologies
A new breed of computing
architecture
www.web2grid.com
Xyleme
Enabling intelligent access
to XML content 
www.xyleme.com
Zeliade Systems
XML technology to the
processing of financial
derivatives products
www.zeliade.com
The technology companies stemming from INRIA
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GridML (Grid-based Machine Learning)
is a research project supported by the
Economic Competitiveness Operative
Programme (GVOP) of the Hungarian
Government. The project began in
January 2005 and will run for two years.
The GridML Consortium consists of four
partners: SZTAKI (coordinator) with the
participation of the Machine Learning
Group and the Laboratory of Parallel and
Distributed Systems, the Research Group
on Artificial Intelligence from the
University of Szeged, AAM Consulting
Inc, and Magyar Telekom Ltd (T-
Systems).
There exist numerous applications areas
for data mining. Examples include mar-
keting, chemistry, CRM, environmental
control and security, just to mention a
few.
One characteristic feature of data mining
is that it works with extremely flexible
models, often involving dozens, some-
times hundreds of tunable parameters. The
promise is that such flexible models are
capable of capturing the complex relation-
ships hidden in data. The price one must
pay is a significant increase in the compu-
tational cost of fitting such models to the
data. However, experience has shown that
the quality of the resulting solutions makes
this approach worthwhile. 
Often however, the process is expensive
not only in terms of computational re-
sources but also in a monetary sense.
This is primarily due to the high human
resource costs, which follow from the
current practice of assigning several data-
mining experts for the full duration of the
project. The tasks of these experts range
from defining the problem, through ob-
taining and cleaning the data, to selecting
the right model and tuning the models’
and learning algorithms’ parameters. Out
of these, the latter two contribute most
significantly to the total time spent on the
project. 
Due to the high cost of experienced ex-
perts, many data-mining projects are
abandoned or never see the light of day.
Another problem with the current ap-
proach is that the quality of the solutions
obtained depends largely on the prefer-
ences or the experience of the experts in-
volved. This significantly decreases the
predictability of the results of the mining
process, making companies uncertain of
whether it is worth starting the project. It
is not only industrial data mining that
suffers from the issue of ad hoc para-
meter and model selection: researchers
also face this problem due to the lack of
sufficient computational power.
One possibility to overcome the compu-
tational bottleneck is to employ a large
number of computers in parallel, con-
nected into a cluster or Grid. Projects de-
voted to migrating data-mining algo-
rithms to such distributed envi-
ronments have existed for some
time. The two most widespread
approaches are either to paral-
lelize the algorithms themselves
or to let many instances of the al-
gorithms (same or different) run
in parallel. 
It would be naive to think that
distributed data mining is a uni-
versal cure. With the increase of
computational resources, re-
searchers and data-mining ex-
perts see new opportunities that
would not previously have been
feasible, and the available re-
sources an soon become insufficient.
Hence, the central issue investigated in
our project is how to better utilize the
available resources, with the ultimate
goal of the project being to develop a pro-
totype data-mining system that organizes
computations in such a way that given a
fixed computational budget it produces
the best possible models in a reliable
manner. 
As such, the main research theme of the
project belongs to the domain of meta-
learning, a relatively new field concerned
with the relationship of tasks or domains
and learning algorithms. However, un-
like most approaches to meta-learning, in
our project the emphasis is on the online
performance of the algorithms. Most pre-
vious methods produce an initial ranking
of the various algorithms without giving
The GridML Project: 
Next-Generation Data Mining on High-
Performance, Parallel Distributed Systems
by Csaba Szepesvári
The aim of the GridML project is to develop a prototype of an advanced, next-
generation data-mining system, capable of more efficiently exploiting the vast
computational resources of distributed, parallel computational environments.
Researchers will look not only into the problem of predicting the performance of
the algorithms separately, but also at the whole process of data mining, where
the cost of making such predictions is also taken into account.
Researchers plan to apply bandit theory to
optimizing the execution of data-mining
algorithms on Grids.
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further advice on how best to utilize the
resources. In contrast, our approach not
only provides an initial ranking, but also
continuously monitors the performance
of the various methods throughout the
mining process, and then feeds the result
back to the resource allocation strategy.
The resource allocation problem is
treated as an online learning problem, the
best-known example of which is the so-
called multi-armed bandit problem where
a gambler faces the problem of deciding
which arm of a K-slot machine to pull to
maximize his total reward in a series of
trials. The payoffs of the machines are
random and initially unknown. After try-
ing each machine at least once, the gam-
bler has to decide if a machine with a
high estimated payoff should be chosen
or one that has a lower estimated payoff
but which has been tried less often.
In addition to researching the perfor-
mance of various advanced online re-
source allocation schemes for optimizing
distributed data mining, another goal of
the project is to create a prototype system
capable of meeting several technical re-
quirements such as accountability, secu-
rity and the automated documentation of
the mining process. 
Link: 
http://zaphod.aml.sztaki.hu/wg/index.pl/gridml
Please contact:
Csaba Szepesvári, SZTAKI, Hungary
Tel: +36 1 279 6262
E-mail: szcsaba@sztaki.hu
The CLR (Common Language Runtime)
is the heart of the .NET framework; to-
gether with the FCL (Framework Class
Library), a consistent, object-oriented set
of classes, they both provide a platform
supporting multiple programming lan-
guages. The idea is that the developers
should use the language they are most fa-
miliar with or the one best suited to the
task at hand. The (.NET) language com-
pilers should then convert source code
into Intermediate Language (IL) code,
which is used by CLR to convert lan-
guage-independent IL code into the ma-
chine code of the device on which it is
intended to run. In this way, different
languages can be combined to write a
single application.
While this description of the basics of
the CLR may suggest that making a pro-
gramming language into .NET is a sim-
ple task, this is, of course, not the case.
There exist many different kinds of pro-
gramming languages inspired by quite
different programming paradigms,
which exploit and exhibit quite different
features. Functional programming lan-
guages, for instance, deal with higher-
order functions, fully parametric poly-
morphism in data structures and function
definitions and lazy evaluation of ex-
pressions. These features are typically
missing in imperative (object-oriented)
languages like C, C++, or C#, which are
the ‘natural’ .NET evolution of previous
forms. Fortunately, however, a number
of different attempts have successfully
fitted functional languages into the .NET
platform, namely, SML.NET and
Mondrian. 
Haskell is a general purpose, purely
functional programming language with
an impressive number of libraries, exten-
sions, compilers and projects for current
and future developments (see the
Haskell Communities URL below).
During recent years, we have used
Haskell to develop several tools that im-
plement the compilers, termination anal-
yses, and declarative debugging tech-
niques available for programming and
specification languages like Maude,
CafeOBJ, OBJ and XHTML. All these
tools target different but complementary
purposes, and programming languages
would greatly benefit from an integrated
framework in which full interaction and
combination is possible. As remarked
above, .NET has excellent capabilities in
this regard. Although the Haskell com-
munity is also interested in this, the func-
tional language Haskell has yet not been
ported into .NET. 
Interoperability (ie allowing a program
on one system to access programs and
data on another system) is a general
problem in Software Engineering and a
number of solutions (namely middle-
ware systems) have been devised. One of
the main goals of the new research pro-
ject SELF (Software Engineering and
Lightweight Formalisms) is the explo-
ration of middleware translators and in-
terfaces, from the existing programming
languages and development frameworks
(like C# and .NET) to the formalisms or
languages which underlie the program
analysis tools (eg Haskell). Fortunately,
Crossing the Rubicon: 
from Haskell to .NET through COM
by Beatriz Alarcón and Salvador Lucas
.NET is an emerging Microsoft project which promotes a new framework for
Software Development that emphasizes the use of Internet resources and the
interaction between components written in different programming languages.
Whereas functional programming languages such as Haskell are well suited for
developing tools to analyse, verify and transform programs, typical Haskell
compilers do not provide sophisticated capabilities such as support for XML-
Web services, assisted GUI development and so on, which occur frequently in
most .NET development frameworks. This article reports on our experience in
the integration of Haskell applications into the .NET framework.
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well-known middleware techniques like
Microsoft’s COM (Component Object
Model) have received some support
from both Haskell and .NET communi-
ties. The figure summarizes how it
works: our starting point is
HaskellDirect (HDirect) which provides
a Foreign Function Interface (FFI) for
Haskell based in the standard IDL
(Interface Definition Language). This
permits the specification of a program-
ming interface which does not depend on
any concrete programming language.
With HDirect it is possible to build COM
components in Haskell that are then im-
ported and used by a .NET application
by means of a COM DLL (Dynamically
Linked Library). In the figure, an input
IDL file (Example.idl) containing the ap-
propriate interface information given by
the programmer is processed by HDirect.
A file (ExampleProxy.hs) is automati-
cally generated. Together with
Example.hs (which contains the Haskell
code of the COM component), the
HDirect library Com.lhs and a Run Time
Support (RTS) C module, the COM
module is obtained after processing ev-
erything with the Glasgow Haskell
Compiler (GHC). The output is a COM
DLL that requires the use of a Runtime
Callable Wrapper (RCW) to become part
of a .NET application. The RCW is part
of the .NET SDK. We are now able to
see the application written in native (un-
managed, in the .NET terminology)
Haskell code as managed code, which
can be executed by the CLR together
with the other components of the .NET
Framework. 
We are using these ideas to make our
software tools available within the .NET
framework. Moreover, the COM DLLs
that we are producing are a good basis
for easily extending the original capabili-
ties of our Haskell applications.
Links:
Haskell: http://www.haskell.org 
Haskell Communities: 
http://www.haskell.org/communities
SELF: http://self.lcc.uma.es/
Please contact:
Salvador Lucas, Universidad Politécnica de 
Valencia / SpaRCIM
E-mail: slucas@dsic.upv.es
http://www.dsic.upv.es/~slucas
A number of studies show that the quality
of Web applications is often poor or un-
satisfactory; end users often make the
same claim. Quality demands on these
software systems are thus increasing.
Since 1999, in the SSI division at ITC-
irst (a public research centre of the
Autonomous Province of Trento, Italy),
we have been investigating, defining and
applying a range of techniques for the
analysis, testing and restructuring of
Web applications. Our purpose is to as-
sess the quality of Web applications dur-
ing their development and evolution.
The results of the analyses can be used to
check whether a Web application satis-
fies suitable constraints, and to detect
possible anomalies. The goal of testing is
to improve the quality of the Web appli-
cation and expose possible failures, that
is, deviations of the application from the
intended behaviour. The restructuring
activity aims to improve certain quality
factors of the Web application without
changing its external behavior.
The approach we have adopted is based
on reverse engineering. Unlike the more
traditional forward engineering ap-
proach, we move from the assumption
that a Web application already exists.
Our starting point is therefore the actual
implementation of the Web application
(Web pages, server programs, forms,
frames etc), and our techniques work on
the abstract models that we derive from
the implementation. This approach is
also based on the observation that sev-
eral well-established methods for the
analysis, testing and restructuring of tra-
ditional software systems already exist,
and these can be adapted to Web applica-
tions (see Figure 1).
Our work is divided into three parts:
• the development of models and views
of Web applications that can accom-
modate static as well as dynamically
generated entities 
• the application of a variety of analyses,
restructuring and testing techniques to
these models 
• empirical studies on real-world appli-
cations.
As a necessary component of our experi-
mental work, two research prototype
tools, ReWeb and TestWeb (see
Figure 2), consisting of a number of soft-
ware modules, have been built to imple-
ment a range of analyses/restructuring
techniques and to support application de-
velopers in testing activities.
The main contributions of our work ex-
tend in several directions:
• modelling and model extraction of dy-
namic Web applications
A Tookit for Analysis, Testing 
and Restructuring of Web Applications
by Filippo Ricca and Paolo Tonella
We have defined and implemented a toolkit to support the quality of Web
applications. The validity of this toolkit has been assessed by extensive empirical
work. 
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SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) — a pro-
tocol for Telephony over IP — is at the
forefront of the rapid emergence of ToIP.
It was standardized by the IETF and
adopted by the ITU; it is used as the under-
lying signalling protocol for 3G/UMTS
mobile systems and various communica-
tion tools running under Unix and
Windows. Besides telephony, SIP sup-
ports other forms of communication:
Internet conferencing, presence, event no-
tification and instant messaging. SIP im-
plementations are available for a variety of
devices including desktop computers,
wired and wireless phones and PDAs. 
A SIP platform is based on a client-server
model and consists of a signalling server
performing telephony-related operations.
In addition, service logic is executed by
an application server and can access re-
sources from the computer network such
as Web resources, databases and agen-
das. This evolution brings a host of new
functionalities to the domain of tele-
phony, which in turn enables telephony
to be customized with respect to the pref-
erences, trends and expectations of ever
more demanding users. 
Challenges for Service
Development
The open nature of an SIP platform
makes it possible for a wide range of de-
velopers to write telephony services.
Yet, telephony is as heavily relied on as
water and electricity. As telephony plat-
forms become programmable by any de-
veloper, they become less reliable. A
lack of reliability may disrupt or even
crash a service or the entire platform.
Furthermore, to create a service, a devel-
oper should have extensive expertise in
the telephony domain, SIP and related
Telephony over IP: Experience and Challenges
by Laurent Burgy, Charles Consel, Fabien Latry, Nicolas Palix 
and Laurent Réveillère
Telephony over IP (ToIP) makes it possible to program telephony platforms that
have long been kept closed and proprietary. As new services are developed that
enrich telephony with complex features such as database access, Web service
invocation, and agenda look-up, the telephony platform is increasingly exposed
to software bugs. Because telephony is heavily relied on, the success of its
evolution to IP critically depends on the reliability of services.
• structural and evolution analysis
• Web application slicing
• structural and statistical testing
• multilingual Web site restructuring
• migration of static Web sites to dy-
namic Web applications
• Web application understanding: pro-
ducing abstract views.
Many interesting developments and ex-
tensions of the proposed techniques and
tools are possible. We are currently work-
ing on Web application testing; in particu-
lar we are collecting data in order to define
a fault model for Web applications. Our
goal is to verify the fault detection abilities
of the various testing techniques. 
At present, we are completely rewriting
ReWeb and TestWeb using HttpUnit (a
Java framework which provides a library
for implementing a Spider and auto-
mated test scripts for Web applications).
This restructuring was necessary for
many reasons. The original Spider did
not use a fully fledged parser, and sup-
port for cookies and Javascript was lim-
ited with the consequence that the mod-
els extracted were in some cases partial.
Moreover, the testing process was overly
complex and the test cases were not ex-
pressed in the Java language.
The new versions of ReWeb and
TestWeb will be available for research
purposes soon. Further information can
be found on our Web site.
Links:
http://star.itc.it/
Please contact:
Filippo Ricca, ITC-irst, Trento, Italy
Tel: +39 0461 314 522
E-mail: ricca@itc.it
Paolo Tonella, ITC-irst, Trento, Italy
Tel: +39 0461 314 524
E-mail: tonella@itc.it
Figure 1: Reverse engineering through the application of
software engineering techniques.
Figure 2: ReWeb and TestWeb.
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Research at the Norwegian University of
Science and Technology is building on
the concept of DMP, which was first pro-
posed in 1996 as an extension to MHP. A
collaborative effort is underway between
researchers in the departments of
Psychology, Telematics and Art and
Media Studies, with research looking at
the design and testing of visual sequences
that support a comparison between realis-
tic meetings and virtual collaborative
meetings using three-dimensional, high-
Adaptive Scene and Traffic Control 
in Networked Multimedia Systems
by Leif Arne Rønningen
The Distributed Multimedia Plays (DMP) Systems Architecture provides three-
dimensional multiview video and sound collaboration between performers over
packet networks. To guarantee an end-to-end time delay under twenty
milliseconds, and to obtain high network resource utilization, the perceived quality
of audio-visual content is allowed to vary with the traffic in the network. Typical
applications are in the next generation of televisions (Multimedia Home Platform
(MHP) extended with DMP), games, education, and virtual meetings that have a
realistic feel. The architecture is also suitable for use in creating virtual
collaborations for jazz sessions, music lessons and distributed opera.
protocols, distributed programming, net-
working, and SIP APIs.
The TelIP Project
The Phoenix research group at INRIA
Futurs/LaBRI/ENSEIRB in Bordeaux is
developing a software engineering ap-
proach to producing programs whose re-
liability is guaranteed with respect to
critical properties of a given domain.
This approach relies on the development
of Domain-Specific Languages
(DSL),which ease program development
without sacrificing safety. Phoenix has
been studying the DSL approach in the
context of communication services.
We have deployed an SIP platform
named TelIP at ENSEIRB, a graduate en-
gineering school of information and com-
munication technologies to which the
group is affiliated. TelIP interfaces with
the PABX (Private Automatic Branch
eXchange) of ENSEIRB, allowing IP ter-
minals to call anyone either inside or out-
side the school. Because ENSEIRB pro-
vides Wi-Fi, terminals can be wired or
wireless, enabling longer-range mobility
than conventional wireless telephony sys-
tems. TelIP already has two dozen users
at ENSEIRB and the number is growing
fast.
The group has developed an application
server allowing telephony services to be
deployed on TelIP. The server function-
alities include the binding of a user to
one or more services. This binding al-
lows an incoming or outgoing call to be
handled by the service logic of the corre-
sponding user, enabling a wide variety of
customizations. 
To ease the development of telephony
services, we have designed and imple-
mented a DSL known as SPL (Session
Processing Language). This language
offers domain-specific constructs and
extensions that abstract over the intri-
cacies of the underlying technologies.
By design, SPL guarantees critical
properties, far beyond the reach of gen-
eral-purpose languages such as Java or
C++. Examples of errors detected in
services include call loss, incorrect
state transitions, and unbounded re-
source usage.
To enable non-programmers to define
services, a graphical, simplified version
of SPL has been developed. This version
of SPL offers intuitive visual constructs
and menus that permit users to quickly
develop a wide variety of services rang-
ing from simple redirection to agenda-
dependent call handling.
To validate SPL, rich telephony services
are being developed. In particular, one ser-
vice is dedicated to handling calls to the
telecommunications department of EN-
SEIRB. If the department secretary is al-
ready on the phone, this service queues in-
coming calls. An estimated waiting time is
periodically computed and played to the
waiting callers. Furthermore, the availabil-
ity of the secretary is automatically up-
dated, thanks to the user status managed
by SIP. If the secretary on duty is unavail-
able, calls are redirected to an alternative
secretary. In the context of a conventional
telephony platform, such a service would
typically need to be written by a third-
party application developer who has been
certified by the PABX manufacturer. As a
result of this development model, tele-
phony service creation has been anecdotal
and the cost has been prohibitive.
In the future, the goal is to significantly
increase the base of TelIP users. EN-
SEIRB consists of more than 700 stu-
dents and 140 faculty and staff members.
Enabling users with different skills and
interests to succeed in developing the
services they envision is a real challenge.
Doing so without compromising the ro-
bustness of the platform is a key step to-
ward validating the platform and the lan-
guage. 
Links: 
http://phoenix.labri.fr
http://phoenix.labri.fr/documentation/sip 
Please contact:
Charles Consel 
INRIA Futurs/LaBRI/ENSEIRB, France
Tel: +33 5 40 0035 19
E-mail: Charles.Consel@inria.fr
ERCIM News No. 63, October 2005 55
R&D AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
resolution display.. The temporal and
spatial resolution will be varied for indi-
vidual objects in scenes. Eye movements
and object focus are tracked when sub-
jects watch selected video clips.
Practical applications for this developing
technology could be in use before 2015.
A DMP terminal system is shown in
Figure 1. The two upper layers must al-
ways be present, while the two lower
layers represent wireless and fibre alter-
natives. Network nodes include resolu-
tion and traffic control in addition to nor-
mal routing functions.
Scene Characteristics
To give the virtual collaboration a natu-
ral feel, the size, form and position of ob-
jects should be near natural size, the dis-
played picture shall be flicker-free, and
individual pixels should not be visible at
a viewing distance of fifty centimetres.
The normal comfortable distance be-
tween people generally varies between
fifty centimeters and several metres, but
may also be several hundred metres. The
natural viewing area of human eyes is
used as the ‘frame’ of the scene.
Sub-objects and 2D Interlace
In the RL algorithm  - an integrated reso-
lution and traffic control algorithm -
each object is divided into two, four or
more sub-objects, which are sent
in separate streams. This is called
the 2D interlace.
Video Segmentation 
and Multiview Shooting
Object recognition and tracking is
carried out by analysing video se-
quences, shot by multiview cam-
eras. Some of the most important
factors for DMP are face and eye
recognition and tracking. Note that
the motion estimation of object-
oriented scene objects is moved
away from the coder (compressor)
to the object- and eye-tracking
systems.
Compression and Coding
Compression algorithms can make
use of the Discrete Cosine
Transform together with Huffman
coding, or wavelet transforms that
represent data in the time-fre-
quency space. The Wavelet trans-
form makes level scalability easy.
The RL Resolution and Traffic
Control Algorithm
A detailed description of the RL-C algo-
rithm can be found in the reference.
Simulations show that the end-to-end
delay can be guaranteed. However, for-
mal tests must still be conducted to show
when and to what extent the time-vary-
ing resolution of audio-visual content is
acceptable.
Service and Scene Setup, 
and Address Allocation
SMIL (Synchronized Multimedia
Integration Language) is used for scene
composition. The SIP/TCP/IPv6 proto-
cols are used for set-up, and the SIP URL
identifies services, scenes and sub-
scenes. Parameters in the combined
RTP/UDP/IPv6 protocol header identify
the same for content transfer. IPv6 ad-
dresses will be allocated in a private
way, and the SIP and RTP protocols are
adapted for this application.
Variable-Resolution Display
A viewer focuses on one scene object at
a time, and most viewers focus on the
same object at any given time. An eye-
tracking system identifies these objects,
and orders the encoder on the shooting
side to shoot and represent these objects
with high resolution. 
A Virtual Dinner Scenario
Researcher A in Trondheim enters his
dining room, sits on his sofa and requests
a Virtual Dinner with researcher B in
Padova, also sitting on his sofa. This in-
teraction generates different levels of
traffic from A sent to B. The system
‘finds’ two faces and a plate with food
for researcher B. A and B talk for about
30 seconds (7 Gbps), then researcher A
arises (0.5-1 sec), goes out for a plate of
food (5-10 sec), is absent (1-2 min), re-
turns (5-10 sec) and sits down (0.5-2
sec). This increases traffic to nearly 60
Gbps, which then drops to the back-
ground of 127 Mbps. The system tracks
the plate and the food. They start eating
and talking, during which their faces,
arms,  hands, plates and food dominate
the data rate, about 8 Gbps.  
Researcher B stands up and walks across
the room. After a few minutes they need
to talk to researcher C in Poznan, and es-
tablish a three party DMP. After eating,
B leaves the room. A asks the system to
disconnect B. Meanwhile, researcher C
has to leave home and go to his office,
but he wants to continue the session with
A while travelling to the office.
PhD funding has been provided from the
Research Council of Norway (NFR).
Link:
http://www.item.ntnu.no/~leifarne/
Please contact:
Leif Arne Rønningen 
Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU), Norway
Tel: +47 9003 0473
E-mail: leifarne@item.ntnu.no
Figure 1: The DMP Terminal System.
Network
Figure 2: Virtual Dinner, traffic generated
by researcher A (time-scale not correct)
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Documents today contain a mixture of
textual, multimedia, and metadata infor-
mation. One way to format this mixed
content is according to the eXtensible
Mark-up Language (XML). In contrast
to HTML, which is mainly layout-
oriented, XML follows the fundamental
concept of separating the logical struc-
ture of a document from its layout. XML
thus offers the opportunity to exploit the
logical structure of documents to allow
more precise searching. Providing effec-
tive access to XML-based content has
become a key research issue. 
Effective access to XML repositories is
the core of XML retrieval research.
XML retrieval systems aim to exploit
the logical structure of documents to re-
trieve, in response to a user’s query,
document components (ie XML ele-
ments) rather than whole documents.
Implementing this more focused form of
retrieval means that an XML retrieval
system must not only find relevant in-
formation, but also determine the appro-
priate level of element granularity to re-
turn to the user. Evaluating the effec-
tiveness of these systems therefore re-
quires test-beds utilizing criteria that
take into account the imposed structural
aspects. 
In 2002, INEX started to address these
issues. An infrastructure was estab-
lished, and a large XML test collection
and appropriate scoring methods were
provided for the evaluation of content-
oriented XML retrieval systems. 
Evaluation is carried out using test col-
lections assembled specifically for eval-
uating particular retrieval tasks. A test
collection consists of a document collec-
tion, a set of user requests (ie topics) and
relevance assessments. The characteris-
tics of traditional test collections have
been adjusted to appropriately evaluate
XML retrieval effectiveness: the docu-
ment collection comprises documents
marked up in XML, the topics specify
requests relating to both content and
structure, and the relevance assessments
are made at element level. In addition,
relevance is measured such that it appro-
priately quantifies the system’s ability to
return the correct granularity of XML
elements.
Ad Hoc Retrieval
The main retrieval task to be performed
in INEX is ad hoc retrieval. This can be
described as a simulation of how a li-
brary might be used, and involves the
searching of a static set of documents
using a set of topics. In INEX, the li-
brary consists of XML documents, the
queries may contain both content and
structural conditions, and in response to
a query, arbitrary XML elements may be
retrieved. 
In 2005, we identified two ad hoc re-
trieval sub-tasks that depend on how
structural constraints are expressed. In
the content-only sub-task, it is left to the
retrieval system to identify the most ap-
propriate XML elements to return to the
user. Three different strategies have
been defined, depending on the pre-
ferred output format of an XML re-
trieval system. In a focused strategy, we
assume that a user would prefer the sin-
gle element most relevant to the topic; in
a thorough strategy, we assume that a
user would prefer all highly relevant ele-
ments; and in a fetch and browse strat-
egy, we assume that a user is interested
in highly relevant elements contained
within highly relevant documents. An
extension of this sub-task is when a user
adds structural constraints to the topic to
narrow down the number of returned el-
ements. 
In the content-and-structure sub-task,
the structural constraints are explicitly
stated in the topics and can refer to
where to look for the relevant elements
(ie support elements) and what types of
elements to retrieve (ie target elements).
Structural constraints can be interpreted
as either strict or vague, and these inter-
pretations can be applied to both support
and target elements, giving a total of
four strategies for this sub-task.
Tracks
INEX has separate tracks looking at spe-
cific issues in XML retrieval. The inter-
active track aims to investigate the be-
haviour of users when interacting with
XML documents, and to develop effec-
tive user-based approaches to XML re-
trieval. The heterogeneous track is con-
cerned with cases where an XML col-
lection comprises documents from dif-
ferent sources and based on multiple
document structures. The multimedia
track aims to provide an evaluation plat-
form for XML retrieval systems that in-
clude text, images, speech, and video.
The document-mining track aims at
defining techniques for effectively min-
ing information from XML documents,
with a focus on classification and clus-
tering.
INEX is led by Norbert Fuhr from the
University of Duisburg-Essen,
Germany, and Mounia Lalmas from
Queen Mary University of London,
United Kingdom, and is partly funded
by the DELOS Network of Excellence
on Digital Libraries administrated by
ERCIM.
Links:
INEX: http://inex.is.informatik.uni-duisburg.de/
DELOS: http://www.delos.info/
Please contact: 
Mounia Lalmas
Queen Mary University of London, UK
E-mail: mounia@dcs.qmul.ac.uk
INEX: Evaluating XML Retrieval Effectiveness 
by Mounia Lalmas
The Initiative for the Evaluation of XML Retrieval (INEX) is an international campaign
involving more than fifty organizations worldwide. It provides a means of evaluating
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A report by the Co-ordinating Commis-
sion for Biological Recording, in 1995,
recognised that there were at least 60,000
active biological recorders in the UK,
2,000 organisations were involved and
60 million species records had been
accumulated. This report was instrumen-
tal in the formation of the NBN in 2000.
The NBN includes the UK Countryside
agencies, the Wildlife Trusts, Environ-
ment Agency, Natural History Museum
(NHM), Joint Nature Conservation Com-
mittee (JNCC), Biological Records Cen-
tre (BRC) and other partners. The NBN
currently provides free access online to
over 18 million species records and these
are also contributed to the Global Biodi-
versity Information Facility (GBIF).
An important part of the work of the
NBN Trust is ensuring that access to
data is free at point of use, whilst letting
data providers exercise control over the
level of detail. The NBN Trust has built
up considerable experience in the field
of Intellectual Property and database
rights. They have drafted template
agreements for data providers, data col-
lators and end users, as well as putting
in place the technical web components
to manage the process. A data exchange
standard, incorporating an XML Data
Type Definition, has been established.
The NBN is also responsible for the
GBIF UK National Node.
Delivering Data
The NBN’s main portal to data is
through the NBN Gateway, which was
launched as an operational system in
June 2004. The construction and man-
agement of the Gateway is a joint ven-
ture by JNCC and BRC. Special map-
ping displays have been developed for
this project. Polygon information allows
generation of species lists within defined
boundaries, such as protected sites.
Extensive use is made of map layers, in-
cluding Ordnance Survey maps and land
cover. 136 different datasets containing
over 18.6 million records have been inte-
grated to allow searching by species,
designated site or by 10 km square. 
Gathering Data
A software application for use in biologi-
cal recording is managed by JNCC. The
current version is known as Recorder
2002. This is the latest in a pedigree that
stretches back to the days of DOS, when
the software was written in Advanced
Revelation. The software has been devel-
oped with public funding and is available
at very low cost through a network of re-
sellers. The software is structured around
surveys, sites and site visits and supports
‘virtual recording cards’ which mimic
manual systems familiar to the recording
community in the UK. Features include
mapping using polygons and Ordnance
Survey map tiles, bibliographic refer-
ences and image handling. The applica-
tion has been designed to accommodate
additional modules. Recently the Musée
national d’histoire naturelle,
Luxembourg has extended Recorder with
a comprehensive Collections
Management module and a multi-lingual
thesaurus.
Taxonomy is Complex
To properly account for what is found in a
country requires a maintained taxonomy
that tracks changes in nomenclature and
classification. Ongoing taxonomic re-
search may lead to splitting or lumping
of species. Species may be reassigned to
different genera and revisions made to
higher classifications. In particular,
names written into legislation may
quickly become out of date and need be
mapped to the current name. Within the
NBN, this work is undertaken by the
Species Dictionary project, which pro-
vides the taxonomy underpinning both
the Gateway and Recorder. The
Dictionary is managed by the NHM and
has the ultimate aim of being the master
list of what is found in the UK. It cur-
rently provides complete coverage for
70% of the 109 taxonomic groups
recorded from the UK. It contains over
410,000 records from over 250 different
checklists representing 190,000 separate
variants of names. A Name Server is
being developed that provides links be-
tween names and this will, in due course,
be accessible through a web service to
external applications.
Many of the current online biodiversity
resources presume some knowledge of
scientific names. The NHM received a
grant from the New Opportunities Fund
to create a website for use by the general
public that would allow them to search
using familiar common names - in partic-
ular, informal names for higher groups
(such as “ants” or “conifers”). The site
provides a finding aid for resources and
images relating to UK wildlife. Common
names are mapped to equivalent scien-
tific names and presented in a display that
encourages users to explore relationships
between organisms. The default display
is based on a classification showing
broader and narrower terms but users can
switch to a dynamic ‘spider-diagram’
display developed using software from
http://www.touchgraph.com.
Links:
NBN: http://www.nbn.org.uk
NBN Gateway: http://www.searchnbn.net
NBN Species Dictionary: 
http://www.nhm.ac.uk/nbn/
Nature Navigator: 
http://www.nhm.ac.uk/naturenavigator
Please contact:
Charles Hussey, Species Dictionary Project  
Manager, Natural History Museum, London, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 207 942 5213
E-mail: c.hussey@nhm.ac.uk
Steve Wilkinson, Manager for NBN Gateway 
and Recorder projects,JNCC, Peterborough, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 1733 866 865
Providing Access to Biodiversity Data 
in the National Biodiversity Network
by Charles Hussey and Steve Wilkinson
The National Biodiversity Network (NBN) is a partnership working to build the UK’s
first network for sharing biodiversity information.  A number of services and tools
are being developed to mobilise the large quantity of data present in the UK.
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The conference offered a fascinating
program, starting with a set of six tutori-
als on Sunday, covering general con-
cepts and formal frameworks for digital
libraries, context-enhanced digital li-
brary services, thesauri and ontologies in
digital libraries, building digital library
collections with Greenstone and DL in-
teroperability standards. This was fol-
lowed by a dense 2 1/2 day program of
presentations. 
The first keynote speaker was Neil
Beagrie from the British Library and the
Joint Information System Council, UK,
who addressed the potential of personal
digital libraries, considering specifically
the massive amounts of data that are and
will be collected by the population at
large as part of their day-to-day life, and
the resulting potential and consequences
for personal information systems.
The second keynote by Erich Neuhold,
former head of Fraunhofer-IPSI, now
Vienna University of Technology, picked
up this topic and pointed out future direc-
tions in DL development, focusing par-
ticularly on the promises and challenges
of integrating and combining DL, peer-
to-peer and GRID technology.
The quality of the presentations, held in
two parallel sessions, was excellent, with
only 32% of all papers submitted to the
conference having been accepted for pre-
sentation. In addition to the presentations
ECDL featured two panels. Donatella
Castelli discussed with a prominent
group of panelists one of the key mes-
sages addressed in the second keynote,
namely whether digital libraries on the
GRID will turn out to  be hell or heaven,
whereas Tamara Sumner tried to answer
the question whether e-science needs dig-
ital libraries. The whole range of current
digital library research as well as project
activities were presented in a poster ses-
sion, featuring both research posters, ap-
plication demos, as well as current pro-
ject activities of the DELOS Network of
Excellence on Digital Libraries.
Furthermore, a large group of
PhD students had the chance to
present and discuss their work
not only within the ECDL
Doctoral Consortium, but also
with the whole ECDL commu-
nity as part of the poster session.
Following the main conference
program, ECDL was rounded off
with a set of well-attended work-
shops. CLEF, the cross-language
evaluation forum, drew more
than 100 participants during its
two and a half days of presenta-
tions and evaluation sessions.
IWAW, the ECDL Workshop on
Web Archiving and Digital
Preservation was extended to fill an inten-
sive two-day program this year, with
about 60 participants.
Both the NKOS Workshop on Mapping
Knowledge organization Systems, as
well as HDL, Healthcare in Digital
Libraries, ran in their successful 1-day
form, soliciting intensive discussion. 
ECDL 2005 prooved to be a splendid op-
portunity for people to meet and discuss
current core aspects of digital library re-
search. We are looking forward to con-
tinue these discussions at the 10th aniver-
sary of ECDL, which will be held
September 17-24 2006 in Alicante, Spain. 
Link: 
http://www.ecdl2005.org
http://www.ecdl2006.org
Please contact: 
Andreas Rauber, Vienna University of 
Technology, Austria
Tel: +43 1 58801 18826
E-mail: rauber@ifs.tuwien.ac.at
Some 400 researchers and practitioners met in Vienna, Austria for the 9th European
Conference on Research and Advanced Technology for Digital Libraries (ECDL
2005) 18-23 September 2005.
ECDL 2005 –European Conference 
on Research and Advanced Technology 
for Digital Libraries
by Andreas Rauber
sponsored by ERCIM
ECDL participants enjoy the ECDL gala dinner.
Costantino Thanos, DELOS Scientific Coordinator
(left) is handing over the DELOS Research
Exchange Award for the best paper presented by a
young author, to Christos Tryfonopoulos for his
paper “LibraRing: An Architecture for Distributed
Digital Libraries Based on DHTs”. 
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The main objectives of the Cross-
Language Evaluation Forum (CLEF) are
to stimulate the development of mono-
and multilingual information retrieval
systems for European languages and to
contribute to the building of a research
community in the multidisciplinary area
of multilingual information access.
These objectives are realised through the
organisation of annual evaluation cam-
paigns and workshops. Each campaign
offers a series of evaluation tracks de-
signed to test different aspects of mono-
and cross-language system performance.
The focus is diversified to include differ-
ent kinds of text retrieval across lan-
guages and on different kinds of media
(ie not just plain text but collections con-
taining images and speech as well). In
addition, attention is given to issues that
regard system usability and user satisfac-
tion with tasks to measure the effective-
ness of interactive systems.
The scope of CLEF has gradually ex-
panded over the years. In CLEF 2005
eight tracks were offered to evaluate the
performance of systems for:
• mono-, bi- and multilingual document
retrieval on news collections (Ad-hoc) 
• mono- and cross-language structured
scientific data (domain-specific) 
• interactive cross-language retrieval
(iCLEF) 
• multiple language question answering
(QA@CLEF) 
• cross-language retrieval on image col-
lections (ImageCLEF) 
• cross-language speech retrieval (CL-SR)
• multilingual web retrieval (WebCLEF)
• cross-language geographic retrieval
(GeoCLEF). 
In order to cover all these activities, the
CLEF test collection has been expanded
considerably: the main multilingual
comparable corpus now contains over 2
million news documents in twelve
European languages- new entries this
year were Hungarian and Bulgarian.
Sub-collections from this corpus were
used by the Ad-Hoc, QA, iCLEF and
GeoCLEF tracks. The collection used to
test domain-specific system perfor-
mance consists of the GIRT-4 database
of English and German social science
documents and the Russian Social
Science Corpus. ImageCLEF used a
number of different collections: an
archive of historic photographs provided
by St Andrews University, Scotland, and
several sets of medical images with
French, English and German case notes
and annotations made available by
University Hospitals, Geneva, and by
Aachen University of Technology. The
cross-language speech retrieval track
(CL-SR) used speech transcriptions from
the Malach collection of spontaneous
conversational speech derived from the
Shoah archives. Finally, WebCLEF used
the EuroGOV corpus, a multilingual col-
lection of about two million webpages
crawled from European governmental
sites.
Participation in this year’s campaign was
considerably up with respect to the pre-
vious year with 74 groups submitting re-
sults for one or more of the different
tracks as opposed to 54 groups in CLEF
2005: 43 from Europe, 19 from North
America, ten from Asia and one each
from South America and Australia. The
introduction of the Speech, Image and
Question Answering tracks in previous
years and of the GeoCLEF track this
year means that the growing CLEF com-
munity is increasingly multidisciplinary,
with expertise in diverse areas such as
natural language processing, speech
recognition and analysis, geographic in-
formation systems, image processing,
medical informatics, etc..
The campaign culminated in the work-
shop held in Vienna, Austria, 21-23
September. In addition to presentations
by participants in the campaign, Noriko
Kando from the National Institute of
Informatics, Tokyo, gave an invited talk
on the activities of the NTCIR evaluation
initiative for Asian languages. Breakout
sessions gave participants a chance to
discuss ideas and results in detail. The
final session was dedicated to proposals
for activities for CLEF 2006.
The presentations given at the CLEF
Workshops and detailed reports on the
experiments of CLEF 2005 and previous
years can be found on the CLEF website
at http://www.clef-campaign.org/ The
preliminary agenda for CLEF 2006 will
be available from mid-November.
CLEF is an activity of the DELOS
Network of Excellence for Digital
Libraries.
Link:
http://www.clef-campaign.org
Please contact:
Carol Peters, ISTI-CNR, Italy
CLEF Coordinator
Tel: +39 050 3152897
E-mail: carol.peters isti.cnr.it
by Carol Peters
The results of the sixth campaign of the Cross-Language Evaluation Forum were
presented at a two-and-a-half day workshop held in Vienna, Austria, 21-23
September, immediately following the ninth European Conference on Digital
Libraries. The workshop was attended by well over 100 researchers and system
developers from academia and industry.
Cross-Language Evaluation Forum — 
CLEF 2005 
CLEF steering
committee. 
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The ERCIM Working Group (WG)
‘User Interfaces for All’, through its
dedicated and prolific work, actively
supports since 2001 the Universal
Access in Human-Computer Interaction
Conference, held this year for the third
time. The UAHCI Conference alternates
with the ERCIM biannual workshop,
and many members of the WG have
participated in the Conference in Las
Vegas. 
HCII 2005 was one of the biggest ever
organised in the fields related to Human
Computer Interaction and Information
Society Technologies, and attracted
more than 2100 participants from 60
countries, representing the research and
academic communities, as well as the
industry. 
The Conference Programme was organ-
ised into nine thematic areas, namely
Ergonomics and Health Aspects of
Work with Computers, Human Interface
and the Management of Information,
Human-Computer Interaction, Engineer-
ing Psychology and Cognitive
Ergonomics, Universal Access in
Human-Computer Interaction, Virtual
Reality, Usability and Internationaliza-
tion, Online Communities and Social
Computing, and Augmented Cognition.
The programme featured an opening
session, 251 parallel paper sessions, 22
tutorials, 271 poster presentations,
eleven demonstrations and five Special
Interest Groups. Dr. Gerald M. Edel-
man, Nobel laureate (The Neuro-
sciences Institute, San Diego, Califor-
nia, USA) was the keynote speaker. His
keynote address was entitled ‘From
Brain Dynamics to Consciousness: A
Prelude to the Future of Brain-Based
Devices’. During the opening session, a
movie premier was also shown, entitled
‘The Future of Augmented Cognition -
An Alexander Singer Film’, introduced
by Dr. Dylan Schmorrow, DARPA,
USA.
The Proceedings have been published
on CD-ROM by Mira Digital Publish-
ing (ISBN 0-8058-5807-5), and are
structured in eleven
volumes, entitled:
‘Engineering Psychol-
ogy, Health and Com-
puter System Design’,
‘The management of
Information: E-Busi-
ness, the Web, and
Mobile Computing’,
‘Human-Computer
Interfaces: Concepts,
New Ideas, Better
Usability, and Applica-
tions’, ‘Theories Mod-
els and Processes in
HCI’, ‘Emergent
Application Domains in HCI’, ‘Human
Factors Issues in Human-Computer
Interaction’, ‘Universal Access in HCI:
Exploring New Interaction Environ-
ments’, ‘Universal Access in HCI:
Exploring New Dimensions of Diver-
sity’, ‘Advances in Virtual Environ-
ments Technology: Musings on Design,
Evaluation, & Applications’, ‘Interna-
tionalization, Online Communities and
Social Computing: Design and Evalua-
tion’, and ‘Foundations of Augmented
Cognition’, and a ‘Posters’ section.
The 12th International Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI
International 2007) will be held in Bei-
jing, PR China, 22-27 July 2007, jointly
with the Symposium on Human Inter-
face (Japan) 2007, the 7th International
Conference on Engineering Psychology
and Cognitive Ergonomics, the 4th
International Conference on Universal
Access in Human-Computer Interaction,
the 2nd International Conference on
Virtual Reality, the 2nd International
Conference on Usability and Interna-
tionalization, the 2nd International Con-
ference on Online Communities and
Social Computing, the 2nd International
Conference on Augmented Cognition,
and the 1st International Conference on
Human Digital Modelling. The call for
papers is available at
http://www.hcii2007.org.
Link: 
http://www.hci-international.org/
Please contact: 
Constantine Stephanidis, ICS-FORTH, 
Greece
Tel: +30 2810 391741
E-mail: cs@ics.forth.gr
HCI International 2005
by Constantine Stephanidis
The 11th International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction (HCI Inter-
national 2005) was held in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 22-27 July 2005, jointly
with the Symposium on Human Interface (Japan) 2005, the 6th International
Conference on Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics, the 3rd
International Conference on Universal Access in Human-Computer Interaction,
the 1st International Conference on Virtual Reality, the 1st International Confer-
ence on Usability and Internationalization, the 1st International Conference on
Online Communities and Social Computing, and the 1st International Confer-
ence on Augmented Cognition, under the auspices of nine distinguished inter-
national boards of more than 200 members from 30 countries. 
The exhibition of the HCII 2005 Conference.
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The aim of the CASSIS workshop is to
bring together experts from the smart de-
vices industry and academic researchers,
with a view to stimulate research on for-
mal methods and security, and to encour-
age the smart device industry to adopt in-
novative solutions drawn from academic
research. In order to address the different
issues raised by the evolution of smart de-
vices, the workshop consisted of seven
thematic sessions: 
• Session 1: Research trends in smart
devices. The session was organized by
Jean-Jacques Vandewalle, from
Gemplus. The session was dedicated
to providing perspectives on possible
evolutions of smart devices. The
keynote speaker was Gilles Privat,
from France Telecom R&D.
• Session 2: Web services. The session
was organized by Cédric Fournet and
Andy Gordon, from Microsoft
Research Cambridge. This session fo-
cused on security issues for web ser-
vices, including trust and identity man-
agement, and formal and automatic
verification of web services deploy-
ments. The session was followed by a
panel discussion on web services secu-
rity, chaired by Andy Gordon. The
keynote speaker was Cédric Fournet.
• Session 3: Virtual machine technology.
This session covered new develop-
ments in Java technologies and in for
developing generic, adaptable and
maintainable platforms for smart de-
vices. The keynote speaker was Sophia
Drossopoulou, from Imperial College
London.
• Session 4: Security. This session was
devoted to security issues from a wider
perspective, and addressed issues such
as elecronic voting, Internet threat
analysis, privacy and language-based
security. The keynote speaker was Dan
Wallach, from Rice University, Texas.
• Session 5: Validation and formal methods.
This session, organized by Thomas
Jensen, from IRISA Rennes, focused on
verification techniques for Java-like appli-
cations, including run-time verification,
program analyses, and interactive verifica-
tion. The keynote speaker was Klaus
Havelund, from Kestrel Technology at
NASA Ames Research Center.
• Session 6: Proof-Carrying Code. The
session was organized by Adriana
Compagnoni. It was devoted to the
presentation of Proof-Carrying Code
architectures, and of their applications
to advanced security policies about re-
souce control and information flow.
The keynote speaker was George
Necula, from the University of
California at Berkeley.
• Session 7: Embedded devices. The final
session was organized by Traian
Muntean, from Marseilles University,
and Jean-Louis Lanet, now at Gemplus.
The session focused on technology is-
sues that arise from the evolution of
embedded devices into networked mo-
bile devices. The keynote speaker was
Rajesh Gupta, from the University of
California at Irvine.
The workshop was attended by over 70
participants. The organizers would like to
thank the session organizers, speakers and
participants for contributing to make
CASSIS 2005 a stimulating and enjoy-
able event. The organizers would also like
to acknowledge financial support from
ERCIM, Gemplus International S.A, and
Oberthur Card Systems. A special thanks
goes to the support teams at INRIA
Sophia-Antipolis, and in particular to
Nathalie Bellesso and Monique Simonetti
for their help in organizational matters.
Link:
CASSIS’05: http://www-sop.inria.fr/everest/
events/cassis05/index.html
Please contact: 
Gilles Barthe, INRIA
Tel: +33 4 92 38 79 38
E-mail: Gilles.Barthe@sophia.inria.fr
by Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Marieke Huismanand Jean-Louis Lanet
Following last year edition in Marseilles, the second edition of the International
Workshop on the Construction and Analysis of Safe, Secure and Interoperable
Smart Devices was held in Nice, 8-11 March 2005.
CASSIS: Construction and Analysis of Safe,
Secure and Interoperable Smart Devices
sponsored by ERCIM PHISE’05 - 1st Workshop
on Philosophical
Foundations of
Information Systems
Engineering 
by Cesar J. Acuña and Belen Vela 
Esperanza Marcos from Rey Juan Car-
los University, Spain, and Roel Wieringa
from the University of Twente, The
Netherlands, have successfully orga-
nized the 1st International Workshop of
Philosophical Foundations on Informa-
tion Systems Engineering (PHISE’05),
held in conjunction with the 17th CAISE
in Porto, Portugal.
Empirical and formal sciences are older
than engineering sciences and, for this rea-
son, they have their own branch of philoso-
phy, the philosophy of science.
Engineering sciences have not fully devel-
oped a philosophical branch working to-
wards conceptual clarity. The PHISE
workshop tries to cover different aspects re-
lated to philosophical foundations of the re-
search in information system engineering
and aims to promote an interdisciplinary
forum as a result of the confluence of three
disciplines: philosophy of science and tech-
nology, software engineering and informa-
tion systems. From the 21 submissions,
twelve papers were accepted as regular pa-
pers and six as short papers. The selected
papers were structured in four sessions:
• foundations of information systems en-
gineering,
• research methods in information sys-
tems engineering,
• models and ontologies in information
systems engineering
• miscellany.
In addition Dr. Heinz K. Klein from the
Department of Management Information
Systems (MIS) of the Temple University
of Philadelphia, USA, present the invited
lecture: ‘Methodological Differences be-
tween the Cultural and Natural Sciences’.
Link:
http://kybele.escet.urjc.es/PHISE05/
Please contact:
Esperanza Marcos, SpaRCIM, Spain
E-mail: esperanza.marcos@urjc.es
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EURO-LEGAL
Current proposals for a legal requirement
for the retention of electronic communi-
cations data, which would include details
of mobile phone calls and internet traffic,
will affect the privacy of every EU cit-
izen. A recent draft framework proposing
the retention of electronic data by com-
munications service providers for up to
three years was rejected by the European
Parliament. A separate proposal by the
European Commission for a new
Directive on the retention of electronic
communications data has now been con-
sidered by the European Data Protection
Supervisor (‘the EDPS’), Peter Hustinx,
who delivered his opinion on the proposal
on 26 September 2005.
The provisions of the proposed
Directive were considered by the EDPS
with regard to data protection legislation
and the protection of privacy given by
Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR).
The EDPS has suggested amendments
to the proposal that would provide a
legal basis for the retention of data by
service providers and access to the data
by law enforcement agencies of the
Member States. 
The EDPS recognises that access to cer-
tain traffic and location data by law
enforcement agencies can assist in the
combat of terrorism and other serious
crime. However, the necessity of the obli-
gation to retain data must be demon-
strable and proportionate. The EDPS is
not convinced of the absolute necessity of
the retention of traffic and location data
for law enforcement purposes, or that it is
in itself an effective response, unless
additional safeguards apply including
that: 
• the data should be transmitted from the
service providers to the authorities,
rather than allowing them direct access
• access should be prohibited for data-
mining activities or for routine ‘fishing
operations’
• access by the authorities should only be
for the investigation of certain serious
criminal offences, and should be sub-
ject to judicial control
• data protection principles must be
expressly provided for, such as the
exercise of rights by the data subject,
the need for data quality and security,
and limitations as to lawful purposes of
retention of data.
The new Directive provides that the obli-
gation to retain data should apply for a
maximum period of 6 months in the case
of Internet communications data, and for
up to one year for the retention of other
communications traffic data. The reten-
tion of all data for such periods will mean
the creation of huge databases, and
require technological measures to ensure
that data is erased after the relevant reten-
tion period, the provision of a verifiable
audit trail of actions, and an adequate and
effective search engine to allow for tar-
geted searching for specific data.
The costs of data retention and related
technological measures such as effective
search engines will be considerable.
Providers must be offered compensation
as an incentive to install the technological
and procedural security measures to retain
the data and control access. Member states
will bear the cost of compensating the ser-
vice providers. There are interesting cross-
border jurisdictional issues, for example in
cross-border phone calls, crossing a
border during a phone call, and the use of
a provider in another country than that
where the individual resides.
The Council of Europe is scheduled to
meet on 12th October to discuss the issue
of data retention further. The full text of
the Opinion of the European Data
Protection Supervisor on the
Commission’s Proposal can be found at
http://www.edps.eu.int/12_en_opinions.htm.
By Judy Beck, CCLRC, UK
Editor: Heather Weaver, CCLRC, UK
Proposed Retention of Electronic Communications Data in Europe
Heather Weaver, would like to make it clear that the article on Digital Rights Management
(DRM), which appeared in the Euro Legal column of edition 62 of ERCIM News, was an
extract from a paper written by Renato Iannella and the URL included in the article
(http://www.dlib.org/dlib/june01/iannella/06ianella.html) will take you to the full paper. 
As the debate on open access continues to gain pace, Renato has kindly agreed to
contribute an article on his latest research into DRM for the January edition of ERCIM News
which will look into Open Access issues in the European Scene.We look forward to that.
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IN BRIEF
SICS — Staffan Truvé is the new Managing Director of
SICS and new member of ERCIM’s Board of Directors.
Staffan Truvé has been appointed Managing Director of
SICS as of 1st July 2005. The position is his third as
Managing Director within the same group: Staffan Truvé al-
ready leads the Interactive Institute as well as the umbrella
organization SITI, where SICS and Interactive Institute are
included together with Viktoria and S:ta Anna Institutes.
Consequently he will also join ERCIM’s Board of Directors.
Staffan has 20 years of experience in research and high-tech startups. His research
background is in compiler technology, computer architecture and computer vision. In
1994 he co-founded CR&T (Carlstedt Research and Technology), a research and de-
velopment organization in the areas of computer science and computer engineering.
He is also the co-founder of Spotfire, AppGate, Pilotfish, Gatespace Telematics and
CADSIM. Staffan is the chairman of Gatespace Telematics and acts as a
technical/business advisor to startups, venture capital funds, universities and govern-
ment agencies. Staffan is 42 years old, and holds a PhD in Computer Science from
Chalmers University and a BA in Business Administration from Göteborg University.
He has been a visiting Fulbright scholar at MIT and maintains a strong academic net-
work in Sweden and in the US.
The appointment of Staffan Truvé as Managing Director takes SICS one step closer to
leading the co-ordination of the four IT research institutes in Sweden.
INRIA — Call for proposals for 2006-
2007 Cooperative Research
Initiatives. INRIA launched a new call
for proposals targeted at the scientific
community in France and in Europe.
This program aims to foster the rapid
emergence of certain topics, encourage
initiatives by young research scientists
and support synergies between teams
having different and complementary
skills.  These initiatives also are a means
for INRIA to open itself up to new re-
search partnerships. External collabora-
tions are largely open in to INRIA’s
priviledged European partners such as
the members of ERCIM and transfron-
tier projects are encouraged. 
The allocated resources support research
activities for two years. The present call
for proposals concerns a sum that is not
entirely defined yet but that should be
close to 500 KEuros per year over two
years. Around ten proposals could be se-
lected after this call.
Cooperative research initiatives are in-
tended to support already begun scien-
tific activities that are not connected to a
short term transfer project. It is not
necessary to set up industrial partner-
ships or development initiatives in this
context. This however could happen at a
later stage. The potential applications re-
mains an important element in the as-
sessment of proposals.
Concerning the definition of themes for
the initiatives, emphasis is placed on the
priority challenges set by the INRIA’s
scientific policy. All proposals will how-
ever be examined according to their mer-
its. Cooperative research initiatives must
make it possible to launch research ini-
tiatives that could not be undertaken oth-
erwise, or with difficulty. Proposals that
include more than one geographical site
have priority once they are scientifically
justified. 
The application deadline is 10
November 2005.
http://www.inria.fr/recherche/arc/arc2006.en.html
FhG — The Drug Discovery applica-
tion, where scientists carry out in silico
docking, was initiated and implemented
by Fraunhofer Institute for Algorithms
and Scientific Computing (SCAI) in
Germany and the Corpuscular Physics
Laboratory (IN2P3) of Clermont-
Ferrand in France. It has been running on
the EGEE (Enabling Grids for 
E-Science) production service since
December 2004. In silico docking en-
ables researchers to compute the proba-
bility that potential drugs will dock with
a target protein and is one of the most
promising approaches to speed-up and
reduce the cost to develop new drugs to
treat diseases such as malaria. 
The application is part of the WISDOM
data challenge which demonstrated how
grid computing can help drug discovery
research by speeding up the whole pro-
cess. The sheer amount of data generated
indicates the potential benefits of grid
computing for drug discovery. The next
step is to analyse the huge quantity of re-
sults provided by this experiment which
will require significant data mining ef-
fort. 
http://public.eu-egee.org/news/fullstory.php? 
news_id=53
SpaRCIM — Spanish Awards in
Informatics — during the First Spanish
Conference on Informatics (CEDI 2005)
in Granada, 13-16 September 2005, two
new national awards have been granted
to prominent Spanish researchers. The
‘José García Santesmases Award’ for the
most outstanding professional career
was presented to Prof. Antonio Vaquero
from the Complutense University of
Madrid (UCM). Antonio Vaquero is one
of the founders of Informatics in Spain,
both as an academic discipline and as a
very active research field. The ‘Aritmel
Award’ for the researcher developing the
most significant scientific contributions
to informatics engineering was given ex-
aequo to Manuel Hermenegildo, from
the Technical University of Madrid
(UPM) and Mateo Valero, from the
Technical University of Catalonia
(UPC). Mateo Valero has strongly con-
tributed to the development of high per-
formance computing. Manuel
Hermenegildo is well-known for his
many scientific contributions in the areas
of software engineering and program-
ming languages. Finally, the ‘Mare
Nostrum Award’ was given to the com-
panies Telvent and iSOCO, and the
Ramón Llull Award gone to the Junta de
Extremadura.
http://cedi2005.ugr.es/premios.shtml
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tems and mobile ad hoc networks. We
proposed a protocol called CONFIDANT
(Cooperation Of Nodes — Fairness In
Dynamic Ad hoc NeTworks) to cope with
misbehaviour. Detection is based both on
first-hand observation and on second-hand
information provided by other nodes. 
To be useful, reputation systems need to
be reliable and robust against liars. They
can, however, be tricked by the spread of
false reputation ratings. On the other
hand, simple solutions such as exclu-
sively relying on one’s own direct obser-
vations do not make use of all the infor-
mation available. 
Our fully distributed reputation system is
based on a modified Bayesian estimation
procedure and can cope with false infor-
mation so as to effectively use second-
hand information. Each node maintains a
reputation rating and a trust rating for all
other nodes it cares about. Reputation
ratings capture the quality of the be-
haviour of a node as an actor in the net-
work performing routing and forwarding
tasks. From time to time reputation in-
formation is exchanged with others.
However, second-hand information is
only accepted if it is compatible with the
current reputation rating or comes from a
trusted node. To decide whether it is
compatible, we introduce a simple mech-
anism called the deviation test. If the re-
ceived estimation of misbehaviour devi-
ates more than a threshold value from the
current one, it is rejected, otherwise it is
accepted. The trust rating is updated
each time a deviation test has been per-
formed, meaning compatible nodes are
thus more trusted.
We use simulation to evaluate and
demonstrate the performance. We found
that CONFIDANT can keep the network
performance high even when up to half
of the network population misbehaves.
We showed that our approach of using
second-hand information significantly
speeds up the detection of misbehaving
nodes while keeping the number of false
positives and negatives negligibly low. 
Simulation results also suggest that the de-
viation test performs nearly as well on its
own without the trust component. We
have therefore analysed it in more detail
and in a more general context. We intro-
duced a mathematical model for a dis-
tributed reputation system based on the
deviation test. We showed that it exhibits a
phase transition behaviour, ie critical para-
meter values exist, below which liars have
no impact and above which liars do have a
certain impact and corrupt the reputation
system. The critical values are obtained
via a mean-field approach and are con-
firmed by direct computation as well as
simulation. We thus give guidelines for a
good choice of parameters. We also pro-
vide insight into a fundamental design
question of such systems, namely whether
or not direct observations only should be
passed on as second-hand information.
Our current focus is on combining our
simulation-based approach with the ana-
lytical approach. In particular, we are ap-
plying the insights gained by the analysis
to find and zoom in on relevant parts of
the experiment space. We are interested
in seeing whether and how the phase
transition effects observed in the analyti-
cal work carry through to our simulations
of a more complex system, such as a mo-
bile ad hoc network implemented in
GloMoSim. Based on our analytical re-
sults, we now know what sort of be-
haviour we need to look for in the simula-
tions. This will then enable us to see how
the guidelines for a good choice of pa-
rameters from the analytical approach
translate into a good choice of parameters
for the more realistic system. We thereby
optimize the performance of the dis-
tributed reputation system.
In conclusion, we provide a methodology
to identify potential sweet spots and irregu-
lar behaviour of complex distributed repu-
tation systems in decentralized self-orga-
nized systems. We expect to complete the
combination of the two approaches by the
end of the year.
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